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LAvVYERS ON THE AUCTION BLOCK: EVALUATING THE 
SELECTION OF CLL\SS COUNSEL BY AUCTION 
jill E. Fisch* 
The lead counsel auction has attracted increasing attention. Auction 
advocates mgue that auctions introduce competitive market forces that im­
prove the selection and compensation of class counsel. The benefits of the 
auction, the;' claim, include lower legal fees and better representation. 
Careful scrutiny reveals that auction advocates have overlooked sub­
stantial methodological problems with the design and implementation of the 
lead counsel auction. Even if these problems were overcome, the auction pro­
cedure is flawed: Auctions are poor tools for selecting firms based on multiple 
criteria, compromise the judicial role, and are unlikely to produce reasonable 
fee awards. 
Although the existing record is insufficient to permit rigorous empirical 
evaluation, early results raise concerns. This Article therefore considers an 
alternative: negotiation by an empowered lead plaintiff The Article ana­
lyzes recent deuelopments under the Private Securities Litigation PL£fonn Act 
to demonstrate that client empowennent is a more effective way of incmpomt­
ing market forces into the selection and compensation of class counsel. The 
Article concludes with interj;retive guidance on fwther develojJmen t of the 
model and its extension beyond securities litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The lead counsel auction has recently achieved increased visibility 
for several reasons .  Judge Lewis Kaplan ' s  decision to use an auction in 
the prominent Auction Houses anti trust case 1 was described as highly suc­
cessful . :>  After a number of years in which Judge Vaughn Walker's pio­
neering auction in Omcli� attracted few imitators, several other j udges 
have begun to experiment with the auction proced ure.4 Those responsi­
ble for reforming class action procedures, from the Advisory Committee 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" to the Third Circuit Task Force 
on the Appointment of Counsel in Class Actions,il are seriously assessing 
l. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); sec also 
John C. Coffee,.Jr., U ntangling the 'Auction Houses' Aftermath, 1\.Y. L..J., Nov. 30, 2000, <H 
l, [hereinafter CoHee, Untangling] (describing bidding procedure used in the case). 
2. Mark Hambleu, Lead Counsel Bid Formula Seen as Success, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 5, 200 l, 
at l. 
�. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N .. D. Cal. 1990). 
4. See, e.g., In re A u ction Houses, 197 F.RD. at 71, 85 (using auction to select counsel 
in anti trust class action); In re Bank One S' holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2cl 780, 
784-90 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (using sealed bidding process to select counsel in securities class 
action); In re Lucem Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 155-58 (D.NJ. 2000) (same). 
5. See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Class Counsel Appoimment 
Rule & Attorney Fees Rule, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(revised as of july 31, 2001). 
G. See Shannon P. Duffv, 3rd Circuit to Examine Class Counsel Selection, l.egal 
lntelligencer, Jan. 31, '200 l, at 1 (describing formation of Third Circuit task f"orce t:o stuclv 
use of lead counsel auc tions) . I testified before the Task Force on :\'larch 1 fi, 200 J. The 
Third Circuit Task Force Report on the Selection of Class Counsel (Jan. 2002) is a\·ailable 
at http:/ /mvw.ca3.uscourts.g0\/ classcounsel/ final% 20report% 20of%20tbircl %20ci rcui t% 
20t<tsk 11cJ 20forcc. pdf. 
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the potential of the auction to address perceived problems in class action 
litigation.' 
Under the auction model, a court selects class counsel by soliciting 
bids from prospective plaintiffs' firms. On the basis of these bids, the 
court determines which firm will represent the plaintiff class, as well as 
the price and structure of the eventual fee award. Supporters of the auc­
tion approach, including judges who have used lead counsel auctions, 
claim that the lead counsel auction introduces competitive market forces 
into the selection process, and that these forces can address many ex­
isting problems with class action procedures and the jurisprudence of fee 
awards . The benefits of the auction, they claim, include lower legal fees 
and better representation. 
These claims have not been subject to careful scrutiny. Indeed, auc­
tion advocates have made several fundamental and erroneous assump­
tions about the operation of lead counsel auctions and have overlooked 
substan_tial methodological problems with their design and implementa­
tion. Even if these problems were overcome, limitations of the auction 
procedure hamper its ability to function as an effective method of select­
ing class counsel. 
Among their shortcomings, lead counsel auctions do not address 
agency problems or the difficulties inherent in drafting an appropriate 
contract for legal services in a class action; auctions are unlikely to pro­
duce reasonable fee awards; and auctions reduce counsel's accountabil­
ity. Auctions also compromise the judicial role. A court's reliance on 
auction results may lead to undue complacency and cause the court to 
approve an unreasonable settlement or fee award.H Moreover, by casting 
the judge as auctioneer, the auction exacerbates existing structural 
problems in the class action mechanism. Accordingly, to the extent that 
existing procedures for selecting and compensating class counsel are de­
ficient, auctions are not a promising solution. 
This Article therefore proposes an alternative: selection and reten­
tion of lead counsel by an empowered lead plaintiff. Relying on a variety 
of client-centered materials, including interviews with institutional inves­
tors, this Article assesses the developing experience of institutional inves­
tors as lead plaintiffs under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (PSLRA) Y Institutional investors are developing competitive 
rnarket-based procedures to select counsel and negotiate fee agrecmen ts. 
7. See abo Declaration ofjoseph Grunclfest Regarding Procedures Emplovecl in the 
Selection of Lead P laintiff and Lead Counsel Pursuant to the Private Securities Lit igation 
Reform Act of 1995, r\ronson v. tvlcKesson HBOC, Inc . ,  79 F. Supp. 2d 1 14 6  (N.D. Cal. 
1999) (No. C-99-20743-R:"Il'l'\') [hereinafter Grundfest Declaration] (descr ibing benefits of 
emplo:·ing a court-initiated bidding procedure). 
8. See, e.g., In re Ccndant Corp. Prides Lirig .. 243 f.3d 722, 742-44 (3d Cir. 200 I) 
(holding th<tt trial coun·s use or leacl counsel auction did not e:-:cuse coun·s h i l urc to 
determine, at conc lu�ion of case, that resulting fee award was reasonable ) .  
9. Puh. L �<o. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (199:3) (codified in scattered sections of l:J 
;�·.s.c:.). 
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This Article argues that the lead counsel model is superior in precisely 
those cases in which courts have used auctions. The Article concludes by 
describing the circumstances under which the lead plaintiff model can be 
extended beyond securities litigation. 
Part I briefly describes the existing regulatory framework and identi­
fies the selection of counsel issues that have led courts to explore the 
auction alternative. Part I I  explains the methodology of the lead counsel 
auc tion and describes recent auction cases. Part III  formalizes the auc­
tion model. Part III .A explores the rationale for using an auc tion. Parts 
I II.B, C, and D then consider constraints in the auction procedure that 
limit its ability to meet the identified objectives. This analysis includes an 
examination, in Part III.D, of the auction theory literature, which sug­
gests that lead counsel auctions are unlikely to produce competitive 
prices or lead to the selection of the most qualified firm s. Part IV in­
troduces the empowered lead plaintiff alternative and considers its advan­
tages as well as guidelines for implementation. Finally, Part V proposes 
criteria for determining when the lead plaintiff model can appropriately 
be extended beyond securities litigation. 
Several introductory caveats are in order. First, this Article does not 
take a position on the extent to which class litigation is desirable.10 Sec­
ond, the auction model addressed in this Article is an auction of the lead 
counsel position, not an auc tion of the underlying claims. This Article 
does not address the academic proposal of a claims auction, 11 although 
some of the discussion is relevant to that proposal.' :-2 Third, this Article 
10. The Article operates fi·om the premise that class litigation can be defended on 
both deterrence and compensation grounds . See generally Jill E. Fisch, Class Action 
Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, Law & Contemp . Probs., Autumn 1997, at 
167, 170-76 [hereinafter Fisch, Qui Tam] (describing compensation and deterrence 
rationales). To the extent that one rejects victim compensation as <l \·alicl litigation goal, 
the evaluation of attorneys' fees becomes less significant and collapses into an e\·aluation of 
the total recoverv generated bv the litigation. H01vever, as discussed below, see infra Part 
ll.B, if the incentives created by particular selection methods or fee structures reduce the 
recoverv. thev reduce litigation ' s deterrent effect. See, e.g., Hugh Gravalle & Michael 
·Waterson, No 'v\'in. No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees, 10:\ Econ . .J. 1205, 
J 206-07 ( !993) (observing that anticipated costs of settlemenr affect clefenclant·� level of 
care). 
ll. Ethical rules and restrictions on champerty appear to limit the viability of a claims 
auction under existing law. See 'v\'illiam B. Chandler Ill. A,,·arcling Counsel Fees in Class 
<mel Derivati\·e Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancerv 42 (Uni,·crsit\ of i\l ichigan 
Law School, unpublished Working Paper, Apr. 2001) (on file with the Columl!ia Law 
1-?.eviet:e). 
1 '2. See generally .Jonathan R. Macey &: Geoffrey P. \!iller. The Plaintiffs' Auorney's 
Role in Cb:;s A.ction and Deri\ative Litigation: Economic /\.n�1h-si:; and Rccnmmcnclations 
for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L Re1·. J (J 991) [hereinafter :Vbcey 8.: !\·filler. Plain till:;· Attorr1cv·s 
Ro le ] (C\J!l prehensivelv anakzing the merits of a claims <luction ) ; R<mcLlll S. Thomas 1:;.: 
Robert C. l-Lnsen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivati1·e Lli\SUits: .-\ Criticd Anahsis, f\7 
1\w. L:. l.. Re1·. 423, 424-2:1 (1993) (analyzing :vtacev and \Iiller proposal); _jonathan R. 
\ben(�.: Ceoffrev P. :\iiller. Auctioninf( Class Action and Deri1<1ti1·e Suit.;: .\. !(ejninclci·. ;;7 
:\1'-. L·. L. F.eY. -+5�< -U1:!-7() (1CJ99>) (re-;poncling to TIWJll<h and H�tnsc:n·., critici . .;m:;). 
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does not address the consistency of lead counsel auctions vvith existing 
law.13 Finally, this Article does not attemp t  to formulate a comprehensive 
solution to the selection and compensation of class counsel. Class litiga­
tion varies tremendously with the context; this Article focuses primarily 
on litigation areas in which courts have used or considered auctions, such 
as securities and antitrust litigation. 
I. THE REcuLATORY STATus Quo 
A. The Role of Lead Counsel 
Class litigation is increasingly conducted through a form of central­
ized management in which the court designates a firm or group of firms 
to act as lead counsel and assume primary responsibility for the case. As 
complex litigation has evolved, the position of lead counsel h as grown in 
importance. Initially, the role of lead counsel was created primarily to 
coordinate the work efforts of the various attorneys.14 Recen t decisions 
have given lead counsel greater power. Lead counsel now h as authority 
to run the case, to make litigation decisions, to negotiate settlemen t, and 
to determine the extent to which litigation responsibilities will be shared 
among other law firmsY' Although compensation for lead counsel var­
ies, the lead counsel position carries with it the opportunity to garner the 
lion 's share of the eventual fee award.16 
At first, those law firms that had filed the original complaints in the 
case prior to consolidation or those that had representation relationships 
with specific individual plain tiffs selected lead counsel cooperatively. In 
exchange for supporting the appointment of one or more firms as lead 
counsel, other firms would be allocated a share of the work in the case 
and, as a result, would share in the eventual fee award.17 As the power 
1�. I have argued elsewhere that lead counsel auctions are inconsistent with the 
PSLRA. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection 
of l.eacl Counsel Under the PSLRA., Law & Con temp. Probs., Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 
91-95 (2001) [hereinafter Fisch, Aggregation]; see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 
F.:kt 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that auctions are generally inconsistent with the 
PSl.RA); In re Razodlsh, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d30'i, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); 
In re Microstratcgy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438 (E.D. Va. 2000) (same). 
14. See, e.g., MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2cl Cir. 1958) (explaining 
hmction of ·'general counsel'' as "to supervise and coordinate the conduct of plaintiffs' 
cases" ) . 
15. See, e.g., Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) 8 41.31 (1905) (including 
sample order designating lead counsel with authority to determine position of plaintiffs on 
allm�ttters arising in the cases, to coordinate discover:', to conduct settlement negotiations, 
and to delegate responsibilities to other lawyers whom lead counsel is to "monitor"). 
16. See, e.g., In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(describing role of lead counsel and competition for the position in light of the potentially 
large fee). 
17. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingencv Fees in l\lass Tnns: Access, 
Risk, and the Pro\·ision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawvers \York for !t1cli'.icluals and 
CullectiYes of Clients, 47 DePaul L Rev. 425, 431 n.l-1: (1998) (describing hfm' "[i]nitia!ly, 
informal networks of lm\·vers began by selecting their own le�tdcrs"'). 
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and financial rewards associated with the position increased, however, 
firms found it more difficult to resolve the issue. In particular, the alloca­
tion of the fee award between the lead counsel and other participating 
attorneys became increasingly complex. Courts also became relu ctant to 
approve the appointment of lead plaintiff consortia, citing fears that ap­
pointment of multiple firms would result in duplicative work and exces­
sive fees.18 Moreover it was difficult to distinguish between cooperation 
and collusion in assessing the effect of voluntarily-created ad hoc firms on 
competition for legal services. 19 In keeping with the dominant character­
ization of the class action j udge as a fiduciary, some courts also began to 
consider the lead counsel appointment as a way to exert greater control 
over the conduct of class litigation.20 
As a result, district courts have increasingly taken for themselves the 
responsibility of appointing lead counseP 1 Selection of lead counsel dif­
fers somewhat depending on the nature of the case. In mass tort litiga­
tion, the court commonly appoints a lead counsel consortium or plain­
tiffs' steering committee. In more traditional common fund cases , such 
as securities and antitrust class actions, the lead counsel is more likely to 
be a smaller group or even a single firm. The lead counsel appointment 
typically restricts the activities of nonlead counsel and, although as a prac­
tical matter other firms may continue to participate, their roles are deter­
mined by lead counsel.22 Because firms are compensated in accordance 
with their contributions to the case, the selection of lead counsel effec­
tively allocates the economic rewards of the litigation.23 
18. See, e.g., In reFine Paper Antitntst Litig., 751 F.'2cl 56'2, 57'.!.-73 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(expressing regret over duplicative effort resu lting from prior decision to appoint large 
Plaintiffs' Executive Committee). 
19. See john C. Coffee,.Jt· . ,  Understanding the Plaintiffs r\ttorney: The Implications 
of Economic Theo1-y for Private Enforc e m ent of Law Through Class and Deri\ative 
Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 , 7ml n.111 (]986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding] 
(describing the resulting " hastily organized political convention at whic h  log-rolling tactics 
and patronage agreements were used to secure the election of the lead counsel""). 
'20. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 17, at 431 n.14 (describing _judicia l seiection of 
lead counsel as "illustrative of the trend toward increasing judicial managerial control'"). 
'21. Support for this shift is reflected in the evolution of the l'vianual for Complex 
Litigation, possibly the most authoritati\T source on complex litigation procedures. 
Initially, the Manual instructed trial courts to leave the selection of lead counsel to 
plaintiffs " attorneys. Manual for Cnmplex L i tigation § 1.9'2 (5th eel. 1932). l\lorc recent 
versions instruct the courts to make the selection. Manual for Compte:" Litiga tio n  (Third ) 
s§ '.!.0.'2'22, '.!.0.'224 (1995); IVlanual for Complex Litigation (Second)§ '.!.0.2'24 (191-l:)). The 
Manual further advises the judge to ·'make an assessme n t  of the qualifications, functions, 
org<mization. and cmnpcnsation of designated counsel.'" i\Janual for Comp lex Litigation 
(Third ) § '20.'22'f (1995). 
2'.!.. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air \\'., Inc. , 557 F.'2d 759, 773 (9th Cir. 197/) 
(upholding triai court's poll'er to appuint lead co unsel ancl restrict the activities "lnonic;tcl 
cutmst�l eYe!\ though this resulted in lctcl counsel being entit led to the bulk uf the fee 
<�W<trd). 
'2:l. See, for cx;unplc, In rc Thirteen Appeals Arising out of S;m .Juan, '16 ?.:>cl 295. 
;\09-!0 ( lst Cir. 19�h), in ll"hich the collrt stated that it was 
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Despite the economic significance of the appointment, courts have 
developed little j urisprudence addressing the selection decision. Al­
though courts pay lip service to the proposition that counsel m us t  pro­
vide representation of sufficient quality to satisfy the requirements of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23 , courts rarely go beyond superficial efforts to assess quality.24 
Nor do courts attemp t  to appoint counsel on a competitive basis.20 In­
deed, the most widely applied rule for the selection of lead counsel is the 
"first-to-file" rule, under which courts favor the firm that has filed the first 
complaint in the case.26 Although this rule, which leads to the infamous 
race to the courthouse, has been extensively criticized ,27 li ttle academic 
attention has been devoted to the selection of lead counsel. Few com­
mentators have scrutinized the scope of j udicial inquiry into attorney 
qualifications or the risk that appointment decisions may be m ade on the 
basis of favori tism rather than merit. 28 Perhaps most troubling is the lack 
of transparency in the selection process. Most courts offer little if any 
explanation of their selection decision. 
The j udge's  role as decisionmaker is also problematic. There are 
reasons to question the j udge ' s  ability to act effectively as agent for the 
class.  The court may unwittingly favor i ts own interests and be influenced 
by considerations such as docket m anagement. As a result, the court may 
select an attorney who is likely to negotiate a quick settlement rather than 
the attorney likely to obtain the highest recovery for the class. 2�1 In aclcli-
troubled lw the implications of a scheme in which the trial j udge se lects a c h osen 
few from m any lawyers who volun teer, assigns l e gal tasks to those few ( th ereby 
dictating, albeit indirec tly, the scope of the work re m a i n i ng to be clo n e  by the 
many) , ancl then,  i n  awarding fees, heavily penalizes the very lawyers to who m  h e  
h a s  relegated t h e  " lesser" duti es. 
:Z4. Cf. TC\\" Tech . Ltcl. v.  I n te rm eclia Com m u n i cations, I n c . ,  :\'os. 1 8336,  1 8289, 
l S 29c3 ,  2 000 D el .  Ch.  LEXIS 1 47 ,  at ''10-''' 1 :2  ( Del .  Ch.  Oct.  1 7 , :ZOOO) ( considering quali ty 
of the pleading, economic stake of t h e  shareholder plain tiff, ancl exte n t  to wh ich l i tigant 
pursued i ts l awsui t with greater "energy, e n thusiasm or vigor" ) .  
2:1 .  In addition to forcing a represe n tation relationship upon u n co nsen tin g  clien ts ,  
the appointm e n t  of lead counsel m ay leave class m embers powerless and unable  to 
m o n i tor l i tigation decisions. See Paula Batt  Wilson,  Note, A t tornev T rn-estm e n t  in Class 
Action Litigat ion:  The Agent  Orange Exam p l e ,  4.5 Case IV. Res. L. Rev. 29 1 ,  323 (1994) .  
26.  S e e ,  e . g  . .  Elliott ] .  \Yeiss & Jo h n S.  B eckerm a n ,  Let t h e  :\•I oney D o  th e Mon i toring: 
How I nstitutional I nvestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securi ti es Class Actions,  l 04 Yale 
LJ .  ::?00'), 20CJ() n .  2 1  S ( 1 995) ( describing ancl crit icizing race to t h e  courth ouse ) .  
2 7 .  See , e . g . ,  Conference Report on Th e PriYate Securit ies Litigation Refonn Act of 
l SJ % ,  H . R. Rep. >.!o. 1 04-369, at 33 ( 1 995 ) ,  reprin ted i n  1 995 L' . S . C. C.A.N. 7:)0, 732 
( c ri t ic iz ing appoimment of counsel based on race to the courthouse ) .  
'28 .  Cf )ohn C:. Coffee ,  .Jr. , Rescui ng the Pri\ a te A ttorney General : Wh\· the M odel of 
d1e Lmn:r as Bounty H u n ter Is N o t  'Working, 4:Z J\ld. L .  Rev. 2 1 5 , :277 ( 1 983)  ( proposi ng 
cri teria l'or selenion of lead counse l ) .  
2CJ . Set: .  e . g  . .  John C. Coffee,  Jr. , Class \Yars: Tht: Dilemma of th e Mass Tort Class 
Acrio n ,  ()') C: o l u m .  L . .  Re\·. 1 343, 1 454 ( 1 995 )  ( obsen i n g  t h a t  <l tried court " b e nt on 
set t lement . ,  is u n l ikelv to ch oose a lead counsel with a repu tat i o n as a tough n egotiator) . 
l nc i e e cl .  the prefcTt: n c e  of many j udges for prompt sc Lt lc m c n t  h;t•; crGt ted the op po rt u n i l\· 
t u r  c � > l l u:; i : J l 1  hc' L\\'Ct:n p l a i n ti fTr.; ' artotT1C\·s and clcft' l1�1C c n u n �·,c l .  See,  e . g  . . R h u n da 
\\'a_sseri l l <ll l .  CL!:;c: Ac t i ons .  8 0  B . U .  ! . . .  ReY. Hi i .  - ! 72 (::?000) ( n: pl a i 1 1 i n g  that .  b1 
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tion, the absence of j udicial inquiry into price considerations is troubling. 
The combination of the class action mechanism and the lead counsel 
role creates a m onopoly position for class counsel ,  leaving market forces 
p owerless to check the trial court's appointment discretion. As one c ourt 
explained ,  " the power to appoint l ead counse l  gives the trial j udge an 
unusual degree of control over the livelihood of the lawyers who prac tice 
before the c ourt. "�0 
B. judicial Determi·nation of Fee Awards 
In addition to appointing lead counsel,  the trial court is responsible 
for determining counse l  fees in class litigation. Unlike traditional litiga­
tion, in which price competition may play a role in the selection of coun­
sel,  the compensation and selection decisions in a class action are typi­
cally independent. The court appoints lead counsel at the outset  of the 
case but generally decides both the price and s tructure of the fee award 
at the conclusion of the case.31  
Courts have developed an extensive j urisprudence of fee awards.�� 
Two methods of calculating fees dominate33-the lodestar method and 
the percentage of recovery method-although some courts use a combi­
nation of th e two:14 or a third alternative."'·" The lodestar meth od com­
pensates counsel on the tim e  expended and instructs j udges to calculate 
the fee award by n1ultiplying a reasonable h ourly rate for the attorneys ' 
services by the number of hours worked.% The percentage of recovery 
method resembles the traditional contingency fee and calculates the law-
proposing a ch eap earlv sett lement,  a prospec tive l ead counse l  can obta i n  the support of 
defense counsel �.mel frequen t!\· secure appo intm en t as l ead counsel to the detrime n t  of 
th e pla i n tiff c l ass ) . 
:10 .  I n  re Thineen Appeals Arising out of San Jua n , 56 F.3cl 295,  3 1 0  ( 1 s t  Cir .  1 99:1 ) . 
S 1 .  See J u d i t h  Resni k  et a l . ,  I ncliYiclua1s within the Aggrega te : Re l a t i onsh ips , 
Representat ion,  an d Fees, 7 1  N Y U .  L ReY . 296, SS6-S7 ( 1 996) ( exp lai nin g that courts 
con trol fee a\,·ards " c i t h e r  because Co ngress has said so . . . or beGlU5C courts have found 
th ei r o\\·n authority'' ) .  I n  m ost class acti on s , judicial authoritY m·er fee awards is based o n  
the common fun d  doctrine. See,  e .g. , Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class 
Actions, 47 DePaul L Rev. 347, :'148-49 ( 1 998) ( describing common fu nd cases) . The 
alternati1·e source c:f j ucl ic ial  a u t hori ty to award a ttorneys ' fees is  s ta tu tory . Sec, e .g . ,  icL at  
341\ ( i cle nt i f)•i ng ai temarive of s ta tu LOry fee s h iftin g ) . 
:t2 .  Sec, e .g . ,  Go ldberge r  v. I n tegra ted Resources. Inc . ,  209 F. 3cl 43, 47-50 ( 2cl C i r. 
2000) ( describing eYoi u t i on of fee award j u ri s prudence in the Second Circuit  from the 
percent� tge < tppmach to the lodestar ancl b�td.) . 
:1 3 .  See . e .g  . . Geoffrey P. lvii l k r  & Lori S. Singer, !'ion pecu n i an Class Action 
Settlements .  L;,,· & Con tem p . Probs. , Au tu m n 1 997 ,  at  97 ,  app.A a t  1 45-4f:i, tbls .A9 & A l O  
(describing rules o n  award i n g  attorney fees in common fu nd cases i n  federal c o u rts  and 
t h e  fiftY �tate courts) . 
3-L See. e .g  . .  iu h·a n o tes () :)-()() �mel accompanyi ng text ( describ i n g percen tage of 
reco\'er�: inethod \\'ith l odestar c ross-check) . 
35.  />... nu!11ber of � t"dt� c o u rts use various t-ypes of rnui Lifac tor balancing lt::') t s .  See,  e . g  . .  
Sugarbr'.cl hdu'' ·  \ '  'f' l 1ome1> .  · l:!O . ..� • .  2 d  1 4 2 ,  1 4CJ-?i() ( DeL l �:·W )  ( adopt i n g m u i t i i'ac tor tes t ) . 
�)h .  See :  c .g . . Ch� trlc;;: Sih·t:r. LJ nlnading· t h e  Lodest�tr: �r o,,.�lrd �-i >Je\\' Fee  .. �l..\,·�1 rd 
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yer' s  fee as a percentage of the recovery provided to the plaintiff class as a 
result of the litigation . 37 
Common law development of each method has provided j udges with 
a variety of principles for setting an appropriate fee. For example, courts 
using the lodestar method typically adj ust the hourly fee to reflect various 
factors such as the degree of success, the novelty or complexity of the 
issues, the quality of representation, and the risk associated with the liti­
gation.38 Courts employing the percentage of recovery method often ap­
ply similar factors in determining the applicable percentage.39 
Although both the lodestar and percentage of recovery methods 
look to the market for legal services as a source of guidance for various 
factors, the court' s  fee determination is properly characterized as a regu­
latory approach. The need for j u dicial fee regulation arises from a com­
bination of the monopoly created by the class action and failures in the 
market for legal services :w 
More specifically, fee awards in class action litigation are a form of 
rate regulation.41 The fee determination is remarkably similar to the pro­
cess by which rates are set, for example, for p ublic utilities, although the 
regulatory guidelines in the case of counsel fees are the result of common 
law rather than legislation or agency rulemaking.42 The common law 
principles described above are the basis by which the court, at the conclu­
sion of the case, determines the appropriate rate of p ayment for coun­
sel 's  services. Importantly, as with rate regulation in the context of public 
utilities , the regulatory guidelines do not instruct the court to attempt to 
replicate the market process in determining compensation-indeed, the 
absence of a viable market process is the j ustification for regulation.4?· 
37. See, e .g . ,  Monique Lapo i n te,  Note, Attorney's Fees i n  Common Fu nd Auions, 59 
Fordham L. Rev. 843 , 863-67 ( 1 99 1 )  (describing percen tage of recove r-y method ) .  
38. See, e.g . ,  Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc . ,  488 F .2d 7 1 4 , 7 1 7- 1 9  (5 th Cir. 
1 9 74)  (l isting twelve factors that have been \videly used in  acU usting the lodestar 
calculation ) .  
39. See, e . g . ,  G u n ter \". Ridgewood Energy Corp . ,  223 F.3d 1 9 0 ,  1 95 n . l  ( 3 d  C i r. 2000) 
(setting forth seven factors for courts to consider in applying the percentage method) . 
40. See Susan P. Kon iak & George M. Cohen,  Under Cloak of Se ttlemen t , 82 Va. L. 
Rev. 1 051 , 1 095 ( 1 996) (expla in ing that absence of competition among pbin tif[<;' counsel 
is clue,  in  part, to the monopoly created by the class actio n ) .  
4 1 .  See generally .Jean-Jacques Laffo n t  & Jean Tirole, A Theory o f  Incentives i n  
Procurement and Regulation 6- ] 9 ( ] 993) (describing nature and forms of rate 
reg·u lati on ) .  
42. See Coffee, U nderstanding, supra note 1 9 ,  at  69 1 (describing court as a "public 
uti l i ty commission that regulates the ' fair '  return" receiYecl by the attorney) . See general ly 
Andrew P .  Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theor-y for Administrative a n d  Regulator-y 
Law: A Case Studv or Public U ti l i ty Regulati o n ,  73 C h i .-Ke n t  L. Rn·. 1 :'l:'i ( i 998) 
( d escribing h i s to ry anci j us t i fications for publ i c ut i l i ty rate regulatio n ) .  
43. Regulation is typical ly _ j ustifi ecl o n  the basis that i t  has the p O Lcn ti ai to red uce costs 
( by reduci n g  \vastc) ,  reduce ren ts to th e supplier, or both.  See La!Tont  & T i ro l e ,  �;upra 
note 4 1 .  at 1 :'\ . Publ ic uti l i ty regulation is typ ical ly based on a iixecl price approa c h ,  i n  
which t h e  ti n n  i s  the residual cla i m a n t  for i ts cost sa\·i n gs o r  a cost of SCJTi ce (or  cm; t  p l us )  
�tppro � tc h ,  i n  w h i c h  the fi n n  i s  com pe nsated for i ts costs.  S e e  i cl .  at  ti-7. 1 -1- ! i i ;  see also 
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Rather, the court's  task, in applying the factors described above, is to de­
termine a reasonable fee.44 The regulatory structure allows courts to con­
sider the social value of the litigation and to adj ust fee awards in an effort 
to optimize litigation levels,45 although instances in which courts explic­
itly consider the social costs and benefits of litigation in awarding counsel 
fees are rare.46 
C. Evaluating the Status Quo 
The existing methodology h as been extensively criticized. Courts 
and commentators have identified problems with both the lodestar47 and 
percentage of recovery approaches. 48 Critics fault the lodestar method 
for its heavy reliance on hours worked rather than value produced.49 Use 
of the lodestar m ay thus create poor incentives by penalizing lawyers who 
Peter Navarro, The Simple Analytics of Performance-Based Ratemaking: A Guide for the 
PBR Regul ator, 1 3  Yale  J.  on Reg. 1 05 , 1 08-09 ( 1 996) ( describin g performance-based 
ratemaking as an a! ternative to traditional rate-based regulation ) .  
44. Cf. George B. ivlurr, Analysis o f  the Val uati o n  of Atto rney ·work Product 
According to the Market for Claims: Reformulati n g  the Lodestar Method,  3 1  Loy. U .  Chi.  
L .J .  599,  6 1 5- 1 6 ( 2000) ( describing reasonableness i n quiry as  artificial constra in t  on 
market decisi o n s ) . 
45 . See, e . g . ,  Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil L i tigation Attorneys' Fees 
in Class Action Li tigati on , l l 3 Han• . L. Rev. 1 755,  1 8�-H ( 2000) ( exp lain in g that fee awards 
should re!1ect  goal of optimizi n g  social benefits of l i tigation,  which i nclude deterrence and 
tort insurance ) .  
46. See j ud i d1 Resnik, M o n ey M atters: Judicial M a rket I n terven ti o ns Creati n g  
Subsidies an cl Awarding Fees and Costs i n  Individual and Aggregate Li tigation ,  1 48 U .  Pa. 
L Rev. 2 1 1 9, 2 1 28 ( 2000) (arguing that courts h ave typ ica l lv sough t " to avoi d  i mposi ti on of 
value-laden assessments of the u til i ty of forms of l i tiga t ion '' i n setti ng counsel fees) .  But 
see, e . g . , Peter H. Schuck, Age n t  Orange on Trial 1 96 ( 1 986) ( recounting Judge 
v\'einste in ' s  com men ts in setti n g  counsel fees in Agen t  Orange class action that he wan ted 
to e ncourage "the legal profession . . .  to t h i n k  ;-J.t least twice before in i tiat ing sprawli ng, 
complicated cases of h ighly questionable meri t that will consume time,  expense, and 
effort . . .  in a degree vastlv disproport ionate to the resu i L� eventually ob tai nable " (quoting 
J udge \\'e inste in ) ) ;  M ark Hamblett, Lawyers' Fees Cut in  Class Acti o n ,  N .Y. LJ. , Ju n e  22, 
200 1 ,  at  1 ( reporting court's conclusion in In re D reyfus Aggressive Growth Mu tual Fund 
Litig. ,  [200 1 Transfer Binder] Feel. Sec.  L. Rep. ( CCH) 9! 9 1 ,505 ( S . D . N .Y. June 2 1 ,  200 1 ) ,  
that a higher fee was un n ecessary to attract counsel to this type o f  l i tigation ) .  
47.  See, e . g . ,  I n  rc Sumitomo Copper Li tig. , 74 F .  Supp. 2cl 393,  397 ( S . D . N .Y 1 999) 
( ''Cou rts i ncreasingly have come to recognize the shortcom i n gs of the l odestar/ multiplier 
method as <t un i\·ersal rule for compensati on . " ) ;  ?vl acey & M i l ler , Plaint iffs' Attorney's Role,  
supra note 1 2 , a t '10-54 (cri tic izing lodestar method) ; Andrew K. N i ebler,  I n  Search of 
Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Pla in ti ffs ' Lawvers: The Promise and P i tfalls of 
Auc ti oning the Position of Lead Counse l ,  5-J. Bus. Law. 763, 7 70-7 1 ( 1 999) (explaining 
how iodeswr m e thod distortS counsel's i ncen tives) . 
-18 . Sec, e .g . ,  In re Auction Houses Anti trus t  l .i t ig . ,  197 F .R. D .  71 , 77 (S.D . N .Y. 2000) 
( icle n ti t\ i ng incen tive problems created by p e rcen tage of reco\·e n· ll l ethocl ) ;  Edward D. 
Ca\'�tn�;gh , ;-\ t to; n eys · Fees in Anti trust Li tigati on : i\'laking the Systc l l l  Fairer, :17 Fordham 
L. Rev. i) 1 .  711-77 ( 1988 ) ( recounting clisacl\'an ugcs of the percemage of recover;• 
rn e t.hc >cl ) . 
·f�} .  Sec . .  e .g . �  ln re Fine Paper A n ti trust l. .i t ig . ,  75 1 F.2d :1G2, :)7 1 -7 :),  583 (3d (�ir. 
1 () 1)- l ) ( (k:;c rih!ng rt:�tsuns for th in ki ng that l"de.'> t<ll' method produ ced excc.ssive aw�trcls) . 
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work efficiently and rewarding lawyers who delay or provide unnecessary 
services. In addition, the lodestar method is administratively unwieldy, 
requiring courts to scrutinize counsel' s  billing records. 
The percentage of recovery method attempts to tailor the fee award 
more closely to the benefit provided,  but the value produced by the attor­
neys ' efforts is not necessarily correlated with the amount of the recovery. 
The attorney who settles a strong case involving a large class m ay receive a 
windfall.'"0 The attorney who u ndertakes a challenging case that, al­
though successful, yields a relatively smaller recovery may be undercom­
pensated. Percentage awards create incentive problems, including the 
risk of a cheap early settlement. In addition , critics argue that in u tilizing 
the percentage of recovery method courts place undue reliance on 
benchmark percentages and invest insufficient effort tying compensation 
to attorney performance in a particular case _:"> l  
At the core of the problem i s  uncertainty about what consti tu tes a 
"reasonable" fee award.52 Even outside the class action con text, it is un­
clear 'Whether attorneys are appropriately compensated based on their 
effort, the value they provide , or some combination of the two. Analyzing 
fee awards in terms of market-based hourly rates may be misleading."'" 
Few trial lawyers are compensated on a traditional hourly basis. The fee 
awarded to class counsel,  like the s tandard contingency fee ,  reflects pay­
ment for the lawyer 's  assumption of risk and cost of financing the litiga­
tion , as well as paymen t  for legal services. At the same time , institutional 
constraints may limit the court' s  ability accurately to assess the benefit 
generated by the litigation; courts may also be unduly reluctant to penal­
Ize counsel with low fee awards even where such awards are 
appropriate . '-'4 
A review of j udicial practice,  however, suggests that cnt1cs m ay be 
overstating the problem. vVilliarn J. Lynk's  empirical analysis of fee 
awards in class litigation, the most extensive analysis of the s ubject, con­
sidered the extent to which fee awards reflec t  lawyer effort and recovery 
50. Sec, e,g, , Lapointe, supra note 37, at 845 ( describing percentage method as 
tending "to promote excessive fee awards") , 
5 L  See, e ,g , ,  Fisch, Aggregation, supra note ! c) ,  at 59 & n .39 (describ ing j udicial 
rdi ance on benchmark percentages) ,  
') '2 ,  See, cg, ,  ln  re Svnthroid I\lktg, L i tig . ,  '264 F.3d 7 12 ,  7 18 ( 7th Cir. '.WO l )  ( 1 ej ec ting 
u i�1l court's use of megafu ncl cap and instruct ing ccmn t o  determine reasonable fee b;· 
"esrimat[ ing] the terms of the contract that private pL1in tilTs would ha,·c negotiated with 
t h e i r  Lm,·ers, had bargaining occurred at rhe uutse t o f  the case" ) .  
5 ') .  See,  e ,g . ,  Charles SiheL Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can ' t  Get 
Th ere from H e i'C ,  74 TuL L. Rev. n .;o9, 1 8'2 , 1-'27 ( 2000) ( a rguing that hourl\' rates sh ould 
n o t  be u :-:.��c1 a:; the s tandard of re�tsonablen c.ss for c on tinge n t representat i o n ) .  
:)·-L Set·_. �� .g . .  C:hancl ler, supra note 1 1 ,  at 2 1  ( �:uggesting tb�t t ,  al though the pe rcen tage 
�_)f J.·;.__· c o Y e i.·v fe e- c a n ,  in theorv, be ac�j u:-�tccl tJ)  accou n t  fo r differe n t  f::1 c t o rs ,  _ j uclges 
past 
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size . ')') Lynk concluded that, regardless of the fee methodology purport­
edly applied by the court, fee aw·ards consistently reflec ted both factcrs . ' 1' 
To the extent that class action fee awards are based on benchmarks, 
those benchmarks appear to be lmver than the standard "volun tary" con­
tingency fee of 33% to 40 % . ·"7 Moreover,  although some courts continue 
to rely on benchmarks, oth er courts in recent high profile class actions 
have awarded much lower fees.''8 In the Drexel Burnham class action ,  the 
court awarded plaintiffs ' counsel a mere 4%,  j ustifying the low recovet)' 
on the relative absence of risk in the case.59 The award >vas upheld on 
appeal .60 In the Prudential case,  the court awarded plaintiffs' counsel j ust 
4.8% of the recovery, despite characterizing the decision to take on the 
worl d ' s  largest insurance company and its sophisticated team of experts 
as involving "extraordinary risk."6 1 And in the NASDAQ antitrust case ,G:< 
in which the court described the recovery as "the largest  anti trust class 
action recovery to date,"t > 'l the court awarded counsel 14% percen t of the 
recovery.6-+ 
Courts are also increasingly evaluating the reasonableness of their 
fee calculations by using the percentage of recovel)' method and then 
cross-checking their results with the lodestar me thod. ( ;,-; This process in­
s ures that the fee award reflects both the size of the recovery and the 
a ttorney input.66 The results under the current approach arc n o t  dra-
55. v\' i l li am J Lynk,  The Courts and the Plaint iffs' l3ar: A.w;1 1 ch n g  the Attorney's Fee 
in Class-Act ion L i tigation,  23 J Legal Stud. 185 (1994) .  
56. lei. at 209. 
57. See, e.g., Goldberger v. I n tegrated Res . ,  Inc . , 209 F.:kl 43,  51 ( 2cl Cir. 2000) 
( t inding that distric t  courts typical lv use a benchmark of 2.'i % ) ;  Fisch ,  Aggreg;1 ti on ,  supra 
n ote I :1 ,  at :J9 n . 39 ( describing preva i l ing benchmarks in class action l i ti gat ion ) ; Thomas E. 
\\. i l lging e t  aL ,  .-\n Empirical Anal\'sis of Rule �23 to Address the Rulemaki ng  Chal lenge,, 71  
i'!.Y. U .  L Re1·. 74, 1 5 ') ( 1 996) ( find ing that median rates uf recoverv ranged fw m 2 . 7% to 
:Hl % ) . 
58.  See generally In re Prudentia l  I ns. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Li t ig . ,  ] 06 F. Supp. 
2cl 72 1 ,  733-35 ( D .NJ. 2000) (summariz ing fee awards as percen tage of the rcuwery in 
rece n t  class actions) . 
59. See Guldbnger, 209 F.3d at 46-..j./ (describing fee applicat iot1S and Judge J(ram's  
fee award, which was based on the l ocleswr method ) .  
60. ! d .  a t  56-57. 
6 1 .  See Pruden tial, J 06 F.  Supp. 2d a l  735-36. Indeed, depending un the mctll ocl of 
ctlcuLt tion , the award could be clescri bed <ts reflecting onlv 3. 7% of the ' c t t l cm c :n. See icL 
<tt 7'12. 
62. In  re NASDAQ Market-Makers Anti tmst Lit ig . ,  1 87 F.R.D. -+b''> (S .D . N .Y. l �l9S ) .  
6:3. l ei .  a t  470. 
()4 lei .  
()0. See, e.g. , Pmrlen liol, 1 06 F.  5upp. 2cl  a t  732 ( conc lud ing that :h ::: l ock�t;tr 
mul t ip l in \\'Ou lcl be less than � . 1 3 ) ;  In re Sumi tumo Copper I . i tig . . 74 f. Supp . '2d ?:\J3 ,  
399--+00 (S .D . .\f 'J'. 1 999) (finding th< t t  lodestar with ·'rcasonabie'' m u lti p\ i�r of "  ':2 . :) ' ielc\s 
:i<U n e  re,;ul L  as percentage of recon:ry) .  
b6.  See fn 1r S umilomo Coj1jm . 74 F .  5upp. 2 d  at 400 (c;;pbin ing ch��t.  bec.;u,;e beth Llw 
lodes t<tr and percentage of reCi l\ ·cry m e thod:; �upponed coun,,e ! · \  fee pct ; t i u n .  the 
"blanket  crit icisms uf ;ttto rn c1·s · !'ccs i n  the tobacco cases <tre \l'h ulh i l l <tppl ictbk: to th e 
Ltc r:; <illd c irnu nstc�n ces i n  this c;;se" ) .  
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m atically out of line with hourly billing rates outside the class action con­
text. 67 Moreover, any disparities can be j ustified by a variety of factors. 
An appropriate hourly rate for class action litigation must reflect the con­
tingent nature of that work and the financing costs associated with delay­
ing the attorneys ' compensation until the conclusion of the case. l'iR In 
addition, to the extent that the appointment of lead counsel creates a 
tournament among plaintiffs ' firms, tournament theory suggests that 
competitors must anticipate the prospect of receiving an above-market 
wage to be induced to competeYJ 
There are also reasons to expect that even a functioning m arket for 
legal services would produce a natural floor for the attorney's percentage 
of the recovery. A minimum percentage of the recovery may be necessary 
to induce sufficient attorney effort. Rudy Santore and Alan Viard have 
demonstrated that, because attorney effort is unobservable ,  litigation cli­
ents face a moral hazard problem.70 They explain that contingency fees 
partially address this problem by providing incentives for attorney effort, 
but that competition will not reduce contingency fees below a certain 
rate, at which attorneys will continue to earn positive profits. 7 1  Lucian 
Bebchuk and Andrew Guzman' s  work also indicates that too low a contin-
67.  Based on the court's lodestar a nalysis , for example, the fee award i n  Swnilomo 
translates i n to hourly compensation of $664. See id. at 398. The fee award i n  Ikon Ojfice 
Solutio-ns, wh ich generated obj e c tions because i t  refle cted a l most 30% of the recovery, 
yields an hourly rate, based on the court's lodestar figures, of $678. See In re I ko n  Office 
Solutions,  I n c .  Sec. Litig. ,  194 F . R. D .  1 66 ,  1 97 (E.D.  Pa . �000) . Th ese figures can be 
com pared to the b i lls submi tted by \1\'ei l  Cotshal & Manges i n  the i n vestiga tion o f  the 
:Vlaricopa I nvestm e n t  Fund, in which the firm charged as much as $6 1 5  an h our for rvliami­
based lawyers. Sec Julie Kay, Expensive Search:  Feels wan t  accounting giant,  l aw fi rm to 
slash $ 1 . 8  mil l ion b i l l  tha t could consume assets owed to cldr�ntcled im·estors, 'V! iami D ailv 
Bus. Rev., Sept.  1 1 ,  2000, at Al . Sign i ficantly , the ivlaricopa ctse did not  i m·olve the delay or 
risk assoc iated with contingency fee l i tigation.  See icl. 
68. See Patricia M. Hynes, Plain tiffs ' Class Action Attorneys Ea rn v\'hat They Get, � J. 
Inst .  for Studv Legal E thics 243, 244-46 ( 1 999) ( exp lai n i ng that l a rge scale class actions 
im pose greater risks on class counsel because o f  need for co u n se l to com mi t  substan tial 
fraction of the tirm's resources to a s ingl e  case for an expcncled period of time and the 
inabi l i ty to cliversih· away this risk) . 
69. See, e .g . ,  Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen ,  Ra n k-Orde r T o u rn a m e n ts as 
Opti m um Labor Con tracts, 89 ] .  Pol . Econ.  84 1 , 844-47 ( 1 98 1 )  (developi n g  tournament 
model ) ; James M .  Malcomson, Work I n c e n tives, Hi erarchy , and I nt e rn a l  Labor M arke ts, 92 
J .  Pol.  Econ . 486, 487-88 ( 1 984) ( developing tournament theory expla n a tion of 
supranormal wages ) ;  i'darc Calanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The 
Transformation of the Big Law Firm 3, 1 00-02 ( 1 99 1 )  ( applvi n g  tournam e n t  th eorv to law 
firms) . 
70. See .Rudv San tore & Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restr ic t i ons, i'vloral Hazard, and 
Atr.orn ey Rents. 4-1 . J . L. & Econ. (forthc o m ing �00 1 )  (man uscri p t  < t l  ?>, o n  fiie ,,-ith the 
Columbia [J(WI Rruie7U) . 
7 1 . San tore and Vi arc\ obserYe that  this p ro b l e m ,  which i s ,  in dfe c t ,  <U l age n cy 
p ro bl e m ,  could he elimin ated if the eth ic al rules perm i tt e d  a l <\1\"ycr w purcha:;c <l c l i e n t ' :;  
clairn . l ei .  L t l  �)2-:J;). 
i 
l 
l 
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gency fee may impede settlement negotiations . 72 In general, the contin­
gency fee structure enhances a plaintiffs  bargaining position because the 
plaintiff does not bear additional l i tigation costs by rejecting an unduly 
low offer.73 If the fee percentage is too low, i t  will not cover counsel ' s  full  
l itigation effort, and he or she cannot credibly threaten to go to trial . In 
addition,  a structure in which the fee percentage increases at later stages 
of the litigation may weaken the plaintiffs bargaining position because 
the plaintiff bears additional costs by delaying settlement. 
Finally, rate regulation gives courts the ability to reflect nonfinancial 
factors in fee aw-ards. In particular, both the lodestar and percentage of 
recovery methods allow the court to consider the general social value of 
the l itigation in addition to the monetary benefits it confers on the plain­
tiff class . 74 Class suits may confer positive externalities when they clarify 
an unsettled issue of law or contribute to general deterrence of miscon­
duct; they may confer negative externalities when strike sui ts cause deci­
sionmakers to be unduly risk averse . 75 To the extent that courts make a 
genuine effort to tie attorney compensation to performance, their evalua­
tion of performance may include those factors that would o therwise re­
main outside the incentive structure contemplated by the pure en­
trepreneurial model . 76 By signaling their willingness to reward socially 
desirable litigation through higher fee awards, courts can create appro­
priate incentives for plaintiffs ' counsel. To the extent that enforcemen t 
of  certain legal rules requires vigorous entrepreneurial activity by plain­
tiffs '  counsel, a regulatory regime allows courts to reward this activity. 
Nonetheless, the ambiguity inherent in the concept of a reasonable 
fee has led courts and commentators to search for an alternative . The 
most creative efforts have focused on moving from an "ends approach," 
which relies on standards for ex post judicial review, to a "means ap­
proach," which relies on procedural mechanisms for determination of 
the fee to lead to a reasonable result. 77  The tradi tiona! methodologies 
described in this Section all reflect ends approaches. The lead counsel 
auction , described in Part II, and the use of an empowered lead plaintiff, 
described in Part IV, are both examples of means approaches.7H 
7 2 .  See Lucian Arye Bebch uk & Andrew T. Guzman, How 'v\'oulcl You Like to Pay for 
That? T h e  S trategic Effects of Fee Arran gemen ts on Se ttlement Terms,  l Harv. Nego t. L .  
ReY. 53,  54 ( 1 996) . 
73.  Id. at 60. 
74.  See, e.g., Resnik,  supra note 46, at 2 1 27-29 (advocati ng that  judges consider 
societa l  goals in setring fee awards) . 
75 . See Weiss & Beckerman , supra note 26,  a t  2 1 22-23 (describ ing po ten tial ways in 
wh ich c lass l i tigdtion em confer broader social benefits ) .  
76. See gener;tlh Fisch, Qui Tam, supra note 1 0. a t  1 7 1  n . 2 2  ( cit ing l i tera tu re 
ex;u1 1 i n ing the po te n ti al cli\'ergence be tween priv;ne and societa l  costs and benefi ts o f  
l i L igat ion) . 
77. Chandl er, supra note 1 1 ,  a t  5-6 (distinguish ing benvecn ·'e n ds" a n d  ·'means" 
approach es ) .  
78. Th e leacl c o u n se l  a t tct ion and the empowered lead plaimiff are the onlv  means 
; tppro;tches that  have been used to elate . b u t  c o m m e n tators ha1-e suggested o th er such 
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I I .  THE AUCTION ALTERNATIVE 
A. The Auction 1\1odel 
The lead counsel auction is one alternative to traditional fee deter­
mination methods. The auction approach was first used in 1 990 by Judge 
Vaughn Walker in the Oracle Securities Litigation.79 The Oracle auction was 
structured as a first price sealed bid auction. The court ordered prospec­
tive counsel to submit bids reflecting the compensation they sought, as a 
percentage of the total recovery, for the services of conducting the li tiga­
tion on behalf of the plaintiff class.80 The court also requested informa­
tion on the bidders' qualifications. 8 1  The court then selec ted a winning 
bid, appointed the winning bidder as lead counsel, and announced that 
counsel's compensation would be determined in accordance with its 
bid.82 
Although the Oracle decision attracted considerable a ttention,8:� i t  
was not widely imitated. 84 Recently, however, a growing number of 
courts have experimented with the use of lead counsel auc tions. Selec­
tion of counsel issues, triggered by the reforms of the PSLRA., have led 
several courts to use auctions in securities fraud class actions.x'> Courts 
approac h es. See, e .g. , id. at 7 (p mp osi ng combined ends/means app roach t h rough 
bifurcation of se ttlem e n t  an d fee n ego tiation p rocess ) ; Ke1·in i\l. C l e r m o n t  & . John D .  
Curril'a n ,  l m pn)l'i n g  o n  the Con t inge nt  F e e ,  6 3  Cornell  L. Re1·. 529, 578-BO ( 1 978) 
( proposing con ti n gen t hourly percen tage fee) ;  A. Mi tchell Poli nsky & Dan i el L.  Rubi nfelcl, 
Al igning th e I n terests of Lawye rs and Clients 1 ( un published v\'orking P�tper, Aug. 200 1 ) 
( o n  fiie wi th th e Columbia Law Review) ( proposi ng mod i fied con t i ngen cy fee system i n  
wh ic h , th rough paymen ts made t o  a th i rd party, lawye r bears on ly a fr�tct i o n o f  th e cost of 
l i tigatio n ) .  
79. I n  re O rac le Sec. Litig. ,  l 3 1  F. R. D .  688 ( N . D .  Cal . 1 990) . 
SO. l ei .  at L19 7 .  
S l .  I d. 
8:!.  I n  re Cktc l e Sec.  L i ti g . ,  l c) 2  F . R . D .  5?.8, 548 (N . D. Cal .  1 990) ( recounting resul ts 
uf aucti on and appoint ing lead cou nse l ) . 
83.  See, e .g . ,  ivlelvyn I. v\'eiss, Shareholder Litigation-Reform Proposals to Sh i ft Fees: 
l .i ll l i t  '·Professionctl Plai n t i lls" a n d  Cap Punitive D am ages , in 1 Pr�tct ic i n g  I .aw I nstitute. 
:!6th An n ual I ns ' i tu te on Secu ri ti es Regulat ion,  683, 6%-97 ( 1 99 4 )  ( "Al t h ough . J udge 
v\'alker's  bidd i ng approach has been discussed and debated in the area of c lass act ions 
( i nc lud i n g by Art h u r  Levi tt,  Chai rman of th e Securities ancl Exch�tnge Cummi:;sic!! t ) ,  uther 
courts have rej e cted th e Oracle b iddi ng a pproac h. " ) .  
i·H .  Judge Walker fol lowed h i s own example by co ndu c tin g an auction i n  I n  r e  ·wells 
fa rgo Sec. l .i ti g . ,  1 56 F.R.D.  22?., 228-29 ( N. D .  Cal. 1 994) . App<�ren tly no other  j udge 
i m i tated the auct ion approach unti l  1 996.  See In re A m i n o  Acid Lvs i n e  .-'\n t i t.rust Litig . .  
9 l 8 F.  Supp . 1 1 90 ,  1 1 92 n . 6  ( N . D .  I l l .  1 99 6 )  (sta ti n g that  court was unaware of a n v  j uclges ,  
o t h e r  than Judge ·walker, who h a d  used an auc t ion p rocedure to select  l ead counsel ) .  
85. See, e . g . ,  [ n  re Qui n tus Sec. Litig. , HS F .  Supp.  2 d  967, 972-7-1 (:'-! .D .  Cal .  :?00 1 ) :  
l 1� re Comclisco Sec .  Li tig. , 1 4 1  F. Supp.  2cl 9 5 1 , 953-55 ( N .D .  Il l . 200 1 ) :  I n  rc Bank O n e  
S ' h olders Class Ac ti o ns , 9l1 F. Supp . 2cl 780 , 784-90 ( N .D .  I l l .  200U ) ;  I n  r e  l .c tcent Tec h . ,  
I n c .  S e c .  Litig. , 1 94 F.R. D .  1 37 ,  1 55-58 (D .NJ �2000 ) ; \Ycnclerhold v .  (\ li n k C< > r p . ,  W S  
F .l<..  D .  5 7 7 ,  :J87-:'l8 ( N . D .  Cal . 1 999 ) ;  S herleigh Assocs . L L C  \'. 'v\'inclme re-Durablc 
H oldings, inc . . l t·l4 F . R . D .  688, 695-97 (S .D.  Fla. J 9Ll9 ) ; l n  re Ccncbm C:mp. I .i t i g . ,  1 8� 
F .R .D.  H-l, 1 50-52 ( D . :\ .j .  1 998) ;  see also I n  re Cum m toucl t  Sofn, are Ltd. Sec.  Li t ig . ,  ;·� o .  
C U l -UU 7 l � l ,  a t  -i-6 ( N . D .  Ccti  . . June '.2 '/ ,  200 1 )  (ord er spec i t\ ing clc taiiecl pmc eclurc for 
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have also used auctions in two antitrust class actions.86 Al though the va­
lidity of the auction procedure has not been addressed at the circuit 
court level/" dicta in a recent Third Circuit opinion characterized auc­
tions favorably and recommended that district courts consider their 
use .88 
Courts have refined the auction procedure somewhat from Judge 
Walker' s  original structure. Although details vary, most auctions con­
ducted to date have been simi lar. 89 Every lead counsel auction has been 
structured as a first price sealed bid auction . Consistent with recent 
trends in fee jurisprudence, and perhaps recognizing the difficulty of 
comparing bids that use different methodologies, most  courts have indi­
cated a preference for the percentage of recovery method of determining 
counsel fees.90 Many courts have also recognized the difficulty of evaluat­
ing bids. In a further effort to facil itate comparison of bids, several courts 
have instructed bidders to use a litigation milepost grid ,  which is divided 
into a number of blocks representing different recovery amounts and liti­
gation stages .  The grid used by the court in Sherleigh Associates is typicaun 
submission of b ids to be reviewed bv l ead plain tiff a n d  the court ) ; I n  re Network Assocs . ,  
Inc .  Sec . Lit ig. ,  76 F.  Supp.  :Zd 1 0 1 7, 103:�-34 ( 1\' . D .  Cal . 1 999) ( imtntct ing lead p lain tiff to 
conduct sealed bid auction and subm i t  two winning bi ds to co urt) ;  Rafte n· Y. i\'lcrcurv Fin . 
Co. ,  1\'o. 97-C624,  1 997 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 1 2439, at '''9- * 1 1 ( \J . D .  I l l .  Aug. 7, 1 997) 
( ordering auction which was subseq uen tly abandoned when case setrled) : ln re Cal .  i'vl icro 
D e\ ices Sec.  Li t i g . , 1 68 F.R.D.  '237, 259-60 ( N .D .  Cal .  1 9%) ( conn u n successfu l h  ordered 
competit ive bidding bm did not select counsel th rough the proces:;) . 
86. In re Aucti o n  H ouses An ti trust Li ti g. , 1 9 7  F . R . D .  7 1 ,  78-cn ( S . D . N .Y. '2000 ) ;  In 11' 
.·I mino Acid Lysinr Anlitmsl Lilig. , 9 1 8  F. Supp. at 1 1 9 7. 
87.  B u t  see I n  re Ccndam Corp . Li t ig. ,  264 F .3d 20 1 ,  '286 ( ;kl C :i r .  200 1 )  ( holding that 
district court erred by usin g �m auc tion to determine l e gal fees i n  1-'SLR.-\ case ) . 
88.  Gun ter v. Ridge\voncl E n ergy Cor p . ,  '223 F . 3d 1 9 0 ,  :Z0'2 n.6  Ocl Cir. 2000) 
( ""Ano ther approach is for the d i striu court to determ i n e  the fcc arrangement  in advance 
through competi tive b icldi t t g. . T h is device appears to kt\·e worked wel l ,  and we 
coml llencl i t  to clistrict j udges wi th in this c i rcu i t  for th eir  consideration . " ) .  The Se\· e n t h  
Circui t has  also obse rved th�H lead counse l auc tions Glll provide a bench mark for 
de te rmin ing reasonable legal fees. I n  re Smthroid :vlktg. l .i t ig . , 264 F . :kl 7 1 2 , 720-21 ( 7th 
Cir. :ZOO ! ) .  
89 . The one court to use a substant ia l !\· di !Teren t  bid  stru c tu re 'Sd.S the A uri ion Houses 
court .  See i n fra Pan l l l .  B.3  ( desc ri b ing bid structure) . 
90.  Cf. In t·e \Yel ls  Fargo Sec.  Li tig. , 1 56 F .R .D . 2'23,  2 2 7-:Z9 ( 0! .D .  CaL l 9�l4 )  (giving 
counsel rhree c h oices for the bid structure and, based on counsel "s response,  selecting the 
percent:1ge of recm·cn· method) . 
9 1 . Sh erle i gh Assocs. v. Wi ndmere-Durab le H old i n gs , l n c . ,  l K-1 F . R . D .  68c�,  70�2 (S .D .  
Fb. 1 999 ) . For  si l l l ibr examples s e e  l n  r e  Lucen t Tech . ,  I n c .  S e c .  Lit ig . , 1 94 F . R . D .  1 37 ,  
1 57 ( 0 . :-.i ..J. �2000 ) :  \\"e nckrhulcl -. . Cy!ink Corp. ,  1 88 F.R. D .  577,  5x:� (\.' . D Cal .  1 9'09) .  
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Recovery 
First $500,000 
$500 ,000-$ 1 M  
$ 1 -5 M  
Next $5M 
Next $5M 
Next $5M 
Over $20M 
Sherleigh Associates92 
Application for Lead Counsel 
Fee Bid Schedule 
Fees as Percentage of Total Class Recovery 
Pleading D iscovery After 
Through Through SJ AcU ucl ication of 
M otion to M o ti o n  �J i\1Iotion 
D ismiss Through Trial 
Verdict  
Post-Trial 
The grid enables counsel to specify differing percentage bids for 
each of the designated contingencies. Thus a firm using such a grid can 
vary the percentage of the recovery payable as attorneys' fees as a func­
tion of the total recovery and the stage of l itigation at which that recovery 
occurs. 
Courts have required increased disclosure from bidders ,  including 
bidders ' qualifications, experience,  malpractice coverage , and willingness 
to post a completion bondY3 In some cases, firms have been asked to 
submit information on the expected recovery and to defend their bid 
structure in terms of agency issuesY4 Some courts have emphasized l iti­
gation costs and required bids that specify the treatment of costs or that 
internalize costsY" 
Courts have also l imited joint action by bidders. In most cases, 
courts have required bidders to submit their bids under seal% and pro­
hibited bidders from disclosing their bids or consulting with others dur­
ing the bidding processY7 Some courts have disclosed the bids and bid-
92.  Sherleigh Assocs. , 1 84 F.R .D.  at 702. 
9:> .  Sec, e .g . ,  l.ucen t, 1 94 F. R.D.  at  1 57.  
�14 .  Sec, e .g. ,  S!u:r!eigh Assoc. , 1 84 F.R.D. at  696-97.  
9 5 .  Sec.  e .g , v\'enclerholcl v .  Cyl i nk Corp . ,  1 89 F.R .D .  570, 572-7:'> ( N .D .  Cal .  1 999)  
( reject ing as  unacceptable b id  that sought rcimbursemen t of l i t igation expenses m 
addit ion tn zmom cys fees) . 
%. But :;ee I l l  re Cendan t Cor p . ,  260 F.3d 1 83, }CJ:) ( :'\cl Cir. 200 l )  ( q ucstion ing  
p ro priety ( )f seal ing  auction bids and declaring "strong presumption" that b i cb would he 
·'part of an open proce:;s. acce:;s ible to the publ i c " ) . 
97.  I n  .')hnlcigh .-\ssocs. , for example,  the court req ui red bids to include 
a ccrtiiicn i " n  on  behalf of the finn that ( l )  i ts proposal W<lS jm·jiared independently 
ot <l. m other finn, e n t i ty or person not  affiliated with t h e  fi rm, ( 2 )  no jHtrl of the 
jn opu.w! wos disrloserl to ;mvon e  o u tside the fi rm prior to fi l ing  with t h e  coun ;·md 
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der identi ties in connection with the announcement of the winning 
bid;�ls other courts have delayed disclosure of the bid details until the 
conclusion of the case.9<J Indeed, even after the resolution of the Cendant 
l itigation,  the court did not disclose the identities of the auction partici­
pants and provided only limited information about the submitted bids. 10 0  
Most courts have prohibited the submission o f  j oint  bids, 1 0 1 seemingly in 
an effort to increase competition , 1 02 although they have indicated that 
the winning bidder may subsequently contract out a portion of the legal 
services . 1 03 
B .  Results of Lead Counsel Auctions 
It is difficult to judge lead counsel auctions by the results in recent 
cases. Current experience with auctions is limited; many cases involve 
flawed auction design or limited competi tion . The absence of compara­
ble control groups makes it impossible to identify the extent to which 
auctions reduce legal fees or, more problematically, whether any fee sav­
ings are the result of reduced attorney effort, poor attorney quality, or 
both .  Although i t  is tempting to make the facile claim that auctions have 
reduced fees from the tradi tional 25% or 33% "benchmarks," the claim is 
misleading; as described above, courts have awarded fees far lower than 
(3 )  the proposal was jJrepared without direct or indirect consultation with other firms 
that haYe tiled actions on behalf of the proposed class in this matter, or e n tered 
an appearance i n  any fash i o n .  
1 84 F . R . D .  a t  697. 
98.  See, e.g . .  In re Bank One S ' holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785-87 
( N . D .  Ill .  2000) ( disclosing firm identiti es and bid details i n  con nection with selection 
decision ) .  
99. See I n  re Cendan t Corp. Litig . ,  1 9 1  F.R.D.  387,  387 ( D . N .J .  1 998) , partially 
un sealed by the court on Apr. 7, 2000; see also Sher!eigh .-\.ssors. , 1 Sc} F . R . D .  at 698 ( stating 
that the "bids may b e  permanently sealed or redacted thereafter to p rotect p roprietary 
i n formation") ; v\'enclerhold \·. Cyl i n k  Corp . ,  1 9 1  F.R.D.  600, 60 1 ( N . D .  Cal. 2000) (court 
disclosed competing p roposals to bidding firms prior to bid eYaluation heari ng ''to p rovide 
each an opportu n i ty to a rgue the relative strengths of i ts bid and weaknesses of the 
others'' ) .  
1 00. See in re Cendant, 1 9 1  F.R.D.  at  387. 
1 0 1 . The desirabil ity of restricting joint bids is beyo nd the scope of this Article .  I t  
should b e  noted, h owe\·cr, that  the etiect of j o i n t  bids o n  competi tion i s  a complex 
question.  See, e.g. ,  Sandra Campo et  al. ,  Awmmetry and Joint Biddi n g  i n  OCS Wildcat 
Auctions 3, 24 (June 2000 ) ,  available at  h ttp:/ /www-scf. usc. edu/-scampo/JO INT2 .pdf (on 
fil e  with the Colu mbia Law Review) ( recouming economic justifications for permitting j o i n t  
bidding and con cl uding t h a t  joint  bidding i n  OCS \Vildcat auctions has  been ben eficial  in 
i n creasing reYenues from the auction process) . 
102 .  Sumc courts b a\'e al�o attempted to i n crease co mpeti tion bY open i n g  the <l llCtion 
to <1 l l  i n terested bidders, i ncluding ft rms that have not pre\·iuuslv appeared in the case . 
.Sec,  e .g . ,  Jn re Luc e n t  Techs . ,  I n c .  Sec. Li tig . ,  1 94 F.R.D.  1 37 ,  1 5 7  ( D . N.J . 2000) ( i n \·iting 
submissions from any law firm " i ncluding those p resen tk uncon nected with thi> 
l i tigation") ; Wen derhold v. Cvl i n k  Corp . ,  l R9 F.R.D.  570, 573 ( N . D .  Cal. 1 9q 9 )  ( opening 
extended bidding period to  "a l l  comers" ) .  
1 03 .  But see in 1'1' Cendan t,  1 9 1  F . R. D .  a t  387 ( descri bing submiss ion o f  b ids b\· 
n i n eteen firms, ·:j o i n tly and siugl() . 
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these benchmarks in many nonauction cases. At the same time ,  it is hard 
to assess the reasonableness of fees in auction cases-the fee in Cendant, 
for example, was only 8.275% of the recovery, but totaled approximately 
$ 1 0,86 1 per hour. 1 04 
More importantly, as will be described in Part I I I .B ,  fee structures in 
auction cases have created troubling incentives for plaintiffs ' counse l .  
The risk that these incentives will lead to reduced recoveries cannot be 
assessed by focusing on the single factor of counsel 's  fee i n  percentage 
terms . Moreover, empirical analysis cannot readily determine whether 
auctions sacrifice net recovery to the plaintiff class in favor of reduced fee 
awards . 1 0'  
I have previously described troubling results in several auction 
cases. 106 More recent data i s  also problematic .  At the time  it conducted 
the auction in Bank One, for example, the court estimated the l ike ly re­
covery at $4.6 to $4.8 bil lion . 10 7 Indeed, the court rejected a competing 
bid that was superior at a recovery of $65 million, reasoning that  the pros­
pect of such a l ow recovery "defies reality. " 1 0::; Notwi thstanding the 
court' s optimism, it subsequently approved a settlement for $45 million, 
an amount reflecting less than 1 %  of the recovery as estimated by the 
court. ·1 o!l 
The recently proposed settlement in j\letwork Associates 1 1 0  is similar. 
In Network Associates, the original insti tutional lead plaintiff refused to 
serve after the court required that counsel be selected through a competi­
tive bidding process focused primarily on price. 1 1 1 Although the court 
1 04.  See iVIemoranclum of Law by Corporation Counsel of the Ci ty of New York in 
Opposi tion to the Applicat ion of Lead Counsel for Attorneys' Fees, a t  1 ,  8 ,  f n  re Cenclant  
Corp .  L i tig. ,  1 9 1  F. R. D .  3 8 7  ( D . N J. l 998) (No. 98-CV- 1 664 ) [ here i nafter Cencbnt 
'vlemoranclum] .  The Third Circui t subsequently vacated the D istri c t  Court's fee award. I n  
r e  Cenclant Corp. Li tig . ,  �64 F. :kl 2 0  l ,  220 ( 3d C i r. �()() l ) . 
1 05 .  [ n  addi tion to the near i mpossibi l i t:y of objectively quant ifv i n g  p lai n tifio.; ' 
damages , see \Villard T. Carle ton e t  a l . ,  Securi ties Class Action Lawsui ts: /\. D esc ri ptiYe 
Study, 38 Ari1.. L. Rev. 49 1 ,  49 1 -92 ( 1 996) , sec uri ties fraud settlem e n ts are often 
constrained bv the firm's  assets and the avai lab i l i ty of i nsurance.  See Todd S. Foster e t a ! . ,  
T1·encls i n  Securi ties Li ti gation and the Impact  of PSLRA 8 (v\'orking Pape r, 200 1 ) ( o n  file 
,,· i th  the Columbia I.aw Rr:vinu) .  
1 06.  See Fisch,  Aggregat ion ,  supra note 1 3 , a t  86-88. 
1 07 .  I n  re Ban k  One S ' h olclers Class Actions,  96 F.  Supp. 2cl  780, 788 ( N . D .  I l l .  2000) . 
1 0 8 .  1cl. at 788 & n . l ] .  
1 09 .  See Notice of Pendency <mel Proposed Scttlemen t of  Class Act ion a nd Settlement 
H earing Thereon, Exhi b i t  A to Pre l i m i nary ApproYal Order i n  Connection wi th Sett lemem 
Proceedin gs,  I n  re Bank O n e  S ' holclers Class .-\c t ions,  No .-00-C-880 ( N . D . I l l .  iVLu c h  20,  
�00 1 ) ;  In re Comcli sco Sec.  Lit ig. ,  1 50 F.  Supp.  2d 043, 05 1 -5 2  ( N . D .  I l l .  200 1 ) ( describing 
court's oral approval of Ban k One settlemen t on J u ne I ,  2001 ) .  
1 1 0.  In re Network ,\ssocs. Sec. Li t ig . ,  7b F. Supp. 2cl 1 0 1 7 , 1 0 1 9  ( N . D .  Cal .  EJ99 ) .  
1 1 ! . See i cl .  at  1 0 34 ( orderi ng com peti ti\ e bidding <mel emphasi z ing price ) ;  I n  re 
Commtouch Software l . td. Sec. Lit ig . ,  7'Jo.  C 0 1 -00 7 1 9 , at 7 ( N D .  Cd . . June �tl, 200 1 )  
( urcler defining select.io n  and  appru\·al criteria for c lass cuunsel)  ( describing selection \lf 
low bidder in :\'l'iwod: Asso,-io/1'.1) ; CA Judge Picks Lone l m·estor fo r Letcl Plain tiff After 
Pension Funcl Balks ,  Pe ns i o n Fund Lit ig. Rep . ,  jan . 1 7 , 2000,  at 6 (descri b in g Lhe Bouci of 
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did not estimate damages,  the stock price during the relevant period 
dropped from $67 per share to between $ 1 3  and $ 1 6  per share , and the 
alleged losses of one proposed lead plaintiff group alone totaled more 
than $33 million . 1 1 2 Nonetheless, the case settled for $30 million, 1 L� re­
flecting damages of approximately $0.35 per share . 1 1 4 
Although no generalizations can be drawn from this smal l  sample ,  
the results suggest caution in evaluating the claim that lead counsel auc­
tions are beneficial for plaintiffs . In particular, there are reasons to ques­
tion the ability of courts , through the auction model, to generate a truly 
competi tive bidding process . To elate, auctions have generated limited 
bidder participation. 1 1 3 Moreover, the range and variation in the result­
ing bids 1 1 6  seem more likely to result from uncertainty about the auction 
process or informational disparities among bidders than from market­
based competition . l l 7 
Pensions of the City of P h il adel ph ia ' s refusal to proceed as lead plaintiff if requ i red to 
select counsel by auction ) .  
1 1 2 .  In re Network Assocs. , 7 6  F .  Supp . 2 d  at  1 0 1 9 . 
1 1 3 . In re Commtouch Software, No. C 0 1 -007 1 9, at 7 ( order defining selecti o n  and 
appnwal cri teria for cl ass counse l ) (describin g settl e m e n t  i n  Nctworli Assoc.\. ) .  
1 1 4.  See Notice of Proposed Se tt lemen t of Class Action , I n  re .'-Je twork Assocs.  Sec . 
Li tig . (N .D .  Cal. proposed Mar. 1 4, 200 1 )  (!\o .  C-99-0 1 729) [ h erei n after :\'etwork Assocs. 
Proposed Settlement] . 
1 1 5.  See , e. g. ,  I n  re Comdisco Sec. Litig. , ! 50 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946, 95 1-52 ( N . D .  I l l .  
200 1 )  (descri bing as "unfortunate" th e  parti ci pation o f  only three bidders) . O n h· four 
finns submitted bids i n  Oracle, desp i te the fac t  that the court sol i c i ted b i ds from .. a large 
number of l eading plai n ti tfs ' class action law firms . ·· In re Oracle Sec. Litig . ,  8:12 f. Supp. 
!-!:17, 1 4:16 ( N. D .  Cal .  1 994) . The n umbe r  of partic ipan ts has been l i m i ted,  e\·en when two 
or three dozen firms origina l ly entered <tppearances. For exam p l e , Judge 'iYaiker 
uns uccessfu l ly a ttemp ted to conduct an a u ct ion in In re Crilzjomia i\ Iicm De:vias Si'r:un"!ics 
Litigation , but al though seventeen fi rms had appeared i n the case, just two subm itted bids,  
and the court characterized on!)' one of those as "serious . " 1 68 F.R. D .  257,  259-60 ( 1'\ . D .  
C a l .  1 996) . Sec generally Tn 1e Comdisco. 1 :10 F.  Supp.  2d at 946-48 ( specula t i n g  a s  to 
reasons for reluctance of fi rms to bid) . /\uct ions do n o t  appear to have attracted bids from 
a broader range of firms than other selection methods; most bidders are from the 
trad i t i onal p lai n tiffs ' bar. See, e .g. ,  I n  re Cendant Corp . Sec .  Li ti g . ,  1 09 F. S upp . 2cl 285, 
9.00 ( D . :'I J .  2000) ( describi n g  auction bids as ··most [ ly] from l aw firms national in pract i ce 
�tnd prom i nen t in the field" ) ,  vacated and remanclecl , 264 F.3d 20 1 (200 1 ) .  If  anvth ing,  
�tuctions may discourage parti c ipation from some of the smaller and l ess experienced 
pL! i nt i ffs ' firms cl ue either to the costs of pa rtic i p<tti on or r.he percep ti on that less known 
tirms cann ot compete based on the se lect ion c ri te r i a .  See In rc Qui mus .Sec.  Li tig . . l 4cl F. 
Supp . 2cl Sl67, 975 ( .\I . D .  Cal . 200 1 ) (viewi n g Beatie  & Osbo rn ' s  re l <t ti\'e youth and lesser 
experience in class ac tions as qu a l i r.at i1 ·e d efic i e n c i es ) . 
l Hi. Firms haYe submitted b ids rangi n g  from 1 %  lO 4:1% .  T h e  ran ge i n  '1m gi1 e 1 1  Gtse 
h �ts been substam ia l . See, e.g. , CoiTee, l' n tangling,  supra n o t e  l ,  at 4 (describi ng \\·i n n i ng 
b id in A uction �fo11ses as more tha n m·icc tk1l or closest cnm peti wr) . Bid struC lure <tbo 
1 ·ari ·::s suhstamialk See :\I i ebler .  supra n o t e  4 7 .  �tt 78?.-802 .  
1 1 7 . See R .  Preston 1\·l cAfce & . f o h n  ;\ [c ;.. ! i l l <U l ,  Auct ions �tncl Bidding,  2:) . J .  Eco n .  
L i t ·:.' l.,Hurc Ci99, 7 1 1 ( 1 <) 8 7 )  (warn i ng t.h< l l  i n  t h e  a bse n c e  of corn peti ti\·e prcs:;ur::: bi dders 
C J l l  cnn posir. in� econom i c  ren ts ) . 
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I I I .  FoRMALIZING THE AucTION MoDEL 
A. Why Use an A 1lction ? 
I n  evaluating the long term potential of the auction model ,  i t  is nec­
essary to formalize the obj ectives of the lead counsel auction .  I s  the pri­
mary goal of the auction to reduce fee awards? Is this an appropriate and 
realistic goal? vVhat are the costs of achieving this goal? Alternatively, 
can auctions provide other types of benefits? 
Courts have offered limited reasons for using auc tions .  I n  Oracle, 
Judge Walker explained that his goal was to bring a market-based mecha­
nism to the selection and compensation of c lass counse l . 1 1 8 Similarly, in 
A1lction Ho1lses , Judge Kaplan stated that the auction "approximate [d]  an 
efficient market. " 1 19  The Seventh Circuit also requires courts to use a 
"market-mimicking" approach to determine legal fees in  class actions . 1 20 
Defending auctions m terms of market simulation,  however, 1s 
unsatisfactory. 
First, it is unclear what market the auction is supposed to replicate . 
The market for legal services is not unitary; individuals seeking a lawyer to 
write their wills do not participate in the same market as corporations 
seeking counsel in connection with a public securities offering. Mea­
sured by traditional economic standards such as efficiency, different seg­
ments of the market for legal services are qualitatively different. 
Second, the exten t to which the market for legal services is efficient 
or well functioning is questionable . 1 � 1  Commentators have cri ti cized 
market function in many segments ,  citing problems such as inadequate 
competi tion and asymmetric information . 1 �� Studies fin d  evidence of 
possible market failures, including the downward stickiness of contin-
1 1 8. Sec Tn 11: Om.df, 852 F. Supp. at 1 45 7  ( explai n i ng that auction p rocess 
"adeq uately simulated the market for legal services" ) .  
1 19 .  [n re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig . ,  1 97 F . R. D .  7 1 ,  82 ( S . D . N .Y. 2000) . 
1 20.  I n  re Synthroicl Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3cl 7 1 2 , 7 1 9  ( 7th Cir. 200 1 ) .  
1 2 1 .  Analy-;is of the economic efficiency of contingency fees i n  tort cases is 
particularly ambiguous. Compare James D. Dana, J r. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and 
Contingent Fees:  The Role of Asymmetric Information i n  Attorney Compensation , 9 J .  L. 
Econ. & Org. 349, 349-50 ( 1 993) ( concluding that contingency fees op tim i ze attorneys' 
incentives regarding decision whether to proceed with li tigation ) ,  with vVinancl Emons, 
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Insufficient Attorney Effort, 20 1nt ' l  ReY. L. & Econ. 2 1 , 
30-3 1 ('2000) ( demonstrating  that contingency fees may lead ro i n ef icien t l eYels of 
attorn ey effort) . 
1 2'2 .  See, e .g . ,  Lester Brickman,  Contingent  Fees vVi tb o u t  Conti ngencies: Ham fet 
Wi thout the Prince of D enmark? , 37 UCL,\ L. Rev. 29,  1 04-1 1 ( 1 989) (c la iming that 
market for l egal services does not fun c tion e ffi c ien tly clu e  to inad eq uate competition a n d  
bck of inform a tion ) ; G i l l i a n  K.  H adfi el d,  The Price of Law: H ow the  :Vlarket for Lawye rs 
D i s to rts t h e  .Justice Sys te m , 9R M i c h .  L. Rc\·. 953,  956 (2000) (describing n on co m petitive 
features of the market for lawyers ) ;  Rjcharcl \1\'. Pa i n ter, The New .-\n1erican Rule: A First 
Amendment to the C l i e n t ' s  Bil l  of Righ ts ,  in Man h a t tan I ns ti tu te , 2000 Ci\·i i J us ticc Report 
l ,  ':.! ( 2000) , ava i l ab l e at h ttp :/ /wmv. man h a t tan-i n s t i tute. org/ h t ml / c j r_ l . h tm (on fi l e  with 
the Co/u111bia f.r1w Hruicw) ( a rguing con ti nge n C\' f'ee market  i s  i n su fl i c i e l l l h' c o m pe t i ti\'e ) : cf. 
Lis;t C. Lerm a n ,  B l uc-C : h i p  B i l k in g :  Regu la t i o n  of B i l l i ng anc l  [;.;pensc Fr;t ucl b\· Lawvns, 
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gency fees . 1 23 Some commentators have called for increased regulation,  
rather than a free market approach,  in an effort to address these market 
failures . 1 24 On occasion, courts have found sufficient evidence of market 
failure to interfere with negotiated fee agreements m traditional 
l itigation. 1 25 
Third, reliance on the free market, rather than a regulatory ap­
proach , sacrifices some of the potential benefi ts of regulation,  such as the 
ability of courts to tailor fee awards in order to create the incentive for 
socially optimal l i tigation levels . 1 26 Accordingly, to the extent that fee 
awards in class l itigation can be used to serve broader social goals or to 
direct the commitment of l i tigation resources, greater reliance on mar­
ket-based incentives limits this potential . 
Judge Walker may have had in mind the corporate legal market, 
which, within the broader market for legal services, appears to operate 
relatively efficiently. 1 27 Two attributes of the corporate legal market are 
attractive. First, sophisticated corporate purchasers are generally capable 
of identifying their needs and obtaining relevant information about law­
yer price and quality. 1 28 Second, lawyers compete to provide legal ser-
1 2  Ceo . J Legal Ethics 205 , 227-28 ( 1 999) ( clescrihing "substantial amount  of bill ing and 
expense fraud" even by hourly a ttorneys at prestigious law firms) . 
1 23.  Sec, e .g . ,  Brickman, supra note 1 22 ,  at 1 00 ( criticizing persistence of standard 
33% contingency fee, despi te "a dramatic increase in  the average amount of awards and a 
dramatic decrease in  the risk of nonrecovery" ) ;  Herhert M. Kritzer, The 'Wages of Risk: 
The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice ,  4 7 DePaul L. Rev. 267,  285-90 ( 1 998 ) 
( relating survey results finding prevalence of contingency fees around the level of 33 % ) .  
1 24.  See, e .g. ,  Brickman, supra note 1 2 2,  a t  1 1 1 - 1 4  (suggesting greater e x  post 
judicial scrutiny o f  contingen t fees) ;  Resnik, supra note 46,  at 2 1 2 7-30 (calling for 
increased judicial regulation of attorneys' fees in mass tort l i tigation ) ;  Painter, supra note 
1 22 ,  at 3 (arguing for regulation of con tingency fees through adoption of the "New 
American Rule" ) .  
1 25 .  See, e .g . ,  In re Swartz, 686 P . 2cl 1 23 6 ,  1 243 (Ariz. 1 984) (concluding that 
contingency fee of one third was unreasonable in  individual case) . 
1 26. See, e.g. ,  John F. Grady, Reasonable Fees: A Suggested Val ue-Based Analysis for 
J uclges, 1 84 F .R. D .  1 3 1 ,  1 32 ( 1 999) (suggesting courts look to value produced rather than 
total size of recovery in  determining reasonableness of fee award) ; Resnik ,  supra note 46, 
at 2 1 64-65 ( describing wide variety of public and private benefits that lawyers can create 
through l i tigation) .  
1 27 .  See, e .g . ,  Herbert ivl .  Kritzer, The P rofessions Are Dead, Long Live the 
Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional v\'orld ,  3:::> Law & Soc 'y Rev. 7 1 3, 7 3 1 -32 
( 1 999) (describing market for corporate legal sen·ices) . In the corporate legal market, an 
informed and sophisticated purchaser evaluates lawyer credentials, negotia tes price, and 
makes a selection decision on the basis o f  all relevan t  fac ts . Unti l  fai rly recen tly, of course, 
not even corporate cl ients behaved in this manner. ln the wh ite shoe era, corporate cl ients 
seemingly selected a firm primarily on th e basis of reputati o n ,  wh i c h  was gleaned, in part , 
from inspection of the fi rm's cl ient l i s t .  The re tention decision was n o t  based on price; th e 
cl ient expected to pay and did pay the fi n n ' s  go i n g  rate. ;vi o re recently, corpora t i o n s  have 
become increasingly sophisticated pu rchase rs of leg;d sen ices .  See i cl .  ( e:..:pLti n i n g 
evolution of th e marke t ) . 
1 2::1. See, e.g. ,  Ron ale! J .  Gilson. The Devolution of the Legal Profess i o n :  A Deman d 
Side Perspective, 49 Mel. L. Rev. t\69, 90'2-03 ( 1 990) ( a rgu i n g that corpor<1 te cl i e n ts ha\·e 
found dTecr in� ways to reduce i n funnat i o n ;d a.wmme tries) . 
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vices. Corporate clients increasingly utilize "beauty contests" in which 
they compare firm proposals on price and quality criteria. 1 29 Corpora­
tions also monitor lawyer pricing and demand that their lawyers offer 
competitive prices and pricing alternatives . 1 30 
I t  is not sufficient to identify an appropriate benchmark, however, 
because auctions do not simply replicate the market. 1 31 Rather, auctions 
are a stylized process for addressing two problems that contribute to mar­
ket failure :  lack of information 1 32 and inadequate competition . 1 33 These 
are problems that may contribute to nonoptimal pricing, 1 34 allocational 
inefficiency, 1 35 or both . Accordingly, lead counsel auctions should be 
evaluated based on their abil ity to address the problems that may result 
from market failure : excessive fees, selection of poor quality counsel, or 
both . 1 30 Defining the auction goals in terms of price and,  to a lesser ex-
1 29. See, e .g . ,  David B. ·wilkins.  Do Cl ients Have Eth i cal Obligations to Lawyers? 
Some Lessons from the D ivers ity v\'ars, 1 1  Ceo. ] .  Legal Ethics 855,  884 ( 1 998) ( describing 
beauty contests and cons equen t conditions i mposed upon competi n g  firms, i nc l uding 
lower fees and more extensive supervision by corporate c l ients) . 
1 30. !d.  
1 3 1 .  Cf Robert D.  Cooter & Edward L. Rubin ,  Orders and Incen ti\·es as Regul a tory 
ivleth ods: The Expedi ted Funds Availab i l it:v Act of 1 987 ,  35 UCL\ L. Rev. 1 1 1 5 , 1 1 74-75 
( 1 988) (dist inguishing between market perfecting, market displac i ng ,  and market 
simulating responses to market fai l ure ) . Use of l ead counsel auctions is based on the 
premise that they are market simul ati ng.  See, e .g . ,  In re Oracle Sec. Li tig. , 852 F .  Supp. 
1 437,  1 457 ( N . D .  Cal . 1 994) ( "' [T] h e  court is cominced that competi tive bidding 
adequatelv s imulated the market for l egal services ancl  h as resul ted i n  ' reasonable '  fees . " ) . 
Accord i ng to Cooter ancl Rubi n ,  a '·rn arket s imulati ng statu te is based on th e p remise that 
the market's operation can be restored, but only by imposi n g  gove rn m e n ta l  rules. For 
such rules to restore, rather than displace, the market they m ust mimic some aspect of the 
market's operation that h as been e l iminated b\· the market fai lure . "  Cooter & Rubin ,  
supra, at 1 1 7-J.-75. 
1 32 .  See, e . g. , Daniel L. Rubinfelcl & Suzanne Scotchm er , Con ti n gen t Fees for 
Attorneys: An Economic Analysis ,  24 Ri\N D  J .  Eco n .  343, 343-44 ( 1 993)  ( iden tifyi n g  
i n formation asymmetries i n  market for legal services t o  inc lude c l ien ts '  superior 
information about case qua l i tv and lawyers' superior informati on about their abi l i ties ) .  
1 33. See E cic Rasmusen,  Games and I nfo rmation 245 ( 1 989)  (explaini n g  that 
" "auctions are stylized markets with well-defined rules" ) .  1here are several reasons why the 
market for cl ass counsel mav be i m perfectly competi tive. The economi cs of class 
represen tation may l imit  the abil i ty of firms to enter the market and c reate a n atural 
rnonopolv. Courts may restric t  e n try bv l imi ting lead counsel appoi m m e n ts to specit1c 
firms, such as those wi th a proven track record i n  the field.  Plai n tiff'> firms mav act 
collusively. Perhaps the most importan t factor, h owever, i s  that  u nder the c urren t  system 
in which th e seleoion and compensation decisions are separate. price competi t ion simply 
does not  pla1 a role in the appoin tme n t  of l ead counse l .  
1 :34. Au( [ion s  respon d t o  the p roblem o f  as\·mmetric i nformation by forc i n g  buyers to 
reH:al infonn ation th rough their bids. See id.  at 323. Accordi n gly,  i n  the si tuation i n  
wh ich bm·ers h aYe superior information than the sel ler about the auct.i o n ecl i tem 's va l ue . 
<tn auc t ion can produce a super ior  price.  
1 35 .  I n  the traditionai auction modeL al location of the auctioned i re m  in accordan ce 
w i th th e b ids is efficient,  because the h i ghest bidder is  t.he bui'Cr who 1·alue:; the auctioned 
i tem most h i ghh-. 
! 36.  See , e.g . . Grun dfc�t. D e c Lt rat i o n .  supra nute 7,  'IT '.!.7 (desc r i b i n g  lead counsel 
auct ion ; t s  a ··me th od o f  .se l e c t i n g  the h i gh est q ual i tY reprcsen t;tt: i o n  ; J.t  th e l mH:st  price "' ) . 
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tent, quality, is consistent with tradi tional auction analysis-price analysis 
dominates the auction mechanism, and the primary rationale for using 
an auction is price optimal i ty. 
Auctions can also be used to achieve process goals. In situations in 
which collusion or favoritism can taint the selection process , an auction 
offers the potential for greater obj ectivity. 1 37 Auctions are used in gov­
ernment contracting, for example, to limit the discretion of public offi­
cials, increase transparency, and reduce the potential for corruption and 
collusion . 1 38 Poorly structured auctions, however, are vulnerable to vari­
ous forms of cheating that undermine these goals . 1 39 
Importantly, lead counsel auctions do not address the agency 
problems that arise in the class action from the divergence between the 
interests of the plaintiff class and those of counsel . A n umber of com­
mentators , most notably Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, have pro­
posed auction mechanisms to deal wi th these agency problems. 1 40  The 
Macey and Miller auction i nvolves the sale of the claims, not  the lead 
counsel position.  By eliminating the plaintiff class, the proposal elimi­
nates the problematic agency relationship between the class and coun­
sel. l -l 1 The lead counsel auction does not eliminate the plaintiff class or 
the agency relationship . Indeed, in some cases, the incentives created by 
fee s tructures used in the auction process may increase the conflict of 
in terest, exacerbating the agency problem . 
The process question of whether to use an auction should also be 
distinguished from complex issues about contract design that the auction 
does not resolve . 1 •12 Designing an appropriate contract for legal services, 
1 37 .  See, e .g. ,  Samantha M. Coh e n ,  l\'otc,  "Payi n g-to-Pl ay" i s  the New Rule of the 
Cam e: A Prac tical Implica tion of the PriYate Securi ties Litigation Reform Act of 1 995, 
1 999 U. I l l .  L. Rev. 1 33 1 ,  l 354 ( 1 999)  ( argu i ng that compe t i ti 1 e bi dding procedures 
should be used to select class cou nsel in order to p reYe n t  lawyers from " buyi n g  business·· 
thro ugh pol i ti cal con tributio ns) . 
i 38 .  See, e . g . ,  Rasnmsen, s upr�t n o te J 33, at 2-±5 (describing and disti n gu ish in g 
c he �: ting, corruption,  and collusion in auc tio n con text) ; YYan Lengwi l er & Elmar 
\Yol f-;tetter, Auc tions and Corruption 20-22 ( Ctr. for F.con.  Stud . &.: Ifo lnst .  fo r Ico n .  Res. ,  
\\"orking Paper No. 40 1 ,  Dec. 2000) (descr ibing various forms o f  c h ea t i n g  and 
disti n gu i s h i n g  b e tween corrup ti on ancl c o l l usion in auction context) . 
l :-'\9.  Sec, e .g . ,  Lengwi ler &.: Wo!Lo;tetter, supra note J 38, at l - 2  (descr i b i n g  corruption 
� t s  ·'well docum e n ted" i n  " m any govern m e n t  p rocurement auctions" ) .  
1 40 .  Sec iV!acey & Miller,  P l a i n ti ff-.; . Attorney's Role, supra n o te 1 2 , at 6.  
1 4 1 .  :vloreover, an auction is not a unique :;ol u t i on to the agency problem acld ressecl 
1w :>Aotce\· <m el t\l i l ie r. Any procedure that u n i tes fi nanci �1l  i n terest a n d  decisi o n making 
responsibi l i tY. such <15 a mad;et-based :;al e  of the claims, will achie1·e a s i m i la r  resul t . See, 
e.g . . Peter Charles Choharis,  A Comprchens[ye i\larkcr Strategy For Torr Refo rm , l '2 Yal c j. 
on T�cg. -i:'\5 ,  "1'!3-4-i ( 1 995) (suggesti ng a tort cla i m s  market as a so l u ti o n  to the class 
: tc t i u n  problems in the mass tort con t·�x t ) . 
1 -! 2 .  T h e  use of the auction proced u re sh ould be distingu ished from the ckci�� iott  to 
« ppo i n t  l ead counsel a n d  frum issues about the most � tppropriate rcprese n Lt t i u n  s tructure. 
:\l tho ugh the �1ppoi n tiTl t:n t  of a singl e fi rn1 as l ead cou nsel n1ay crc�t te cosl-Sa\'ing 
cfllci ·:�·n(: i es :  ;;l cou rt  need not usc an �l t ict ion to c.tppoi n t.  a singl e  fi n 1 1 .  [yen \\'h e n  t h e  cnurt 
� 1 l .Jpui nt:-: k��lcl c cnn1se l :  rnc:;t ct1�1�. ::tc t iu n s  i n \:< l h'C dck·g·� t t ion o f  legal :-; e rYice� to i n u l ti pl:� 
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a subject that is  beyond the scope of this Article,  raises a variety of com­
plex issues, including the appropriate valuation of legal services and mini­
mization of conflicts between lawyer and client  interests. Existing auction 
methodology does not address these issues and instead incorporates 
flawed contract design into the auction procedure. Despite these flaws, 
use of auctions may lead courts to be unduly complacent about the result­
ing contracts . 
In conclusion,  the reasons for using auctions include lower fees, bet­
ter selection decisions, and a more objective selection process. Evaluat­
ing the lead counsel auction requires determining whether the auction 
mechanism can realistically achieve these goals .  The remainder of this 
Part addresses that question .  
B.  Bid Evaluation and Comparison 
1 .  Evaluation of Competing Bids. - Because the auction selects a win­
ner by comparing competing bids, 1 43 bid evaluation and comparison are 
central to i ts operation . 1 44 In the typical auction, comparing prices is 
easy because bids are submitted in fixed monetary amounts .  Bid struc­
tures in lead counsel auctions are more complex. 
This complexity does not result from the use of percentage of recov­
ery bids rather than fixed prices or hourly rates, but rather from the pro­
pensity to use bid structures in which the fee award varies in accordance 
with various conting·encies such as the amount of the recovery, the stage 
at which the l i tigation is concluded , and the duration of the l i tigation . 
The purpose of these structures, which reflect existing limitations in the 
design of legal services contracts, is twofold: to tailor fee awards to attor­
ney effort and the value of the services provided, and to address agency 
problems in the lawyer-client relationship. 
U nfortunately, the inclusion of even one contingency in a bid cre­
ates a significant evaluation problem. Consider two competing bids. Bid 
A seeks 8% of the recovery if the case settles prior to trial , and 1 5 %  if  the 
case goes to trial. Bid B seeks 1 0% of the recovery if the case settles, and 
1 2 %  if it goes to trial . The price of each of these bids depends on the 
l ikelihood o f  a specified contingency-in this case, the likelihood of a 
plaint iffs' ri rms. See, e .g. ,  Sherleigh Associates LLC v. VVi nclrnere-Durable Holdings, lnc . ,  
H \4 F. R.D.  688, 6 9 5  (S .D .  F la .  1 999) ( indicat ing that fi rms selected as l ead counsel  may 
refer work to other law firms) . Lead counsel auctions may also mask issues concerning the 
appropriate di\· ision of responsibi l ity and fees in  connec tion with these structu res. 
Tournamem the01-y offers gu idance as to the conseq uences a:;sociatecl with the designation 
of lead counse l ,  which rewards a l i m i ted percenL1ge of the lawyers who i n i tiate a case. See 
supra note 69 and accompanying text ( describing tournament theory) . 
1 43.  The selling price need not  be th e bid submi tted by winner. Auctiom usc a 
variety of methods to set  price.  The sel l ing  price may be the highest  hid ,  the second 
h ighest bid, or, less commonly, some other funct ion of the submitted b ids.  
14"}. Sec,  e .g . . Paul R. M ilgrom, Auction Theon·. in Advances in Economic Theo1·y 
Fifth 'Norld Congress l ,  :! (Truman F. Bewley eel . ,  l �lS7 )  (descr ib ing  sc\·eral essential  
features uf auct ions inc luding the "expl ic i t  (l)illjJarison l l ladc among bids" ) .  
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trial . At trial, the relative superiori ty shifts from Bid A to Bid B. Accord­
i ngly, the event of trial is a crossover point. Neither bid can be classified 
as obj ectively superior, and only by predicting the likelihood of a trial can 
the court compare the two bids . 
Competing bids may have a number of crossover points such that 
one bid is lower in the event of certain outcomes and another bid is lower 
under different circumstances. If competing bids present the court with 
one or more crossover points ,  no single bid will be superior over all possi­
ble l i tigation outcomes, and the court cannot  choose the better priced 
bid without predicting the future course of the l i tigation,  the amount of 
the recovery, or both .  
B id  evaluation i s  further complicated by  the use of  three different 
approaches to the specification of price as a function of recovery: fixed 
percentage of recovery bids, declining percentage of recovery bids, and 
increasing percentage of recovery bids. Consider the example in the 
chart below. Bid 1 seeks a flat 20% of the recovery, Bid 2 is an increasing 
percentage bid which seeks 10% of the first $20 million of recovery and 
30% of any amount over $20 million, and Bid 3 is a declining percentage 
bid which seeks 30% of the first $20 million and 10% of any amount over ' . 
$20 million. 
Attorneys Fees 
Gross Recovery Bid l -f1at 20% Bid 2-increasing Bid 3-decl in ing 
percen tage percentage 
S20 Mi l l ion $4 Mil l ion $2 M i l l i o n  $6 [V! i l l i o n  
$30 M il l i o n  $6 Mi l l ion £5 rdil l ion 55 7  M i l l i o n  
$40 Mil l ion $8 i'vl i l l ion $8 Mill ion $8 Mil l ion 
$:10 Mi l l iun $ 1 0  M i l l ion $ 1 1 Mil l ion $9 M i l l io n  
$60 Mil l ion $ l 2 Mil l ion $ 1 4  M i l l ion :)? 1 0 ivl i l l i o n  
As the chart demonstrates, the relevant crossover point  in comparing 
the bids is a $40 million recovery. If the recovery is less than $40 million, 
B i d  2 is superior. If the recovery is above $40 million, Bid 3 is superior. 
Bid 1 is somewhere between the two at all recovery levels . The competing 
bids require the court to predict whether the recovery is likely to exceed 
$40 m illion ; absent that prediction,  there is no way to choose the best bid. 
Additional variations in bid structure further complicate the task. In 
the Oracle case , for examp l e , Bid 2 is structured as a calendar-based con­
tinr£ency fee ;  counsel  fees decrease with the passa g e of time. 1 4'-, Bid 4 is a 
u ' u 
s tage of litigation contingency fee;  fees increase with the stage of li tiga-
tion. 1 1 ( ;  A superficial review of the two bids suggests that Bid 2 is supe­
rior; it propmes a fee that ranges from 1 0 %  to 30% ,  as opposed to Bid 4, 
! h .  See ln ! C  O r<lc k  Scc Lirig . , 1 :�2 F .R. D .  5 ;)8,  5-� 1 ( :\ L D .  CaL ! 990) . 
1 �H).  ! d .  �H :)-H ) .  
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which ranges from 24% to 37% of the recovery. Selecting the better bid, 
however, requires both identifying comparable circumstances and elimi­
nating unlikely contingencies. 1 47 Only a fairly accurate estimate of the 
likely recovery and litigation process wil l  enable the court to identify the 
superior bid. 148 
It is fair to question whether courts can predict case resul ts with suffi­
cient accuracy to permit meaningful bid pricing and comparison.  Under 
existing law, limited j udicial ability to evaluate case qual i ty hampers judi­
cial analysis of proposed settlements .  Critics observe that j udicial moni­
toring of settlements is often ineffective because, in the absence of a full 
trial and without a truly adversarial proceeding, courts cannot  determine 
the strength of the case. 1 49 Nonetheless, courts do not approve settle­
ments until after the record has been developed through discovery, mo­
tion practice, and so forth .  In contrast, an auction takes place at the out­
set of the case, usually before the defendant has even fi led an answer. 
This exacerbates the information deficiency. Case evaluation is further 
complicated in securities fraud cases by limitations on the court ' s  ability 
objectively to determine the plaintiffs ' losses, 1 "0 the frequency \Vi th which 
cases settle for a small percentage of the losses claimed, 1 5 1 and factors 
tmrelated to the merits that may limit potential recovery such as the de­
fendants' asse ts and insurance coverage . J' '>� 
:VIost courts have failed even to recognize the implicit estimation in­
volved in their selection of the winning bid. 1 ""' Thus, the Cendant court 
1 47 .  Comparing t h e  b ids fo r a comparable recovery amount,  s u c h  as $ 3 0  m i l l i o n  to 
$50 m i l l ion (and ign oring differen ces such as the treatment of l i tigation expenses ) , Bid 2 
starts out costing the class more than B i d  4, b u t  may become the superior b i d  i f  a) the case 
goes to trial ;  or b) the case settles afler a t  l east twen ty-five m o n th s  of l i tigation . 
.\l ternati\·ely, if the case reaches the deposit ion s tage ancl settles withi n  n i n eteen to twentv­
fou r  months, the two b i ds are equiva l e n t. The c oun's e l i m inat ion of u n l i kely 
cont i ngencies, however, such as resolution o f  th e case on appeal o r  a recovery in excess of 
:)200 mil l ion,  can n arrow this range and i mprove the comparison.  
1 48 .  H indsight reveals that, based o n  the settlemen t amo u n t  of :i)25 m i l l i o n ,  Bicl 4 was 
superior to Bid 2. This conclusion ignores the potential  that the recm·ery would hm·e been 
different, under the i n c e ntives provided b)' either Bid 2 or Bid 4 than under the bid 
s tructure selec ted by the coun. See N i ebler ,  supra n ote 47,  at  808-09 ( a rguing that B i d  1 ,  
the w i n n i n g  bid,  should have been rej ec ted,  i n  pan because Firm 1 may have m istakenly 
u n cll'Tvalued the claim ) . 
1 49.  See Fisc h ,  Aggregation, supra n o te l :1, at 58; Macev & Mi l l er, Pbi n ti ll' ' 
Attornev's Role, supra n o te 1 2 , at 44-48 .  
F iO.  See, e .g . ,  Carleton e t  a l . ,  supra n ote 1 05 ,  at 492 ( identi tYi ng c l iHiculty i n  
m c a;;uring damages directly) . 
F i l .  See, e . g . ,  Foster et a l . ,  supra note 1 05 ,  at fig. l �  ( findi ng th a t  securit ies  class 
�lct ions  from Januan· 1 99 1  through June 1 999 s e ttled fo r  an <l\·eragc o f  H . 7 5 %  of i m·estor 
losse:') . 
1 52 .  See, e . g. , icl. at 8; Frederi ck C. Du n bar e t  a l . ,  Shareh older Li tig<� t i o n :  Deterrt�n t  
Val \ !e ,  ivierit ancl Li tigan ts'  Op t ions T'>-3-� (NER.-\, \Yo rk ing Paper. Oct. 1 9�1:> ) .  
1 5 3 .  See Decl aration of E l l iott J .  Weiss a t  J 7-20 .  I n  rc Ceuclant C ( ) r p .  Li t ig . , I 09 F. 
S�!pp.  2d ',:gr:, ( D . ?-; j. 2000) (No .  98-1 1)6,! ) (dcmomtr<l t ing how cn t t rt ' s  i n <thi l i l\ arcmatclv 
; o  p rc:clicr r::ec n\·er'." resul ted i n  court ' :; f<t i l u re to iclcnr . i i\· the "low,:st  'Jll � t l i ficd bid" ) .  
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summarily rejected the Sirota bid which sought l %  to 2% of the recovery 
as unrealistically low, describing the bid as ''q uasi philan thropic" and 
claiming that the bid did not make "professional sense. " As it turns out, 
based on the actual settlement, the bid would have yielded a fee of ap­
proximately $60.4 million, a fee ,  which, although substantially lower than 
the fee awarded by the court, is s till 7 .5 times the lodestar figure provided 
by the lead counsel .  1 "" 
The Bank One decision was one of the fevv to consider bid estimation 
an d comparison issues carefully. The court in Banh One recognized both 
that competing bids contained crossover points and that i t  was necessary 
to predict the likely recovery in the case in order to choose among the 
competing bids. 1 00 Accordingly, the court made a "best-informed" esti­
mate of the potential class recovery as in the $4.6 to $4.8 billion range 1 5 () 
and selected the firm whose bid produced the lowest fee for a recovery 
within that range . 1  "7 
The Bank One court, however, had an unusual quantity of informa­
tion available at the time i t  evaluated the auction bids. Unlike most lead 
counsel auctions, the Bar�k One auction was held after the court denied 
defendants '  motion to dismiss. 1 :>R The court also received detai led esti­
mates from counsel regarding the likely recovecy. Despite this informa­
tion, the court recently approved a settlement for $45 million,  1 '-''1 describ­
ing it as "highly favorable . " 1 1 '0 This suggests that e i ther the court's 
estimation in Bank One was seriously deficient or the selected fee s truc­
ture had a deleterious effect. 1 1' 1  
The complexities o f  bid evaluation and comparison suggest several 
reasons for concern . Firs t, it is not  clear that the court will be able to 
identify the low bidder. Second, the j udgments associated \Vith bid evalu-
1 54. ! d .  at 1 9. 
1 55 .  See I n  re Bank O n e  S ' holders Class Action, 96 F. Supp .  �cl 780,  788 (N .D .  I l l .  
2000) (" [T] h e  rvpe of variati on . . .  among the SC\ era]  proposab wil l  necessitate some la ter 
assump tions by this Court about the poten tial class recovery in the p roces� of comparing 
bids . " ) . 
1 56. The court used a · ·uoycl " s  of Lon d o n "  approach i n  ,,·h ich i t  multiplied the 
ree<wery if the lawsuit  were totally successful bv the p robabii i tv o f  such success. Icl. 
1 57.  I n te restin gly, the bids ref1cc tecl a substa n t i a l  gap between the coun·s  prediction 
;�n cl those of the bidders. The win n i n g  b i dde r proposed a fee schedul e i r; which th e fi nn 
recovered n o  percen tage o f  any amo u n t  recovered in excess of $25 m i l l io n . Id. a t  787. 
Simi larlv, a compe tin g fi n n  p ro posed a similar Glp a t  a recU\ en· of $'10 mil lion .  lei .  at  
787-88. The bids thus appeared to an t ic i pa te recoveries substan t i a l ly bel c m  th e �Hn o u n t  
p red ic ted b y  t h e  court.  I ncl eecl , th e  wi n n i ng bidder expressly resen ecl the righ t t o  request 
a b o n us i f" the case yi elded more than $2:1 m i l l i o n .  lei .  a t  787. 
1 58. l ei .  a t  782. 
1 59 .  See supra note 1 09 anc\ accompanying text. 
1 60.  In re Comc lisco Sec. Li li g . , 1 50 F. Supp. �d 9-1-3, 9:1� C\ . D .  Ill :!0() 1 )  
l () 1 .  The wi n n i n g  bid i n  Bani: Om' i n cluded a fcc ctp prm i cl i n g  th�1t  n o  fe,:s \l"otdd be 
c ktrgecl for �nn u u n ts recovered i n e:--: c e ss of :325 m i l l i o n .  See l;t 1-r  Rr1 1 1k  On !'. �)() F .  SuFP·  2d 
� l t  7�) 7 .  1'h c  cap n1a:· h a,·e d i :-;su£tded c o u nsel frot n  engaging i n  c:�.: i.cnsi\·c ,�,·ork to pu rsu\..: a 
h i Lr h er  rccun:tY.  Sec i n fra Pan l ! ! . R . 2 .  ,_1 . 
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ation reduce the transparency and objectivity of the auction process. 
Third, and perhaps most important, deficiencies in eYaluation m ay im­
pact the subsequen t  progress of the l i tigation . If the court selects a bid­
der that has evaluated the case improperly, the plaintiff class may bear 
the brunt of this decision by receiving a l ower recovery. 
2. Bid Structure and Incentive Issues. - The incentive effects of the 
various compensation structures add an additional level of complexity. 
Unlike the typical product auc tion,  in which the successful bidder, as 
owner of the auctioned item, has an incentive to exploit it m ost profita­
bly, the efforts of the winner of a lead counsel auction are expended 
primarily for the benefit of the plaintiff class. The fee structure dictates 
the extent to which the bidder wil l  share in the recovery, but the auction 
leads to the standard lawyer-cl ient agency relationship. 1 f'2 The lawyer's  
incentives, and thus the resul ts i n  the case, are affected by the structure of 
the legal services contract. Accordingly, in evaluating competing bids, 
the court must consider the incentives they create . 
Incentive problems may arise under a varie ty of different  bid struc­
tures. Because i t  fails to align counse l ' s  i nterests with those of the plain­
tiff class at high levels of recovery, a declining percentage of recovery fee 
structure is especially likely to create a significant moral hazard prob­
lem. 1 63 The last  dollars of a recovery are generally the most costly to 
produce, limiting counsel 's  motivation to pursue them . 1 64 The incre­
mental value to counsel of addi tional dollars recovered is particularly 
small when counsel will receive a very low percentage of those dollars . As 
Santore and Viard explain,  if a contingency fee structure provides lawyers 
with insufficient incentive to devote additional effort to a specific case, 
they wil l  choose to invest the effort elsewhere where it will be rewarded 
more highly. 1 60 At the same time, a low level of recovery often produces 
the highest return to effort for counsel, if  i t  results from an early settle-
1 62.  The Macey and Mil ler proposal advocates sel l ing the entire underlving claim at  
auction to el i m i na te this agency problem. Macey & i'vl i l ler,  Pla in tiff<;' Attorney's Role, 
supra note 1 2 , at 1 08-09. Unlike the c laims auction, the lead counsel auction does not 
unite the in terests of the class and i ts counsel and, as a res u i t, does not address the agency 
problem. 
1 63. Any con tingency fee of less than 100% creates a potemial moral hazard problem.  
In  most  l i tig<t tion ,  however, the effort requ i red by counsel increases a s  the case proceeds 
through discovery and to trial at a much h igher rate than the expected reuwery. See, e.g . ,  
Bruce L. Hay,  Contingent Fees, Principal-Agent  Problems, and th e Settlem en t  of 
Litigation, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 43, 46-47 ( 1 997) (describing i l lustrative hypothet ical ) . 
Accordingly, a declining percen tage fee structure is l ikely to create a larger d ispari ty than 
other fee structures between the marginal reward for counse l ' s  addi tional expendi ture of 
effort and the expected return to counsel for that expendi ture . 
1 64. See, e .g . ,  A.BA Comm. on Eth ics and Prof'! Responsibil i ty, Fonnal Op.  94-389 
( 1 994) ( s tating " eYe t-yone would agree that it is the l ast doll ars, not the li rst dolbrs, of 
recove t-y that require the greatest effort and/or ability on the part of the bwyer" ) .  
1 65 .  See Santore & Viarcl, supra note 70,  a t  3-4. .-\ nominal !v  h igher fee in 
percen tage terms mav increase attornev effort and u l t i mateh· result in a h igher n e t  
reconTy t o  the cbss. 
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ment. 1 66 Thus, under typical l itigation conditions, the declining percent­
age fee may produce a windfall return to counsel while, at the same time,  
shortchanging the plaintiff class. 
The effect is greatest for "capped" fee structures, because the cap 
effectively eliminates any incentive for counsel to pursue a recovery level 
beyond the point at which counsel fees are capped. 1 67 For example, it is 
possible that the fee cap in Bank One at a recovery level of $25 million had 
some impact on counsel ' s  decision to propose a settlemen t  for $45 mil­
lion, rather than l i tigating further in hopes of achieving a result closer to 
the court's predicted recovery of $4.6 to $4.8 billion. 1 68 
The increasing percentage bid structure better addresses the moral 
hazard problem. By increasing the reward to counsel , increasing percen t­
age bids reduce the incentive for cheap settlements and motivate counsel 
to pursue high levels of recovery. Increasing percentage bids can lead to 
very large fees, however, in cases i nvolving large recoveries, causing some 
courts to view them with skepticism. 1 69 Increasing percentage bids are 
particularly problematic in cases i n  which the court cannot readily pre­
dict the recovery at the time it selects counsel .  In Cendant, for example, i t  
appears that the recovery greatly exceeded the court's predictions, result­
ing in a fee award that was very high if measured in terms of attorney 
effort. Increasing percentage bids may also distort the true economic 
structure of the l i tigation and, in some cases, create an incentive for 
counsel to pursue overly risky l i tigation strategies . 
Fixed percentage fees obviously fal l  somewhere between the two , cre­
ating less of a moral hazard problem than declining percentage fees, but 
failing to generate the same incentive for continued attorney effort as 
increasing percentage fees. Moreover, fixed percentage awards may ap­
pear crude to the extent that they do not  appear sensitive to recovery 
levels. Nonetheless fixed percentage fees offer two advantages: They fa­
cilitate bid comparison and they reduce the importance of predicting re­
covel)' for pricing bid proposals.  
Bids that va1-y in price to reflect l i tigation duration or various li tiga­
tion contingencies have similar incentive effects . Early settlement bo­
nuses, for example, exacerbate the moral hazard problem associated with 
declining percentage fee structures by rewarding counsel for a quick 
1 66 .  See, e .g. ,  Hay,  supra note 1 63 ,  at 46 ( demonstrating this resul t  with 
hypothe tical ) .  
H :i 7 .  By some accounts, the capped fee structure i n  I n  re Ami n o  Acid Lysine An titrust 
Litig.,  9 1 8  F. Supp. 1 1 90 (N .D .  I l l .  1 996) , had t h is e ffect.  See Fisch,  Aggregati o n ,  supra 
note 1 3 , at 86-87 (describing fee structure and l i tigation resu l t ) . 
lfiS. See supra no tes 1 07- l 09 and accompanyi n g  text ( describing flank One estimate 
and settlement result) ; see also Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp. ,  534 F. 2cl l 085, 1 09 2  ( 3 d  
Cir. 1 976)  (observin g  th at to assert t h a t  counsel would not take i n to consideration amount 
of expense for which th ere may not be any reimbursern e n t  "is to argue against  real i ty,  
agai nst the vagaries o f  human nature" ) .  
HiCJ. Sec ,  e.g. , Nieblcr,  supra note 4 7 ,  a t  790-9 1 ( describing negatiYe j uclicial  response 
w inc re<tsi ng percen tage bids) . 
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cheap settlement. In addition,  early settlement bonuses can give defend­
ants additi onal leverage in nego tiating a cheap settlement by creating a 
time-based discontinuity in the returns to effort of plaintiffs ' counsel. 
Furthermore, the percentage o f  recovery m e thod already provides suffi­
cient incentives for counsel to expedite the settlement process . Unlike 
the lodestar m e thod, a percentage o f  recovery fee gives counsel l i ttle rea­
son unnecessarily to prolong the litigation.  
In contrast, duration-based fee s tructures, i nc luding both those with 
calendar and l itigation s tage con tingencies, create a problematic incen­
tive for l itigation delay. Alth ough it m ay appear that prolonged l i tigation 
j ustifies a higher fee award and that d uration-based structures counteract 
the incentive for cheap early settlements ,  delay is not closely correlated 
with attorney effort or increased recovery. In addition, the d u ration of 
l i tigation is l argely within the control of plainti ffs ' counsel . It  is  difficult 
for courts to monitor the progress of the l itigation to uncover unneces­
sary delay; defendan ts are u n likely to oppose i t, and defense counsel typi­
cally benefit from p rotracted l itigation . As a result, d uration-based s truc­
tures create the potential for higher fees and delayed recovery, nei ther of 
which is in the interests of the plaintiff class . 
These in centive effects also apply when litigation milepost grids are 
used to structure auction bids . Although the stage of recovery is more 
closely correlated with attorney effort than the simple passage o f  time,  
and succeeding stages of li tigation do entail increasing amounts of effort 
for counsel, each discontinuity in the grid creates an opportunity for 
counsel to trade a higher fee against a lower total recovery. Increasing 
the fee with the l itigation s tage encourages unnecessary work and need 
not p roduce greater recoveries.  
At the same time,  l i tigation grids unnecessarily complicate both the 
bidding process and the evaluation of competing bids. Calculating the 
l ikelihood of and desired return for each contingency is costly. Bidders 
in Sherleigh .Associates, for example,  were required to propose bids for 
twenty-eight different scenarios . 170 Many scenarios are of marginal rele­
vance . For example ,  virtually all class actions are settled , m aking it unrea­
sonable to give substantial weight to the sections of the grid that propose 
fees for resolution of the case after trial or on appeal. Similarly, it wil l  
seldom be appropriate for counsel to settle a case prior t o  conducting 
some discovery. 1 7 1  As a result, those sections of the grid that address res­
olution prior to discovery or prior to the resolution of th e motion to dis-
1 70. For each scenario,  the hiclcler must consider i n n umerable \'�lri,l bles relat ing to 
the cost of l i tigat ion at th<it st:1ge, such as the poten tial need for i n put by senior  b11}t:rS o r  
special i :cecl tr ial  counsel i f  t h e  case goes t o  trial . The bidder must t h e n  de Lcrm inc the 
percen tage of the reco\·ery that i s  n e cessa rr to provide compensation � lt m'trkct rate:;. See 
:;u pr<l note 9�-9:\ a n d  ctccompanying text and chan. 
1 7 1 .  r n rctrt ca5es.  go\·t-rn n1e n  t i n\-es t.igtt tlon o r  collat.�ral I-Ji'oc ecd i n g.·; l l l t"lY re:.; u l t  in � t  
'.u lii c ien rh· clc\·e lupcc l  f<�c w;t l  rc:�c orcl to permit an e<J r i i c r  resoluti o n :  :_h :..·.'c c i rcuw:;t�l l l Ct::' 
a re l i kelY t< J he ap p�lrC J l l  at rht� t ime the auctiun is condu cted. 
2002] LAWYERS ON THE A UCTION BLOCK 681 
miss, which in some types of litigation has become virtually automatic, are 
of limited value in the selection decision .  If marginal contingencies 
should be eliminated, and the court's  analysis lirni ted to one or two sec­
tions of the grid, judicial reliance on grids is misplacecl . 1 72 
Finally, although several courts have focused on the treatment of li ti­
gation costs in analyzing bid structures, 1 73 the requirement that lawyers 
internalize or cap l i tigation costs can also lead to inappropriate l itigation 
decisions. First, any l imitation on counsel 's  abil ity to recover non-lawyer 
costs creates an addi tional conflic t  between counsel ' s  interests and those 
of the plaintiff class. Such l imitations may discourage counsel from in­
curring expenditures that increase the size of the recovery. John Coffee 
has argued that the cost cap in Omcle produced precisely this result, ob­
serving that the case settled at precisely the point at which counsel hit the 
cap on expenses, and suggesting that counsel was unwill ing to continue 
to li tigate once i t  began to bear the cost of addi tional expenditures. 1 7-1 
Second, as Andrew Niebler has demonstrated, the requirement that attor­
neys internalize non-lawyer costs wil l  not lead attorneys to select the opti­
mal mixture of lawyer and non-lawyer inputs . 1 70 Instead, this s tructure 
creates an incentive for lawyers to attempt to maximize their own profits 
through the management of non-l<:nvyer costs .  
The foregoing exemplify the incentive problems presented by bid 
s tructures in recent auction cases. Because of the dynamic relationship 
between the fee structure and the net recovery, and because the court 
should be seeking to maximize the net recovery to the p laintiff class 
rather than to minimize the fee award, the court cannot select a winning 
bid on the basis of price alone, but must attempt to evaluate the incentive 
effects of competing bids. A.11 auction that minimizes counsel fees in ei­
ther percentage or absolute terms at the cost of reduc1ng class recovenr 
cannot be \iewed as more than a cosmetic success. 
1 72 .  Re liance on the grid may also lead the court astray if the court's predi ction of the 
l i kely recm·erv is  substan tial ly inaccurate. J n  such a case, the gri d m av foc us the cou rt ' s 
analysis on diffe rences in fee structures that  are u l tima tel\' trivial i n  l igh t of a more real istic 
assess m e n t  of the recm·en·. In Lw:m t,  fo r example, the court's bidding grid topped at a 
reCO\'CI\' of $25 mi l l ion.  Accordi ngly, the grid was poorly suited to a l low the court to 
eval uate differen ces in b ids for substan tial ly h igher levels of recm c :r1·. T h e  u n realist icallv 
1011· est i mates i n  the grid were brough t to the attention of the cou rt. See Letter from 
\\'e n clv A. \\'eiss to The H o nor;tble Alfred J Lechner ( May 2lJ,  20UO ) , at h ttp:// 
,,.,,w.ca3. uscourts . gov/ cbsscounsel/Wi tness%20Statemen ts/ll·eiss. pcll' ! o n  J i lc  \\'ith the 
C:olwnbi({ Law Revinu) (wa rn i n g  that  S25 mil l ion rep resented a recm·en· o r· k:;s th;m 0 .75 
cents for e<tch clo l b r  of al leged losses) . 
1 73.  See We n clerlwlcl , . .  C:li i n k  Corp . . 1 89 F.R. D .  ')70, 57?, (L '·i .D .  Cd . l 99�l ) : I n  re 
O r<tcle Sec. Liti g. , 1 :'·2 F .R.D.  538. 04:)-48 ( N . D  Cal .  1 990) . 
1 74 .  See J o h n  C. Coffe e ,  J r . ,  Securities Cbss Actions ,  N; t t ' l  L..J , Sept .  l -L 1 �l98 .  ;1[ G() 
( ckscribing Oradf' as looki ng "much l ike a case that the 11·i nn ing bidder c o u ! cl n u t  atforcl tu 
GliTI' fu rth e r" ) .  
! 75 .  N i ebier,  supra n o t e  -J'/, ; \l  798-802. 
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3 .  The i\uction Houses ExamjJle. - In the Auction !-louses case, 1 76 
Judge K:1plan used a unique auction structure designed to address the 
estimation and comparison problems described in Subsections 1 and 2 
above . By some accounts, the auction was a great success. 1 77 In light of 
the foregoing discussion, i t  is worth considering the extent  to which 
Judge Kaplan was successful in limiting these problems. 
Judge Kaplan structured the Auction Houses fee award as follows. 1 78 
The class would receive 1 00 %  of a recovery amount designated as X. 
Counsel would receive 25% of any recovery in  excess of X .  In effect,  this 
amounted to an increasing percentage contingency fee with an initial 
rate of zero. Firms were instructed to bid by specifYing the value of X 
pursuant to which they were willing to serve as lead counsel .  
The resul ting bidding procedure successfully eliminated the bid eval­
uation and comparison problems described in Subsection 1 above by pro­
viding a single bid structure . Firms were essentially competing on the 
basis of the highest level of recovery for which the bidder was willing to 
forgo attorneys ' fees. 
More significantly, Judge Kaplan sought to address agency and in­
centive problems. The structure was designed to eliminate the incentive 
for a cheap early settlement by providing a minimum recovery level for 
the plaintiff class before the lawyer receives anything. By requiring coun­
sel to commit the effort level necessary to obtain a recovery of at least  X, 
the structure prevented a low quality lawyer from submitting an inappro­
priately cheap bid and then selling out the class . 1 7L' At the same time,  
Judge Kaplan reasoned that counsel would receive increasing marginal 
returns to eflort as the recovery exceeded X, creating an incentive for 
counsel to l i tigate aggressively. 1 80 
Despite these advantages, there are problems with the Auction Houses 
fee structure . 1 8 1  One problem is that it subj ects bidders to substantial 
1 76. In re Auction Houses i\ntitrust Litig. , 1 97 F .R.D.  7 1  ( S.D .N.Y. 2000 ) . 
1 77 .  See, e .g  . .  I n  re Auction Houses Antitrust L i tig . ,  No. 00 Civ. 0648 ( LAK) , 200 1 
U .S .  Dist .  LEXI S  1 71 3 , at *77  (S .D .N .Y. Feb. 22 .  200 1 )  ( stating that "the result of the lead 
counsel auction in  this case was exceptionally beneficial to the class'' ) ;  H arnblett, supra 
note 2, at l (describing the bidding p rocedure as a "success" ) .  
1 78. Judge Kaplan in i tial ly chose a more complex three-tiered bidding structure, i n  
wh i ch  the  first t i e r  of the  recovery would go  entirely to  the  plaintiff class, the second tier 
would go entirely to counsel ,  and any additional recovery would be spl i t  betwee n  counsel 
and the class according to a 25:75 ratio. B idders were instructed to specify the size of the 
first two tiers. See In re Auction Houses, 1 97 F.R.D.  at 73 ( describing in i tial  structure ) .  The 
proposed design raised a variety of evaluation and other problems. See Affidavit ofji l l  E .  
Fisch at 3-23, fn re Auction Houses A n titrust Litig. , 200 1 li .S .  D ist .  LEXIS 1 7 1 3  (No.  00 Civ. 
0648 ( LAK) ) (describing bid evaluation and comparison problems and potential conflicts 
of in terest under three-tiered bidding structure) .  
1 79 .  In re A uction Houses, 1 97 F .R .D.  at 8:'1-84. 
1 80. Icl. 
1 8 1 .  In addi tion to the problems described in th is  Subsection. the ,\ uclion Housl's 
pmceclure i:; also subj ect  to the problems described in i n fra Parts l l l . C:  and D. Pan I I I . C  
identities concerns abuut  the p redo m i nance of price considerations �mel about t h e  effec t  
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risk. A firm that erroneously estimated the likely recovery and specified 
too high a threshold faced the possibility of receiving no fee award. 
Firms had an incentive to discount their bids, that is, to reduce the 
threshold X at which they were willing to accept the lead counsel appoint­
ment, in order to reflect this risk. 1 82 Substantial discounting diminishes 
the effectiveness of the threshold as a barrier to a cheap settlement. 
At the same time, the Auction Houses s tructure creates an incentive 
for some firms to overbid, that is ,  to specifY an unreasonably high thresh­
old in hopes of obtaining the lead counsel appointment. The high pro­
file nature of the case generates pressure to overbid .  An unduly high bid 
could create dramatic conflic ts of interest between counsel and the plain­
tiff class. vVhen a firm learns that the case is unlikely to result in a recov­
ery of greater than X, i t  may sacrifice class interests by pursuing a high 
risk, high reward l i tigation s trategy, such as rejecting a reasonable se ttle­
ment offer in favor of an unproductive trial, in hopes of salvaging some 
compensation. Alternatively, the firm may choose to minimize i ts losses 
by shirking, reducing i ts efforts to the minimal level necessary to con­
clude the case .  Because the firm will be indifferent to variation in recov­
ery levels below X, i t  has no incentive to invest further resources to maxi­
mize recovery to the plaintiff class within that tier. 
Finally, the fee structure creates an incentive for counsel to manipu­
late the structure of the settlement in order to maximize i ts fee award. 
Arguably the settlement obtained in the case , although generous, reflects 
this incentive . The se ttlement provided a cash payment to the plaintiff 
class of approximately $41 2  million, with an additional $ 1 25 million in 
discount coupons for future transactions with the defendants . 1 t>� Al­
though i t  is difficult to determine the value of any noncash compensa­
tion,  courts have frequently been cri ticized for overvaluing coupon-based 
se ttlements. In this case, the court determined that the coupons were 
·worth at least 80% of their face value. 1 84 Accordingly, the court valued 
the entire settlement at $5 1 2  million and awarded counsel a fee of $26.75 
million. U:F> Notably, in the absence of the coupons, which the defendants 
of the auCLion procedure on the judicial role, and Part I T I . D  identifies concerns about 
price production in  lead counsel auctions .  
1 82 .  Firms were l ikely to further discount  their bids to address the risk that thev would 
overpay clue to a win ner's curse problem.  See infra Pan I I I .D . l ( describ ing winner's 
curse) . 
1 83 .  See , e.g. , In re Auc tion Houses Antitrust Litig. , :\o. 00 Civ. 0648 (L�) , 200 1 
U .S. Dist. LEXIS 1 7 1 3 , at ''' 77  (S .D .N.Y. Feb. 22, 200 1 ) .  
1 84. !d.  a t  ''' 72 n .SS .  
185.  lei.  at ''' 74. This  fee was 25% of the difference ben,·een the total settlement Yalue 
of S5 1 2  mill ion and the Boies bid of S405 mil l ion .  Icl .  The fee ,  5 .  2% of the total recm·ery, 
was to be paid in the same proportion of cash and coupons as th at received by class 
members. l cl at ''' 78 .  The court also awarded approximate�\' S600,000 in additional fees to 
i n terim lead counsel in  the case. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig . , \:o. 00 Ci\'. 0648 
( L�) . 200 1 L1.S Dist.  LEXIS 1 989. at '' l 5  (S .D .N.Y. feb. 2��. 200 1 ) (awarding fees to 
i nter im iead counsel out of sett lement fu nd) . 
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were presumably far more wil l ing to provide than additional cash, the 
Boies firm would have received a fee of less than $2 million .  
Other factors counsel caution i n  applauding the results of  the Auc­
tion Houses case . First ,  i t  is difficult to evaluate the fee award in terms of 
reasonableness. Although the fee represents only 5 .2% of the total recov­
ery, \Vhich is qui te low in percentage terms, $26.75 million is  fairly gener­
ous compensation for approximately six months' work on a case in which 
the private l itigation was preceded by a Department of Justice anti trust 
investigation. 1 H6 By the time Judge Kaplan ordered the auction in May of 
2000, one defendant, Christie ' s ,  had publicly admitted wrongdoing and 
acknowledged that i t  was cooperating with the investigation . 1  HI Subse­
quently, Sotheby's  chief executive , D iana Brooks, agreed to plead gui lty 
and provide testimony. 1 88 Accordingly, the Auction Houses case did not 
present a serious risk of nonliability; i t  was rather more, as  J udge Kaplan 
described i t, " like finding a pot of gold in the middle of the sidewalk ." 1 H�l 
Second, the range of bids submitted in the case demonstrates the 
serious risk that inadequate competition in a lead counsel auction will 
lead to excessive fee awards.  Although a fairly substantial number of 
firms submitted bids, the bid by the Boies firm was a significant outl ier. 1 90 
More than twice that of the next highest bid, it was characterized by some 
as "daring. " t �J t  Presumably Boies, Schiller could have submitted a bid of 
$205 million and s ti ll been awarded the lead counsel position . Alterna­
tively, if the Boies firm had not participated, the auction would have pro­
duced a winning bid of $205 million. Such a bid, assuming the same 
settlement, would have yielded lead counsel a far less reasonable $77 mil­
l ion fee: FJ2 
Finally, the feasibil ity of Judge Kaplan ' s  approach remains subject  to 
the analysis in subsequent Sections of this Article. I n  particular, Section 
C below identifies concerns about the relationship between the auction 
procedure and the j udicial role, and Section D further explains why lead 
counsel auctions may not produce reasonable fee awards.  
l tlb .  See In  I P  A uction Hottses, 1 9 7  F .R .D.  ��t 72 ( describing backgro u n d  of case ) . The 
li nal dav for submission of bids in the aucrion wa:; i\ hv 25, 2000. !d.  at 74. On Sept. 22 ,  
�2000, t h e  part ies ad\'ised th e court that they h a d  re�tc h e d  a n  agreem en t i n  principle to  
.se t t l e  th e case , a n d  they submitted a proposed sertlement for pre l i m i nary approYal i n  
:\0\ emher 2000. in re A uction Houses, 2001 U . S .  D i s t  LEXfS 1 7 ! 3, at ''' ] l -''' 1 2 . 
1 0 7.  See, e.g .. Carol Vogel , Christie ' s  Says I t  ls Cooperating with Anti trust I n qu i rv i n  
A n  \\'oriel, N .Y. Times,  J a n .  29, 2000, a t  B4. 
1 88 .  See S h awn Tully,  A House Di1 icled. Fort u n e ,  Dec. 1 8, 2000, at  264, 26.7 
( cle�crihing B rooks ' s decision to plead gui l ty and pr01·icle testirnom· aga in st  h e r  fo rmer 
buss, A .. Alfred Taubm a n ) ; In re Auction ! louses, '2UO I Li .S .  D ist . LEXIS 1 7 1 3 , a t  ''' 2 3  
(descri b i n g  guilt:· p leas b v  Brooks a n d  Soth e lw's on Oct. :) ,  '2000. to  cri m i md p r i c e  fixi ng) . 
U )9 .  in u' Aurtion Houses. 200 1 U.S .  D is t .  LEX IS 1 989,  a t 8.  
l L) () . . '\ccording to judge Kap l a n ,  th e mean bid submi tted (exclud ing  the B o i es firm ' s  
bi cl l \\'as :3 1 30.3 mi l l ion .  I n  I P  A uction Houses, '2UU l L .S.  D i s t .  LEXJS 1 7 1 :� ,  at  '''75 . 
! ',) ] . Se::: Cr > l ee, L; n tangl ing, supra n u le 1 .  at -L 
! 9 2 .  S im i b rh . the mean bid ,,·oulcl han: p rocl t t cccl a r·c e ����·�trcl uC :39:1 . 4  m il l i o n  o r  
� �� . t) (/� of the rcc( }\.e i Y .  I H  re l\ nction f-fol(scs. �OO l L . S.  Dis t .  L E X I S  1 7 1 ��- a t  :;: 7:1 .  
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C. A u.ctions and the Judicial Role 
Current experience with the lead counsel auction raises questions 
about j udges' effectiveness as auctioneers. As detailed in the preceding 
Sections, recent cases reveal problems vvith judicial analysis of bid struc­
ture, bid evaluation, and incentive effects . 1 93 In short, courts are making 
mistakes in structuring and conducting lead counsel auctions .  
This conclusion is not  fatal . Judicial experience with lead counsel 
auctions is limited, and continued experimentation is likely to improve 
the auction process. As the Auction Houses case demonstrates ,  j udges are 
capable of understanding the flaws in current practices and responding 
through innovation. 
Structural problems in  the lead counsel auction are m ore problem­
atic, however, than problems in implementation . This A.rticle identifies 
three such problems, the m ultidimensional nature of the lead counsel 
auction, the effect of the auction on j udicial neutrality, and the j udge 's 
role as agent in the auction process. These problems both l imit the effec­
tiveness of the auction model and reduce its procedural advantages .  
1 .  The JVIultidimensional Nature of the Auction. - Despite the focus of 
Part III .B  on bid price, price is not the only relevant consideration in the 
selection of class counsel .  Because the court is choosing a firm that will 
subsequently perform legal services on behalf of the plaintiff class, the 
court must also consider bidder quality .  The relevance of quality to the 
selection decision causes the lead counsel auction to differ fro m  most 
traditional auctions in which non-price bidder characteristics , other than 
abil ity to pay, are irrelevant. 
Traditionally, clients decide to retain counsel on the basis of both 
price and non-price factors . 1 94 As in many markets ,  price and quality are 
closely related; indeed, price is often a function of quality. Higher quality 
lawyers can command a higher price for their services.  Lower quality law­
yers charge a lower price . Lawyer quality is likely to affect both the likeli­
hood and the amount of plaintiffs ' recovery. 
This poses several problems for the judge as auctioneer. First, a lead 
counsel auction cannot select among competing bids solely on the basis 
of price.  Such a process may select a poor quality lawyer precisely be­
cause of the l ikely correlation between price and quality. 1 q -, Second, in 
order to evaluate competing bids, the court must evaluate lawyer quality. 
1 �n . See also Fisc h ,  Aggregation,  su pra n o te 1 :1 ,  a t 8()-88 ( descri bing problems wi th 
j ud i c i al use of lead counsel  <mc t i ons in  rec e n t  cases ) .  
l �)4. Th is Art i c l e  wil l  ge ner ically d e n ot e  n on-price factors as qual i rv c o ns iderations.  
JCJ:) .  Al tern a ti w:ly, price dominance can create a .. r,tce to t h e  bottom .. br en couragi ng 
bidders to m i n i m i ze cost a n d  fee esti m a tes i n  order to obt,t i n  t h e  app o i n tm e n t. 
St tbscque nth· the wi n n i n g  bidder wi l l  ha1-c an i ncc n ti1-c to m i n i m i ze i ts l i t igation efforts i n  
nrclcr rn maxim ize pro fi ts . Sec Securi t i es Li t ig�Hi o n  Reform: H e a ri n gs heforc tht: 
Suhcomm. o n  Tt: lecomm. and Fi n .  of the Ho u:;e Cumm. un E ne-rgY a n d  Commerce . l 0c1d 
l: ')lJ ( 1 LJCJ4) ( s t a te m e nt of Arth u r  :vl i lkr.  Professor  of Law. Han a rd Lr n i versi r1) 
( w�l rn i n g  oC t h is problem ) .  
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Third, the court must  develop a decisionmaking structure that enables i t  
to consider both price and quality. 
Outside the auction context, most courts prefer a negotiated solu­
tion to the selection of lead counsel to a careful assessment of lawyer 
quality. 1 96 Recent auction decisions suggest  continued reluctance to eval­
uate quality. 1 9 7  Auction analyses do not differ markedly from the superfi­
cial quality evaluations conducted elsewhere . Courts rarely solicit writing 
samples, investigate counsel ' s  familiarity with the facts or relevant legal 
principles , review detailed proposals for litigation strategy, or evaluate 
prospective counsel by means of face-to-face "beauty contests . "  
Instead, even those courts that have purported to  consider quality 
factors have relied on unhelpful and self-serving information such as firm 
resumes. 1 98 Naturally, the results have been poor. Thus, in Oracle, al­
though Judge ·walker solicited quality information from the bidding 
firms, he subsequently found that information insufficient to enable him 
to distinguish among them on the basis of quality. 1 99 
Courts may also have difficulty identifying appropriate indicia of firm 
quali ty. Judge ·walls specifically addressed quali ty considerations in his 
Cendant opinion , but the quality factor to which he devoted the most at­
tention was trial experience .:wo In light of the fact that the vast m� ority 
of securities fraud class actions settle prior to trial and that, in  any event, 
the successful bidder could obtain the services of specialized trial counsel 
if necessary, i t  i s  difficult to understand why trial experience is a substan­
tial indication of finn quality.20 1 In Quintus, Judge V\Talker stressed the 
importance of malpractice coverage despite conceding that no bidder 
had substantial coverage relative to i ts exposure in the case. 202 Similarly, 
the court in Wenderhold v. Cylinh concluded that one bidder was superior 
l <J6. Although in theory the fi rst-to-file  rule could be c haracterized as qua l i ty based i n  
the sense that i t  rewards i nvestigat ion efforts bv awarding the lead counsel  position to the 
lawyer who origi nal ly uncovered the defendant 's  m isconduct, i n  pract ice ,  the rule merely 
reaffirms the l i m i ted j udic ia l  comm i tment to qual i ty eYaluation. Cou rts applyi ng the rule 
rarely inqu ire i n to the actual degree of i nvestigation ;  indeed, they appl)l the rule even i n  
cases that p iggyback o n  prior government  proceedings. Moreover, the rule i tsel f  
discourages thorough i nvestigation in  favor of  rapid fi l ing 
l <J7 .  The most  exteusi\·e qual i ty analysis to date was concluc tecl lw .J udge v\'a lker in  In 
rr Quintus Sn. Litig. , 1 48 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974-82 ( \J . D .  Cal 200 1 ) .  
1 98. Sec, e .g . ,  id .  at 9 74-79 ( relying on i n fo rmat ion prO\'ided by firms to gauge 
experi en ce and expertise ) .  
1 99. See I n  re Oracle Sec. Lit ig . ,  1 32 F.R.D.  5 :18,  542 ( N . D .  Cal .  1 990)  ( concluding i t  
was " impossible obj ec tiYely to dis tingu ish among [ the  bidding] 1irrns i n  terms of the ir  
background, experience and l egal abi l i ties" ) .  
200. 1 9 1  F .R. D .  387,  389 (D .NJ 1 998) 
20 1 .  See <t lso I n  re Commtouch Software Ltd. Sec. Litig. ,  l\'o. C-0 1 -007 1 9 , app.B a t  l 
(N .D .  Cal. J u n e  27 ,  200 1 )  ( li s ting descript ion of trial experience as first substan t iYe 
i n form;nion req u i red from prospecti\·e lead counsel ) .  This is n o t  tu �trgue that  t ri;tl 
experience is  i rrele\·an t .  A lawyer's  credible t h reat to go to t rial affects h is or her  abi l i tY to 
negotia te a settl cmen L  
202.  In 1'1' Quintm. 1 48 F .  Supp. 2cl a t  978 ,  980 ( obs e rvi n g that  Weiss & Yourm;tn 's Lick 
o f  m;dpt·ac t i c c  i nsurance wa.-; ' ·a defi n i te str ike <tg;t i n s t  i t  
.
. ) .  
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to i ts competitor, in part, on the basis of quality considerations that in­
cluded, according to the court, the winning bidder's smaller size, lack of 
a west coast office, and absence of l itigation experience in the circuit.20"' 
One might as readily have viewed these characteristics as demonstrating 
the inferior quality of the winning bidder.2°4 
Perhaps most troubling in this regard was Judge \!\Talker's  analysis of 
Milberg Weiss 's  quality in Quintus. Judge Walker purported to determine 
whether he was sacrificing quality in failing to select Milberg by reviewing 
empirical evidence on settlements . 205 Judge Walker reasoned that 
" [o ]ver a large enough sample of cases, the quality of lawyering by a 
plaintiff law firm should be shown by i ts ability to recover a greater pro­
portion of the potential available damages than that obtained by lesser 
quality firms . "206 Citing evidence that Milberg's  settlements ,  measured 
against potential investment losses, did not vary substantially from those 
of other firms,207 the court concluded that Milberg lacked a qualitative 
advantage in practice ability that would justify a higher rate of 
compensation. 
Judge ·walker's analysis is flawed for several reasons. First, as previ­
ously indicated, potential damages in securities l itigation are difficult to 
measure obj ectively.20s Second, the range and type of factors likely to 
influence settlement variation suggest  that it is impossible to determine 
the quality of lawyering by viewing the proportion of losses recoverecl .20� 1 
At minimum, such an endeavor would need to determine whether Mil­
berg's cases were similar to those handled by other firms with respect to 
such factors as the size of the defendant, the size of investor losses , the 
nature of the allegations and the circuit  in which the case was filed .2 1  0 
Third, and most importantly, Judge Walker ' s  reasoning failed to refl ect 
his previously articulated position about the relevance of market consid­
erations. Milberg' s opportunity costs, which reflect the alternative use of 
203. 1 9 1  F .R.D.  600, 602-03 ( N . D .  Cal .  2000 ) .  
204. Cf. In re Quintus, 1 48 F .  Supp. 2 d  a t  980 ( reason ing  that larger firm has greater 
resources to pursue case ) .  
205. Tel. a t  9 8 1 -82. 
206. lcl . a t  98 1 .  
207. The coun c i ted a recent  empirical analysis of securities fraud sett lements .  l ei .  a t  
9 78 ( c i ting 1\ilukesh Baj<�j e t  a l . ,  Securities Class Action Settlements :  An Empir ica l  Analysis 
!'>3 ( Nov. 1 6, 2000) , at  h t tp :/ /securities .stanford.eclu/rescarch/studi es/ 2000 1 1 6_SSRN_ 
Baj aj . pclf (on fi le  with the Colu1nbia Law Review) ) .  
208. See supra note l OS and accompanying text; see also I n  re Comclisco Sec. Lir.ig. , 
1 50 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N .D .  J l l .  200 1 )  ( reject ing i nst i tution ' s  f i rst-in-first-out ( FIFO)  
methodology for computi ng i ts l osses ancl determin ing, instead, that ins t i tution had 
clcri1 ecl a net  gai n  during the c lass period) . 
209. See, e .g . , Foster et a l . ,  supra note 1 0!) , at 7-9 (describing fac tors that e:-; pla i n 
va riation i n  sett lement  values ) .  
2 1 0. Raja j ' s  own statistics o n  median and aYerage ser r lemen t amo u n t  r�!ise questions 
about whether Mi lberg's cases arc represen tative. Sec B��jaj c t  a l . ,  supr; t  note 207, a t ;:\?, 
(sho1,·ing iV! i lbcrg as handl ing cases 11·ith substantial ly lo1,·er �tver;>.gc but h igher n ;ecl ian 
sct t lemcJH amounts tktn other  lirms) .  
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i ts time litigating other securi ties cases, may be substantial . The returns 
in those other cases serve as the market and so form a more appropriate 
benchmark by which reasonableness should be measured than supposi­
tions about practice abil i ty.  
Evaluation of lawyer quality does not appear to pose an insurmounta­
ble problem . Courts are experienced at dealing with and evaluating law­
yers; indeed, most j udges are lawyers. Although information problems 
may hinder a j udge 's abil ity to evaluate counse l ' s  quality based on the 
results of prior l i tigation, i t  is reasonable to assume that j udges have suffi­
cien t  expertise to evaluate lawyers ' performance in the same manner as a 
client, through a review of prior performance,  legal wri ting, legal argu­
ments ,  demonstrated familiarity with the relevant legal issues, reputation,  
and so forth . � 1 1 
Courts might also develop more obj ective standards for evaluating 
bidder quality. Government agencies conduct auctions under circum­
stances in which both price and bidder qual ity are relevant. The procure­
ment auctions conducted by the Department of Defense ( DOD) are a 
common example .� 1 �  The DOD addresses the quality dimension 
through the application of scoring systems which convert the various non­
price characteristics of the bids into an obj ective score .  Bidding guide­
l ines in  such auctions specify the relevant quality cri teria and the scoring 
system in aclvance.2n The DOD then evaluates the competing bids on 
the basis of both price and quality scores to select the winning bid.  
However, quality scoring is only the first step toward addressing the 
issue . Even if the court can quanti£}' quality factors, i t  must then d evelop 
a methodology for comparing bids that compete along two dimensions: 
price and quality. Such multidimensional auctions are complex. 2 1 4  In 
addi tion to de·veloping a system for quality scoring, the court must articu­
late a preference function for price and quality scores, i n  which both vari­
ables are given appropriate weight. 2E' The design of such a preference 
function is not trivial .  For example, although a clien t wil l  l ikely be vvilling 
� l l . On the  other band, courts are seemingh· unable to evaluate and compare Iawver 
qual i ty for r h e  purpose of sel ecting lead counsel under the ll acl i tional approach. Indeed, 
j u d ici <d refusal to focus on qual i tv l ed to the a doption of the fi rst-to-fi l e  rule. Sec Weiss 8..: 
Beckerman,  supra note 26,  at 2062 (describing use of first-to-fi l e  rule ) . 
2 1 2 . See , e . g . ,  Yeon-Koo Che, D esign Competi t ion Th rough \-lu l ti cl imensional 
Auctions, 24 Rr\ND J Econ . 668, 668-69 ( 1 993) ( descr i b i n g  DOD procure m e n t  auctions 
and qua l i tv ,.coring) . 
2 13 .  !d .  �tt G68. 
2 1 -L See. e . g . ,  Fernando B ranco, The Design of M u l t i d i mcnsi on<tl  Auctions,  28 RAND 
. J .  Econ . 63, 77 ( 1 997)  (demonstrat ing that, under certa in condit ions ,  <t s i n gl e  stage 
rnu l t idintemion;\ 1  auct ion cannot provide an optimal resul t) . 
2 Ei .  The mil i tY or the court, or more appropriatelv, of the pla int i ff class. can be 
clescrihecl as <t funct ion of p and q ( L;=f( p, q )  ) . If the court specili6 <t uti l i t; fun ct ion,  i t  
can t hen determ i n e  \\ hich bid, co nsisting o f  speci fi u r i ons fo r p a n d  q ,  m<t:\ i m i ze:; U .  See 
:Vla n i n  Cripp., 8: '-� orman I re l and, The Design of Aucrinns � tn d Tenders w i th Quai i t; 
Th re:;lw ids:  Th·,· SHn m etr ic  Ctse, 1 04 Econ . J  3 1 6 . :'> 1 7  ( l l )CJ"\ )  ( descri bing pri c c / qu�d i t\· 
prefe re n ce fun ct ion ) .  
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to pay more for increased lawyer quality up to a point, 1t 1s difficult to 
determine the rate at which the client is  willing to substi tu te between 
quality and price.  Moreover, the m arginal util ity of increased quali ty 
probably varies, although i t  presumably declines as price increases. 
Even assuming that i t  is possible for the court to specif)' such a pref­
erence function , the l imited economic l i terature suggests that designing 
an appropriate multidimensional auction is extremely difficult.2 1 6  Ex­
isting analysis of multidimensional auctions is incomplete ,  but it indicates 
that the standard bidding process is unlikely to produce an optimal re­
sult. Yeon-Koo Che has concluded, for example, that traditional auction 
procedures are l ikely to over-reward quality in a multidimensional auc­
tion .2 1 7  Fernando Branco extends this analysis and concludes that  a sin­
gle bidding process will not function well and that the seller in  a mul­
tidimensional auction should, instead, use a two step process in which 
bidding over p rice is  followed by negotiation over quality . 2 1 8 
Moving from theory to practice, real world auctions often simplify 
the analysis by specifying a minimum quality s tandard instead of allowing 
b idders to compete freely on the quality dimension . 2 1 9  This task ,  which 
has the effect of reducing the auction to a single dimension, can be ac­
complished in several ways . 220 The auctioneer can specify minimum 
quality criteria and require that bidders pass the quality threshold before 
being evaluated on the basis of price,  thus using quality as a screening 
device .22 1  Bids can be ranked on the basis of price and then bidder qual­
i t:y evaluated in that order, until a bid of acceptable quality is identi­
fied .222 Alternatively, bidders can submit a package of price and quality, 
which is considered as a unit. 
Even assuming that the application of a minimum quality standard is 
a realis tic method for selecting legal services, for any of these methods 
fairly to address quali ty considerations, the court must both be capable of 
arti culating its approach at the outset  of the auction and committing to 
the articulated s tandards . If the court evaluates quality on an ad hoc ba-
2 1 6. See, e .g . , icl. at 3 1 7  (arguing that the varie ty of preference functions among 
parties and the cliHicul ty of quality m o n i toring m er t ime render unlikely an ideal 
rnu l ticl imensional auction reOecting price and qual ity cr i teria) . 
2 1 7. Che,  supra note 2 1 2, at 675-76. 
2 1 8. Branco, supra note 2 1 4, a t  77. 
2 1 9 . See Cripps & Ireland,  �;upra note 2 1 8 , <1t 3 1 7-1 8 (expla i n i n g  that speci f)'in g  
m i nimum qual i tY cr i teria a n d  allowing com petiti\·e bidding o n  price alone otTers a more 
fe;;s ible alternatin: to conducting a m ul tidimensional  auction ) .  This approach was used by 
the U n i ted Kingdom in auction ing televi s ion franch ises. ld. � 1t 5 1 8 . 
220. See i cl .  at 3 1 7 - 1 8 .  
?.2 1 .  Judge \\'a !h 's  approach in  Cm du n l  rd1ect.cd a rough <tppl icat ion of th i s  
appr<><\ C h .  !n rc C:encblt Corp . L i t ig  . . 1 '1 1  F.R. D .  387,  .'\Wl-9 1 ( D .NJ. 1 998) . 
�22 2 .  The Bun/; (),,-p court appeared lo u:;e t h i s  < lppro<tch.  S�.;c In re Bank One 
5 ' 1wlclcrs Cbs:; Action:'. , l)(� F .  Supp. '2d 7h0, 7�g ( >-!. D .  I l l .  '200( ) )  (" [T] hc v\'ec h:; ler  firm is  
'?n t i tk·d te> be de��ir.:n a �cd �:s ci�1s�1 cou�1scl-{/� of course. i t  qu�t l i fic�  Z'!�; a resjJullsib!t} bidder i n  
t _e n n :. u f  i ls c redent idb Jnd t· �  ... :pcri c n c c . " ) .  
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sis, without specifying formal standards in advance, i t  introduces subj ec­
tivity that is inconsistent with ,th e  auction methodology. 
Moreover, as with DOD auctions,  i t  may be very difficult for the court 
to communicate i ts qual ity preferences effectively or to provide sufficient 
information to third party bidders about the details of i ts evaluation.223 
Indeed, specification of a minimum quality s tandard in an area such as 
legal services may be inherently ambiguous.224 This both creates u ncer­
tainty in the operation of the auction and detracts from bidder abil ity to 
make efficient tradeoffs between price and quality in preparin g  a bid. At 
a minimum, the ambiguity significantly reduces the objectivi ty and trans­
parency of the auction process and gives the court increased discretion to 
mask decisions made for other reasons on the basis of qual ity factors that 
are difficult to verify. 
2. Agency Issues. - Anytime a court appoints lead counsel ,  it acts as 
an agent for the plaintiff class. In attempting to further the best interests 
of the class, the court is subj ect  to the standard agency problems. 225 Auc­
tions seem to address these agency problems by replacing discretionary 
government decisions with a more objective procedure . If, however, the 
court controls the design and implementation of the auction and 
through that control makes discretionary choices, the agency problems 
remam . 
D eciding the relative priority to be given to price and quality, as de­
scribed in Subsection 1 above , is an example of a discretionary choice.  In 
making these choices, the court may not be a good agent for the plaintiff 
class. Judges are not simply surrogate clients .  First, judges may act out of 
self-interest.226 The legal literature has begun to recognize that j udges 
may be motivated by personal goals, including power, prestige , auton­
omy, and even maximizing le isure time.227 It is important to recognize 
that the court's  goals need not be related to maximizing class recovery. 
Instead, a managerial judge may want  to expedite settlement.228 A judge 
with a crowded docket may want to minimize the time expended on the 
223. See Che, supra note 2 1 2 ,  a t  675 (describing l imitations on  government 
commitment power in procurement  auctions ) .  
224. Cf. Cripps & Ireland, supra note 2 1 5, at 3 1 7 (questioning whether i t  i s  possible to 
set a minimum quality threshold for the operation of a television franchise ) . 
225 .  See, e .g. ,  Kon iak & Cohen,  supra note 40, at 1 1 22-28 (describing inherem 
limi tations on judicial abi l i ty to act as agen t for the plainti ff class, including judic ial self­
in terest) . 
226. See generally Jonathan R .  i\Jacey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice,  and the 
Rules of  Procedure, 23 J Legal Stud.  6'27 ( 1 994) (explaining h ow j udges formulate 
procedural rules that further their own interests) . 
2'27. See, e .g . ,  Kon iak & Cohen ,  supra note 40, <tt 1 1 2'2;  Richard A. Posner, What Do 
.fudges and Justices Maximize) (The Same Thing E\·erybocly Else Does) , 3 Sup. Ct. Econ . 
Rev. 1 ,  1 :l- Ei ( 1 993) ( identifying various components of juclicial uti l i ty) . 
228.  See ,  e .g . ,  Ji l l  E. Fisch ,  Rewri ting Historv: The Propriety of Eradica t ing Prior 
Decisional I .aw Through Settlement and Vacatur,  76 Comell L. Rev. 589 , 6 1 0 ,  64 1 -4:! 
( 1 99 1 )  (cri t icizi ng judicial preference Cor settlemen t  01er other process goals) ; Sylvia R. 
Lazlns. \iote, Abuse in Plaintiff Class i\c t ion Serl iemcnrs :  The Need r()r a Guardian During 
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case .229 A court concerned about final i ty or its reversal record may seek 
to limit the number of obj ectors or eliminate possible issues for appeal .  
A j udge with political interests may weigh the public relations implica­
tions of the litigation. 230 
These goals create an alternative set of priorities for the court in 
appointing lead counsel . Should the court prefer a creative lawyer who 
can generate a novel resolution to the case? Will an assertive j udge seek a 
la"vvyer who is unlikely to resist the court's efforts to control the course of 
the litigation? Are overworked judges unduly likely to seek conciliators 
who will s trive for consensus?23 I 
Second, by nature , the agency relationship causes a degree of diver­
gence between the agent's actions and the best interests of the princi­
pal-the so-called residual costs of the agency relationship. Accordingly, 
even the best-motivated court will perform tasks such as evaluating firm 
quality and developing preference functions imperfectly; the imperfec­
tions result from the court's inability fully to internalize the preferences 
of the plaintiff class . These considerations limit the court's ability to per­
form the complex tasks necessary to address the multidimensional nature 
of the lead counsel auction. Moreover, the subj ectivity inherent in evalu­
ating quality and weighing price versus quality provides a ready vehicle to 
accommodate judicial policy choices under the guise of procedural 
obj ectivity. 
More generally, this Article suggests that auction design and adminis­
tration are complex tasks that require the expenditure of substantial j udi­
cial resources. It is not clearly desirable for courts to devote the necessary 
time to perform these tasks well . Apart from the question of whether 
courts are well suited to design complex auctions, there is reason to ques­
tion the willingness of the bench to devote itself to this task.  Certainly, 
the judiciary's history of relying on crude benchmarks such as the first-to-
Pt·etrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 Mich .  L. Rev. 308, 308 nn . l-2 ( 1 985) (discussing 
judicial  pol icy of encouraging settlemen ts ) . 
229. See, e .g . ,  Resnik et al . ,  supra note 3 1 ,  at 386 ( i clentit}'ing the risk that judges wil l  
select  counsel based on docket management  concerns) ; Statemen t  o f  Keith Johnson to the 
Third Ci rcui t Task Force on Selection of Class Counse l  2 (May 5, 200 1 )  [herei n after 
Job nson Statemen t] , available at h ttp:/ /www . ca3.uscourts.gov I classcounsel/wi tness%20 
statements/keithjohnson.pclf (on fi l e  with the Columbia Law Review) (warning that 
shareholder goal of maximizing recovery m�ty confl ict  wi th court's incentive to avoid a 
complex and l e n gthy trial ) . 
230. See, e . g . ,  Koniak & Cohen, supra note 40, at 1 1 23 & n.227 (descr ib ing J udge 
vVeinstein 's rece ip t  of an "enormous amount of a ttention and prestige" clue to his 
handl ing of t he Agent Orange c lass acti on ) .  The publi c  attention curren tiy focused on 
abusive cbss actions and excessi1·e legal fees may also lead cou rts to fan)r compensation 
s t ructures th�ll ap pear to reduce fee awards even when such structures sacrifice class 
l"CCO\'ery. 
'2S l .  For �l birlv extreme description of a court ' s  e fforts to exercise con trol over the 
l i tigat ion and �crrlt: m c n t  of �l cl ass action see general l v  Schuck, supra n o te ..J-6. According 
to Sch t tck . _ludge \\.ei nstein ' s  im·oh-emenl  i n  the set t lement nego ti< ttiuns was so substa n tial 
<ts r o  m�1 k c  h i :-; <tp p rm <t l  of the settlemen t a 1 · inual cert a i n tY. See id. at  l /tl-7'J. 
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file  rule in place of carefully investigating and comparing lawyer quality 
suggests some reluctance, as does the tradition of seeking resolution of 
lead counsel appointments by consensus rather than competition. The 
seeming obj ectivity of the auction procedure is likely to tempt an 
overburdened judiciary to place undue reliance on price in general and 
crude elements of price such as fee caps in particular rather  than care­
fully weighing the nuances of auction design . 
3. Judicial Neutrality. - In conducting a lead counsel auction,  the 
court may also bias i tself with respect to the future course of the l itiga­
tion.  As the discussion in Part III .B  demonstrates, for the court to evalu­
ate competing bids, it must  predict the future course of the case .  Because 
counsel is appointed at an early stage , the information available to the 
court for this task is necessarily limited. Some courts have responded by 
requiring bidders to predict the l ikely recovery and to support their pre­
diction. This requirement uses the bidding process to force information 
from the bidders about the meri ts of the case. Although these submis­
sions may improve the information available to the court, the bidders, 
too ,  lack complete information at this early stage . The discovery and le­
gal research that would enable a firm accurately to estimate recovery are 
expensive , and it is irrational for a firm to make large expenditures prior 
to securing the lead counsel position . If some or all of the bidding firms 
do limited research, the information provided to the court is likely to be 
of poor quality and may not lead to appropriate j udicial estimates .2'>2 
Moreover, having gone through the process of estimating the l ikely 
outcome of the case , the court may subsequently be reluctant to revise i ts 
opinion , even though the opinion is based on ex parte information about 
the merits of the case from the plaintiffs ' perspective . 233 The court 's  con­
clusions for the p urpose of the auction may permanently color i ts judg­
ment about the case, resulting in a loss ofj udicial neutrali ty. A court that 
b as erroneously estimated too low a recovery may approve too cheap a 
se ttlement. A court that has mistakenly overestimated the likely recovery 
m av resist !!OOd fai th efforts to settle the case and be undulv hostile to the / 0 ' 
defendant's position in settlement negotiations. Such results are particu-
larly likely in cases in which the court's prediction differs subs tantially 
from that of counsel .  At the extreme ,  a court' s  predictions about the case 
232. Acguably. the Omr!e case demonstrates this risk. The winning bidder subm i t ted a 
fee schedule suggesti n g  that it expected the case to sett le for l ess than $ 1 5  m i l l i o n .  This 
prediction •,,·a:; i nconsistent 11·ith those submitted by the other bidders,  wh ose schedules 
clearly antici pated a much brgcr recoverv. and with the actual settl e men t of  $25 m i l l i o n .  
'2 3 3 .  i t  is obviouslY in�1ppro p riate for defe ndan ts t o  participate in t h e  selection of c lass 
counsel .  lncleecl ,  most couns h ave re!i.tsed to allow defendants i n put  i n t o  t h e  sel e c t i on of 
the lead plai n tiff See Fisch , Aggregatio n ,  supra note 1 3 , at 54 n .5 .  J'vlorem·er, disclosure of 
hid i n fonnatinu to the defe n d a n t  Gtn induce strategic l i ti gat ion beha\·ior .  A defenda n t  
wh o kn (m·s :::lass counsel \':i l l  receive � l  hunus for early settlem e n t  1nay attem pt to press u re 
r:cunse1 •.·.: i th �1 l o\\' bal l  ;-;:�tt! en1e l·l t .  �rh e kno\vleclge that counsel h as agreed tn a fee cap 
rnay l ead the cL-:+!::nd<-t n t  tu irn pvse C:\:ce.s�i\·e l i t i g�lti nn co�ts th rough cl i."co\·er�: requests .  a n d  
.'i o forth.  i n  <1 ' 1  dT( )n to u n derc u t  Lhe economics <ml ici patecl bv t h e  fi rm.  
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may preven t  i t  from subsequently deciding that the litigatio n  is meritless, 
such as by granting a motion to dismiss. 
A court that has selected counsel through an auction may also have 
difficulty subsequently awarding a fee that fails to provide counsel with 
reasonable compensation.  How would the Auction Houses court have 
dealt with the realization that a fair settlement was less than $405 million ,  
if the consequence o f  approving that settlement was the inability of coun­
sel to collect any fee?  Although courts that use auctions generally reserve 
to themselves the right to modif)r the fee award when appropriate,2 '" 1 gen­
erous use of such an option would undermine the court's commitment to 
the auction and distort the bidding process . 
4 .  Alternative Auctioneers. - One possible response to the problems 
identified in this Section is to substi tute a special master or a second 
j udge to perform some or all of the tasks associated with the auction pro­
cedure. Andrew Niebler has suggested that a special master could be 
used to conduct preliminary discovery and add information to the auc­
tion process. 235 Similarly, Alon Klement suggests a private monitor  vvho 
would select class counsel and determine an appropriate fee arrange­
men t.236 Another alternative is to employ a substitute auctioneer rather 
than using the trial judge .237 This substitution would most clearly address 
the neutrality concern identified in Subsection 3 above. A substitute auc­
tioneer would be no better sui ted to address the price/ quality tradeoff 
identified in Subsection 1 or the more general agency concerns ad­
dressed in Subsection 2 .  An independent auctioneer would also intro­
duce an additional layer of agency problems. 
Agency theory indicates that eve n a disin terested agent may not act 
in the best interests of the principaP')8 The problem is that indepen­
dence may breed apathy; without sufficient incentive to work hard, the 
agent may clisserve the interests of i ts principal through inattention or 
lack of effort. Given the difli.cult problems posed by appropriate auction 
design and implementation,  there is particular reason to be concern(:::d 
234. See , e . g. ,  fn re Cendan t,  1 82 F.R.D. 1 44, 1 52 (D.N.J .  1 998) (stating that auction 
. .  wi l l  not obviate the Coun·s lin a! rc\·ie\\· of fees and costs pursuant to Rule 23(  e ) '' al though 
" the  resul ts of the auc ti on will sen·e as �i b e n c hmark of reasonableness"' ) .  
235.  N i e b ler, supra no te 4 7 ,  a t  8 1 9-2 1 .  
'236.  See Alon Kl ement,  Private Moni toring in Common Fund Class 1\cti o ns 
4-6 ( Harvarcl j o h n  M. O l in Discussion Paper Series, No. 3 10 , Feb. 200 1 ) ,  availab!'� at h ttp: 
I /papers.law.h a rvarcl . e clu/programs/ul in_ce n ter (on file with the Columbia l,uw Hevi�w) . 
237.  See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force,  1 08 
F.R. D .  237, '256 ( 1 985) ( recommending that attorney\ fees be negoti <Hed n o t  b\· the 
district court juclge , but rath e r  by an ap poin ted nonj udicial repre:;entative, who would be 
compensated by would-be counsel) . 
238. See, e .g. ,  Ian Ayres & Peter Cram ton , Relatio nal I n vesting and Agen cy Theon•, 
15 Cardozo I .. Rev. 1033, 1 044 ( 1 99--l) ( describing ··standard result., of agency ! i tcratu; e 
that ,  clue to imperfect i nformatio n .  principals cannot general i y  induce ·'first-best·· levels uf 
ped.ormance from their agenr. s ) ; i\ I i c h aei  C. jensen & \•\.i l l iam H .  :vlt·ckling, Theun of th e 
Finn: iVianage rial Beh aYior, .-\gen e_�.· C:o�ts and 0\vnership Structure , ?; j. Fin.  Ecu1 � .  3().� 
jwssim ( 1 9 76) ( detailing costs of age n cy rel < tt ionship ) .  
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about the agent's incentive to act diligently. Seemingly routine tasks such 
as bid evaluation may entail considerable work. The trial j udge at least 
remains responsible for the case outcome and must continue to work 
with appointed counsel. An independent auctioneer, whose role is lim­
i ted to selection of counsel, lacks even this minimal accountabil ity. 
Corporate law typically responds to concerns about agent apathy by 
creating incentives for the agent  to act in the principal ' s  interests.2"'0 
Similarly, the agency problem of the independent auctioneer could, in 
theory, be solved through a compensation structure that rewarded the 
auctioneer based on the resul ts of the auction .  For the reasons detailed 
above, however, j udging these results is l ikely to prove difficult. 240 At the 
same time, the use of an independent auctioneer introduces a second 
selection issue that, in some ways, duplicates the problem of selecting and 
compensating class counsel . 24 1 Will the courts need to create a competi­
tive market in auctioneers? vVhat selection criteria should courts employ? 
Final ly, auctioneer compensation creates an addi tional cost. A compen­
sation level high enough to motivate the auctioneer will reduce recovery 
to the plaintiff class . 
An alternate decisionmaker may nonetheless be preferable to the 
trial j udge for selecting and retaining class counsel .  Indeed, the empow­
ered lead plaintiff model described i n  Part IV below entails the use of 
such an alternative-a member of the plaintiff class. As that discussion 
explains, the lead plaintiff model largely addresses the problems identi­
fied i n  this Section.  Reliance on a lead plaintiff shields the court from 
issues of bias. At the same time, the lead plaintiff is both a principal and 
an agent for the rest of the plaintiff class. Accordingly, the lead plaintiffs  
preexisting stake in the litigation provides an incentive for diligence that 
combats the agency problems described here. 
239 . See,  e.g. ,  vVil l iam J Carney, Con trol ling Managemen t Opportunism i n  the 
Market  for Corporate Con trol: An Agency Cost Model, 1 988 v\'i s. L. Rev. 385 ,  4 1 5  
( describing con tracts wi th corporate managers contain ing "strong i ncen tive arrangements 
designed to align the imerests of managers and shareholders" ) ;  Charles M. Elson, D i rector 
Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-The H istory of a Symptom and a 
Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 1 27 ,  1 30-3 1 ( 1 996) (proposing restricted stock compensation for 
independen t directors to prO\·icle financial incentive necessary to overcome passivi ty ) ; see 
also Henry L. Tosi et al . ,  Disaggrega tin g  the Agency Con tract: The Effects of Monitoring, 
Incentive Align ment,  and Term in  Office on Agent  Decis ion Making, 40 Acad. i'vigmt. . J .  
584, 597 ( 1 997) ( finding incent ives are more effective than mon i toring in causi ng agems 
to act in the in terests of their principals) . 
240. An independent auctioneer also in troduces a r isk of col lu:; ion ,  panicul <H ly if the 
auctioneer is a private ind i \ idual compensated with a percen tage of the recove1-y or the fee 
award. See Klement, supra note 236, at 53-58 (describ ing risk of coll usion) . 
241 . See i cl .  at 4-5 (describing an auction structure for selecting a pri\'ate self 
in terested individual to <tc t  as moni tor for the class ) . 
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D. Price and Allocation Issues 
As explained in Part III.A above, the most defensible basis for using 
lead counsel auctions is their potential to reduce fee awards and improve 
the qual ity of representation . This Section uses auction theory to evalu­
ate the capacity of the lead counsel auction to meet these goals. 
In an ideal world, this question could be answered through empirical 
research comparing the results of cases using lead counsel auctions with 
comparable cases in which alternative selection methods were used. Un­
fortunately, this type of analysis is not currently possible. First, the sam­
ple size is too small; auctions simply have not  been used in enough cases 
to provide reliable information.  Second, many of the current cases in­
volve the use of flawed auctio n  designs, limited competi tion,  or  both. Ac­
cordingly, the results in these cases provide poor insight into the poten­
tial value of an appropriately designed and implemented auction.  Third, 
the task of constructing comparable samples to test the effect of auctions 
is difficult. Litigated cases differ over a large number of variables, many 
of which are not readily quantifiable.  Fourth , as described above,242 the 
apparent results of the auction process can be misleading. In the absence 
of obj ective criteria for evaluating the merits of the lawsuit and the quality 
of the recovery-criteria that, if available, would eliminate the need for 
auctions-empirical analysis cannot identify whether perceived savings in 
legal fees were obtained at the cost of reduced attorney effort, poor law­
yer quality, or both. In other words, empirical analysis canno t  readily cap­
ture the effect of auctions o n  recovery to the plaintiff class. 
Auction theory offers an alternative method of analysis. The auction 
theory li terature explains the benefits of auctions, the limitations of the 
auction methodology, and the conditions under which auctions operate 
well .  Accordingly, auction theory offers some insight into whether auc­
tions are l ikely to be effective in improving the selection and compensa­
tion of class counsel . 
1 .  The Economics of Auction Them)'. - The operation of an auction is 
highly context specific .  Auction theory demonstrates that the results of 
the auction process depend on the auction type.243 Moreover, the suc­
cess of an auction is critically dependent on the appropriate auction de­
sign, and one size does not  fit al l . 244 Theorists divide auctions into two 
242. See supra Pan I I .B .  
24:1. See, e . g . ,  Paul R .  Milgrom & Robert J .  vVeber, A Theory of  Auctions and 
Competitive Bidding, 50 Econometrica l 089, 1 093 ( 1 982) ( demonstrating that, under 
idealized independent  private values model,  the Reve n ue Equivalence Theorem applies, 
and al l four standard auction models produce the same outcome; this result  does not  hold, 
however, under the common value model or wi th the i n troduction o f  Ltctors such as 
at1i l iated information,  risk aversion,  or inadequate competi t ion) ; sec also Paul Klemperer, 
Auction Theory:  A Guide to the Li terature, 1 3 .J. Econ. Survs '2.'2.7, 235 ( 1 999)  (explaining 
that s tandard auction types produce very different results in auctions with atlil iatecl 
information ) .  
244. See, e .g . ,  Paul Klemperer, Wh<t t  Really Matters in Auction Design 1 7  ( Working 
Paper, June 2 1 .  2000) [hereinafter Klcmperer, Matters ] , avai lable at h ttp :/ I 
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basic types : the independent private values auction and the common 
value auction. :>+s In an independent private values auction,  the value of 
the auctioned object is different for each bidder, and each bidder 's  valua­
tion is independent of the value of the object to other bidders .246 In the 
common value auction, the auctioned object has the same value to all 
bidders.247 Auction theory demonstrates that the two models operate 
quite differently.248 
Under the classic assumptions, each bidder in an independent pri­
vate values auction knows his or her own valuation of the obj ect.249 Each 
bidder's valuation is private information, unknown to the auctioneer and 
the other bidders. Auction theor1 demonstrates that, in such an auction, 
regardless of the auction structure ,250 the bidder's  dominant strategy is to 
bid his or her true value, which equals m arginal cost. 25 1 In other words, 
if lead counsel auctions are independent values auctions, it is reasonable 
to expect firms to submit  bids based on their opportunity costs .  
The auction then allocates the i tem to the highest bidder. This allo­
cation is presumptively efficient, because the bidder will ing to pay the 
highest price is the one who values the i tem most highly.212 In the lead 
counsel auction, the winning bidder would be the firm with the lowest 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers. cfin)abstract_icl=23 7 1 1 4  (on til e  with the Columbia !Jtw 
Review) ( explain i n g  that " [a ]  u c ti o n  design is a matte r  of ' h o rses for courses ' ,  not ' o n e  size 
fits a l l "' and tha t  choice of inappropriate design is  "\'ery risky" ) ;  Elmar v\'olfstetter,  The 
Swiss Ul'v!TS Spectrum Auction Flop:  Bad Luck or Bad D es ign) 2�5 ( Ce n te r  for Economic 
Studies & Ifo Inst i tu te for Economic Research, Worki n g  Paper .'J o .  534, August 2 00 1 ) ,  
available at h t tp : /  / papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm)abstract�id=2 7l)683 ( o n  file with the 
Columbia I�aw Review) ( demonstratin g  h ow bad auction design can frustrate the auction's  
goals) .  
245.  See M ilgram & Weber,  supra n o te 243, a t  1 090�95 ( desc ribi n g  both auction 
models) . Real world auctions can rarely be c lassified as p ure in depende n t  p rivate values 
auctions or pure common value auctions. I n deed, some cominen t<�tors use the term 
correlated o r  affiliated value auctions to refer to auctions i n  11·hich the val uations of 
i ndividual bidders are independen t  yet related to each oth er.  See , e . g . ,  :VicA..fee & 
0/lcMil lan,  supra n o te 1 1 7,  a t  720 ( describing auctions wi th correlated valua ti ons) : see also 
Rasmusen,  supra n o te 1 33 ,  at  246 ( describing all three m odels) . 
246. J Richard Harrison,  A Model for Sealed-Bid Auct.i ons with In d e pen d e n t Private 
Value and Common Val ue Cornponen ts, ll IVlanagerial & Decision Econ .  1 23 ,  1 23 ( l l)l)O) . 
247.  lcl. 
248. See, e .g . ,  Peter Cra m w n  & Alan Schwartz, using Aucti o n  Theory to I n form 
Takem·er Regul a ti o n ,  7 J .  L. Econ. & Org. 27, 28�29 ( 1 99 1 ) ( arguing that whether  takeover 
regulation should require an auction depends crit ically on whe ther the takeover auction 
environment i s  properly characterized as an independent p rivate values auction or a 
common value auc ti on ) .  
249.  See id.  a t  2 8  ( describing classic assumptions th<J. t cause trad i ti o n a l  Engl ish 
auct ions to maximize se l l ing p rice and generate al locati onal efficie ncy and arguin g  that 
these assump tions do n o t  apply i n  takeover con text) . 
250.  The four standard auction structures are the English auc t i o n ,  che Dllf.cll aucti o n ,  
th e tirst-price sealed-bid aucti o n ,  and t h e  seconcl-price se<d ecl-bicl auc t io n . See Milgrom & 
\\'eber,  supra note �243,  ztt 1 089�90.  
��:J 1 .  Id .  a t  J ()l) J .  
2:'3:2. I cl .  
2002] LAvVYERS ON THE A UCTION BLOCK 697 
opportunity cost. Accordingly, by selecting this finn, the auction mml­
mizes the cost of the l i tigation. The auction method also produces a 
price which,  from the seller ' s  perspective, is optimal in maximizing reve­
nue,  because i t  h as induced the bidder to reveal private information-his 
value-through the submission of the bid. 253 The auction thus elimi­
nates the need for the court to attempt to esti mate a firm' s  opportunity 
cost to determine a reasonable fee .  
The alternative common value model differs in several important re­
spects .  First, in a common value auction, the value of the auctioned ob­
ject is unknown.254 Bidders estimate the i tem 's  value, based on the infor­
mation available to them, and bid accordingly. As in the independent 
private values auction, price formation is based on the information con­
veyed by the bids. Indeed, an attractive attribute of common value auc­
tions is that they enable price formation in circumstances in ·which the 
value of the item is unknown to both buyer and sel ler, because the auc­
tion process causes the selling price to reflect each bidder's partial infor­
mation about the item's value. 255 
In the common value auction, however, this information is necessa­
rily incomplete .  Moreover, a second essential difference between com­
mon value auctions and independent values auctions is that the common 
value literature addresses and rejects the traditional assumption that bid­
ders can costlessly acquire information about the auctioned i tem 's  
value . 256 Although uncertainty about this value makes it rational for bid­
ders to investigate, this investigation is cos tly and cannot completely elim­
inate the uncertainty. 
This leads to two consequences. First, unlike independent private 
values auctions, common value auctions may not maximize the seller's 
revenue.2 ' 7  The winning bidder faces a risk of overpayment because it 
cannot determine the value of the auctioned item with certainty, a phe­
nomenon known as the winner's curse .25H Bidders respond to the risk of 
overpayment by discounting their bids . 2"0 As French and McCormick 
have demonstrated, bidders must also incorporate the sunk costs of the 
auction procedure,  such as their investigation and bid preparation costs, 
2:53. See, e . g. , i'vlcAfee & McMillan , supra note l 1 7, at / T 2- l 4  ( describing the 
·· ReYelation Princip le" whereby auction fun ctions as a tool w produce price oprimal i t:v) . 
254. See, e.g . ,  Harrison,  supra note 246, at 1 23.  
255.  See, e.g. ,  :V-Iilgrom & Weber, supra n o te 243, at l OSH ( ex p la i n i ng h ow pri c e  in  
common value auctions aggregMes pri1·ate i nformation ) .  
256. See, e.g . ,  Bhaskar Chakra1·oni e t  al . ,  Auc tion i ng the  Ain,·a,·es: The C:on te�t for 
Broadband PC:S Spectrum ,  4 ]. Econ.  & !\·!gm t. Strate�· 34:\ 3:11) ( 1 99:) )  (obsen·ing th at 
acquisition of 1·aluarion i n forma tion is complex) . 
2:17.  In addition. small  asym m e tries between bidders ,  ll'hich crea te an "almost 
common 1 alue" auc tio n ,  can dramatically reduce bid prices.  See Paul Kle mpe re r , Auctions 
l'. i th ,..IJ m ost Common Values: The ' \Vallet Game'  and I ts .-\ppl ictiions .  -t:2 Eu r. Econ. Rev. 
757, 7:18 ( 1 998) [ hereinafter Klemperer, Almost Common \'c1lucs ] . 
2:}8.  Seo: !\·lcAfec & ivlc:Vl i llan, supra n o te 1 1 7 ,  a t  720-2 1 (descr ib ing \':i n n er ·"  cmoc ) .  
259.  I cl .  at 72 1 :  Rasmusen, supra note 1 33, a t  252.  
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into their bid price, in order to make participation in the auction profita­
ble.260 This reduces bid price further and causes the seller to bear the 
industry's sunk costs.  A particularly unsettling implication of this conclu­
sion is that, in the common value auction,  high levels of competi tion,  
which increase the industry's estimation costs ,  can have the effect  of re­
ducing rather than increasing selling price.261  
Second, the auction may not  be allocationally efficient .  To the ex­
ten t  that the value of the auctioned i tem does not  vary with the identity of 
the bidder, the concept of the right winner is inapplicable to a common 
value auction.262 Nonetheless, because i t  is not  a winning strategy to bid 
one 's  private value in a common value auction,  and because bidders can­
not ascertain their private values with certain ty, even if there are differ­
ences among the bidders ,  the auction need not allocate the i tem to the 
bidder who values it most highly. Accordingly, the lead counsel auction 
need not award the case to the firm that can l i tigate it  most efficiently. 
The investigation costs of the common value auction are potentially 
burdensome not merely for the seller, but for society as well .  Because a 
bidder benefits from superior i nformation only if that information is pri­
vate, bidders are unlikely to cooperate, leading to the risk that i nvestiga­
tion will be duplicative, excessive,263 or o therwise socially wastefuJ .264 In­
vestigation costs increase as the number of participants in an auction 
increases and as the degree of uncertainty about the value of the auc­
tioned i tem increases.265 
2. Application of the Themy. - Should lead counsel auctions be ana­
lyzed according to the independent private values model or the common 
value model? To determine which model offers the better fit, that is, 
better predictions about the operation of the lead counsel auction,  the 
260. See Ken n e th R. French & Robert E.  McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs ,  and 
the Process of Compet i t ion,  57  J .  Bus. 4 1 7, 439-40 ( 1 984) ; Jonathan R. Macey, Auction 
Theory, MBOs and Property Righ ts in Corporate Assets, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 85, 88-89 
( 1 990) [hereinafter Macey, Aucr.ion Theory] . 
26 1 .  See French & McCormick,  supra note 260, at 423-24 ( explain i ng tha t  each 
bidder's expected payoff falls as the n umber of b idders i ncreases, and that b idders must 
therefore adj ust  their bid prices) ; Macey, Auction Theory, supra note 260, a t  90-9 1 
(explai n ing that i f  bidders poorly est imate the number of compet i tors they may 
underestimate their  potent i al p rofits, leadin g  them e i ther  to reduce the i r  b ids or to fai l  to 
part i c ipate) _ 
262 . See Rasmusen ,  supra note 1 33 ,  at 25 1 . 
263. See. e .g. , Steven Matthews, Information Acquisit ion in  D iscrimi natory Auctions, 
in Bayesian 'vloclels in Economic Theory 1 8 1 , 197 ( Marcel Boyer & Richard E. Kih lstrom 
eels . ,  1 984) (concluding that bidders are l ikely to purchase excessive private i nformation i n  
common \·alue auctions, and that such purchases are costly to both the seller a n d  society) . 
:264. Bidders wil l  no t, of course, share the i nformation th ey uncover; to do so would 
forsake the competi tive advantage they obta in  by purchasing such information.  Indeed, 
auction theory i ndicates that firms may h ave an excessive incentive to i nvestigate, because 
small i nformational asymmetries among bidders can heavily i nf1uence auction resul ts .  See 
Klernperer, Almost Common Values, supra note :!57, at 758. 
26:1. See, e .g . ,  [\'lacey, Auction Theory, supra note 260, at  93-94 ( iden tify ing socially 
wasteful dupl ication of bidders '  i nvestigati on costs in common value auctions) . 
2002]  LAvVYERS ON THE A UCTION BLOCK 699 
most important consideration is the extent to which the value of the case 
to the bidder is a function of firm-specific attributes versus factors com­
mon to all bidders .  266 If value is primarily a function of fi rm specific 
attributes such as the skills, costs ,  and expertise of the bidder, the appro­
priate auction model is the independent private values model.  If, on the 
other hand, most bidders are l ikely to pursue the same litigation strategy, 
incur similar costs ,  and achieve comparable results, and the value of the 
case wil l  primarily be determined by the resolution of factual and legal 
uncertainties,  then the common value model is applicable .  
There are several reasons to believe that the common value model i s  
the more appropriate choice. First, i t  seems that the overriding uncer­
tainty in class actions concerns the estimated recovery.267 Among the fac­
tors that affect the recovery are the strength of the case,  the factual re­
cord, the class size, the provable damages, the settlement funds available,  
including insurance coverage, and characteristics of the defendants that 
affect their wil lingness to settle. Although bidders face substantial UI1Cer­
tainty in quantifying these factors, especial ly at the early point in the case 
at which the lead counsel auction is conducted, all bidders face these 
factors j ointly. Thus the value of the case is primarily a function of factors 
that are common to all bidders but unknown. 
Second, under a percentage of recovery fee structure, the return to 
the winning bidder is primarily a function of the recovery in the case .  
Even to the extent that bidders differ with respect to the l i tigation costs 
they face ,  the factors that affect the recovery i n  the case will affect all 
bidders similarly, leading to affiliated or correlated valuations .268 In 
other words, a factor that causes one bidder to view the case as valuable 
wil l  l ikely cause other bidders to value the case highly as well .  A strong 
case will be more valuable for all bidding firms; a well heeled defendant 
increases the potential recovery for all bidders. 
Third, firm specific characteristics are unlikely to affect the value of 
the case to a bidding firm. The most relevant firm specific characteristic 
in preparing a bid is the firm's  opportunity cost, which is a function of 
the alternative uses of the firm's time.  Although, in theory ,  firms might 
bid on the basis of their opportunity costs ,  in reality, these costs are likely 
to be both unknown and unknowable .  In part, this is due to the fact  that 
plaintiffs ' fi rms are likely to be involved in multiple cases, including other 
class actions, at any given time. The return on each of those cases de­
pends on the expected time involved and likely recovery, which are both 
:!66. Cf. Cramton & Schwartz, supra n o te 248, at 47--18 (analyz ing ,,·hich auClion 
e nvironment  is prevalent i n  the takeover con text) . 
26 7. Some commentators argue that most common fun d  l i tigation docs n o t  presen t  
substan tial risks of nonliab i l i ty; o th ers chal lenge that argum e n t. r\ny risk o f  n o n liabi l i ty 
can be reflected, ho,,·ever, by appropriately discounting the predi cted recm·ery. 
268. See iVlcAfee & :VlcMillan , supra note 1 1 7, at 722 (describing valuations as 
affi l iated '' i f  the fact that one bidder perceives th e i te m ' s  value to be h igh  makes it l ikely 
tha t  other bidders also percei1·e the l'<du e  to be high" ) .  
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uncertain and continually changing. Further uncertainty is  added as 
ongoing cases are concluded and new cases enter the office .  Accord­
ingly, the assumptions of the independent private values model ,  that a 
bidder knows i ts subjective valuation of the auctioned i tem and that this 
valuation drives the bidder 's  s trategy, do not apply. 
The degree to which firm opportunity costs vary is also unclear. Al­
though firms with greater expertise and experience can presumably re­
present the class more efficiently, the degree of variance among bidding 
firms may not be substantial . Even if firms vary substantially in  quality, 
market forces are likely to result in a direct correlation between firm 
quality and billing rate . The more expert firms will have higher opportu­
nity costs because their expertise makes them more attractive in the mar­
ket for legal servi ces. As a result, even if a high quality firm can litigate a 
case more efficiently, i t  wil l  require higher compensation for doing so .  
Thus, to the extent that bids reflect firm specific differences in  opportu­
nity costs, less qualified firms are more likely to submit lower bids. 
This results in the classic lemons problem.�1'9 If the court relies 
heavily on bid price in the selection decision, high quality firms may be 
unwilling to incur the costs of bidding to participate in an auction they 
cannot win .  If high quality firms do not compete , the court will face a 
pool with a high percentage of low quality lawyers . Because they have 
lower opportunity costs ,  low quality firms will be able to price their ser­
vices lower, and will continue to participate . 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the common value auction 
model more closely describes the operation of a lead counsel auction.  
Three important consequences follow from this characterization.  First, 
the auction theory literature suggests significant reasons to question 
whether lead counsel auctions are capable of producing quality prices or 
qualified selection decisions.  Second,  the operation of common value 
auctions substantially complicates the task of selecting an appropriate 
auction design. Third, the lemons problem is l ikely to affect adversely 
both th e quality of representation in a given case and the overall func­
tional i ty of el' trepreneurial litigation . 
Vv'ith respect to the first point, as described above , a common value 
auction may result in poor quality price production. In part, this is a 
function of transaction costs-common value auctions are costly because 
of the substantial investigation and bid preparation costs entailed, and 
these costs are ul timately borne by the plaintiff class in the form of higher 
legal fees . no In part, the auction structure is  i tself costly-bidders must 
discount to reflect the risk associated with the v.;inner ' s  c urse problem, 
'2 6 9 .  See,  e .g . ,  George A. Akc rl of, The Market for " Lemons·' : Qua l i ta tive U n cc rt<t intv 
<mel the l\ [arket  Mec!J anism.  84 Q. J Econ . 488, 489-90 ( 1 970)  ( describing l em o ns 
prubiem) . 
'2'10. L n l ike tra d i t ional  class actions,  in which the pla i n ti f f  class bears only the 
costs of p la i n tifls' c o unsel ,  i n  a lead counsel  auc t i o n .  the cla�;s be<lrs the cost  
of :\l l  the b i d d er:;. See Fre nch & McCormick, supra n ote '260, a t  4:2 1-2:5 ( explai n i ng then 
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and increased competition among bidders requires increased discount­
ing of bid price . Lastly, the nature of the common value auction magni­
fies the significance of minor differences between bidders, including in­
formational asymmetries, reputational advantages, and so forth .27 1 This 
can give one bidder a significant advantage in winning the auction and 
greatly reduce the price paid by that bidder. 272 In a lead counsel auction ,  
such an advantage may produce a winning bid that substantially exceeds a 
reasonable fee award .27"1 
In a common value auction, appropriate auction design is also more 
important. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem does not  hold in com­
mon value or affil iated value auctions; hence the choice between stan­
dard auction types becomes significant.274 Auction results may also be 
greatly affected by a variety of more complex procedures that appear to 
be beyond the current scope of lead counsel auction design , including 
limitations on entry, imposition of entry fees, and the use of reserve 
prices.275 As commentators have warned,276 insufficient  attention to 
these details may greatly reduce the seller's revenues or, in the case of a 
lead counsel auction , increase the cost of representation .277 
The lemons problem is significant for several reasons.  First, i t  is obvi­
ously likely to result in the selection of lower quality lawyers .  Second, to 
the extent that the lemons problem decreases participatio n  by high qual­
ity firms, it may impact the quality of the auction process . As described in 
Part III.B, above, auctioning courts have used the information provided 
i nYestigation costs of all bidders are reflected i n  the bid price and ult imately borne by the 
seller) . 
27 1 .  Klemperer, Almost Common Values, supra note 257,  at 767-68. 
272. See id. at 7?i8 ("An apparently srnal l advan tage can greatly i ncrease a b i dder ' s 
probabi l i ty of winning,  and greatly reduce the price he pays when he wins . "' ) .  
':273.  I t  may b e  argued that the Cenda n l  auc ti on structu re gave the w i n n i n g  ti nns such 
an advantage by giving them the option to match the lowest qualified bid .  This m i gh t 
explain why the Cendant auction produced what seems to be a high fee award . 
274. See !'vlcAfee & lvicM il lan ,  supra note 1 1 7,  at 72'2 (exp la in i ng differences i n  
expected revenue dep end ing on auction type used) . 
'275. See generally Dan Levin & James L. Smith, Equil ibrium i n  Auctions with En try, 
84 A.m. Econ. Re\ . ?i85, 586 ( 1 994) (stating that sel lers generally wish to deter en try to 
common value auctions ) ;  Mi lgrom & v\"eber, supra note 243, at l l l l - 1 4  ( disc ussi ng th e 
implications of these factors for th e �tuction  model ) ;  John G. Ri lev , Ex Po:;t Information i n  
Auc tions, ?i5 Rev. Fcon .  Stud. 409, 41  J - ':2 0  ( 1 988)  (arg·uing that  use of weigh red avcr<�gc cf 
all bids produces superior p ri ces in correlated value auction) .  
:276.  See, e .g . ,  Chakravorti e t a! . ,  supra n o te 256, at 347 (exp lai ni ng the i m port�tnce of 
appropriate auction design in 1·ad i o  spectrum auctions) ; Klemper c r , Al m os t  Common 
Va l ues , supra note '257,  � tt  7GO-fi4 ( describ i ng several cases in which auctions \\' i th almo:;t 
common ,·alues produced poor price resul ts ) ; Kl emperer, fvlattcrs, supr;t n n t e  2-J -1 ,  �It () 
(expla in ing that  even b idders with no costs of partic ipation can be driYen out of poor!v 
designed cnrnrnon \·alue auc l inn ) .  
277 .  See genera lh· Jeremv Rulow & Pa ul Kl em perer, Prices and the \\" inner · :, Cu rs:: 
('v\"ur!;.i n g  Paper, M�l\' 1 998)  ( o n  lilc \\·irh the Colu111bia Lmu Rr'< 'inu) ( c! e nH>list rati ng h u'.·.' 
sta ndard i n tu i t i o n s  of �1 uc t i o n theo ry clcri,·ccl from i ndepe nde n t priYate ,-�dues nv>dt:i ( \o  
nm appiY to c o rn rn o n  ' �t l ue :;e t t ing., ) . 
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by bidding firms to predict recovery and evaluate competing bids. Lower 
quality firms may provide the court with qualitatively poor information 
about the case with which to perform these tasks . Finally, anticipating a 
lemons problem,  high quality lawyers may refrain from investigating mis­
conduct at the prefiling stage ,  because they would fail to capture the re­
·wards of their efforts if the court, through an auction, a·warded represen­
tation to a low bidding latecomer. Accordingly, the vvidespread use of 
lead counsel auctions may reduce the effectiveness of entrepreneurial li ti­
gation in deterring misconduct. 
IV. AucTIOl'\S VERsus WHAT? THE LEAD Pr..AINTIFF ALTERNATIVE 
As indicated above , i t  is difficult to evaluate the lead counsel auction 
without an appropriate benchmark. Shortcomings in the current  regula­
tory approach and deficiencies in the existing fee jurisprudence foster 
the temptation to regard any alternative as an improvement. Lead coun­
sel auc tions have not developed in a vacuum, however. Over the past five 
years, as courts have experimented with auctions, Congress has provided 
an alternative . 
A .  The PSLRA and the Statuto·ry Lead Plaintiff 
In 1 995, Congress adopted the PSLRA.278 As part of its p ackage of 
statutory reforms, the PSLRA establishes a statutory lead plaintiff, which is 
presumptively the investor with the largest interest in the case . 27P The 
statute then vests the lead plaintiff with a degree of control over the litiga­
tion process . 280 Significantly, for purposes of this Article,  the statute em­
powers the lead plaintiff to select and retain lead counsel ,  subj ect  to the 
approval of the court.:zs J 
As i ts legislative history indicates, the statute contemplates the active 
involvement of large investors, particularly institutional investors . :zs:z Ac­
cording to its creators ,  law professors Elliott \Neiss and John Beckerman, 
the lead plaintiff provision was designed to enable large , sophisticated 
278. Pub. L. No. 1 04-67, 1 09 Stat. 737 ( 1 995) (codifi e d  in scattered sect ions of 1 5  
U.S .C. ) .  
279. The court i s  req uired t o  appoi n t  as a l ead plain tif , t h e  "member o r  m embers of 
the purported p la i n ti ff class that  t h e  court determines to be most capable of adequ a tely 
represen ti ng the i n te rests of cl ass m e m bers." 1 5  U.S. C. § 78u-4 ( a) (3) ( B)  ( i )  (Supp. V 
1 999) . T h e  statu te p rovides a rebu ttable presumption that  t h e  most  adequate p l a i n t i ff is 
the person or group with the largest fi nancial  interest in t h e  cla i m .  lei .  § 78u-
4 ( a) ( 3 )  (B)  ( i i i )  ( I )  ( b b ) . 
280.  See gen eral ly Fi s c h .  Aggrega t i o n ,  supra n o te 1:\, at 6 1  ( describ i n g  the lc<tci 
plaintiff provision ) .  
28 1 .  1 5  U . S . C. § 78tvl ( a )  ( 3 )  ( B ) ( ,·) . 
282. See Fisc h .  Aggregation,  supra n o te 1 3. �1t 74 n . l 5 1  ( descri bing kgisla tin� h iston 
rega rd i n g  i m ol\'emc n t  o f  i n s r i r t n ional  i nvestors ) . 
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investors to investigate , negotiate with, and monitor class counsel.28'� As 
such, the provision was expressly designed as a market-based alternative 
to the existing regulatory approach.284 Weiss and Beckerman contem­
plated that institu tions would develop continuing relationships -vvith 
plaintiffs ' firms and that, as repeat players in securities l itigation, large 
investors would be able to develop case review criteria, procedures to 
identify and evaluate prospective counsel, standardized retention agree­
ments ,  and so forth .  
Early experience under the PSLRA was mixed. Initially institutional 
investors appeared reluctant to seek lead plaintiff status .28'> Additionally, 
courts have varied in their interpretations of the lead plaintiff provision,  
with some courts adopting views that limit the involvement or the power 
of institutional investors .286 Nonetheless, as institutions have obtained 
greater familiarity with the PSLRA, they have increased their involve­
ment. At the same time ,  a number of institutions have begun to consider 
carefully how best to function effectively as lead plaintiffs and to rational­
ize their approaches to the selection and retention of lead counsel . 
These developments will be described in the following Section .  
B .  Institutional Selection Procedures 
Institutional participation in securities litigation has clearly increased 
since the adoption of the PSLRA. Many ins titutions are developing the 
types of practices that Weiss and Beckerman envisioned. Institutions are 
developing sophisticated fee structures and retention agreements .  They 
are forging ongoing relationships with class action counsel. And,  in many 
cases, institutions are negotiating competitive fee agreements that pro­
vide for lower fees than those typically awarded by courts . 
The quantity of institutional involvement to date is insufficient for 
formal empirical analysis . Instead, this i\rticle has assembled illustrative 
and experiential information on developing practices by institu tional in­
vestors . The information is collected from a variety of sources, including 
public statements by institu tional investors, li tigation papers that describe 
the selection procedures used in particular cases, formal interviews, and 
informal discussions. The material set forth below does not purport to 
reflect the full range of institutional experiences to date ; rather, it  at-
283. See Weiss & Becke rma n ,  supra note 26,  at 2095,  2 1 2 1 -23.  T h e  Senate Report 
specifical ly states that " [ t] his [ We iss and Beckerman ] art ic l e provided t h e  basis for t h e  
' most adequate p lai n tiff provision . " S. Rep. N o .  1 04-98,  at  l l  n . 3 2  ( 1 99:) ) .  
284. See vVe iss & Beckerman ,  supra note 26, a t  2 1 0b·-07. 
285. See jil l  E. Fisch , Class Action Reform : Lessons from Securi ti es Litigation , 39 Ariz. 
L. Re\ . 533, 543-44 ( 1 997) [ h ere i n after Fisc h ,  Reform] ( describ i n g  l i m i ted insti tutional 
involve m e n t  in the first year under the PSLRA) ; O ffice of the General  Counsel,  SEC, 
Report to Lhe Presiden t a n d  t h e  Congress on r .he First  Year of Practice U nder the Private 
Sec u ri ties  Litigati o n  Reform A c t. of 1 995 (Apr. 1 �197 ) , <\\'ai lable at h ttp:/ /www.scc.gov/ 
news/stuclies/lreform. t>:t (on ti le wi th the Columbia Law RPPir'lu) ( same) . 
28b. Fisc h .  Aggreg�nion,  supra note 1 :'\, at 74,  92-93 ( expla i n i n g  h O\\' <tppoi u tm c n t  of 
l eac! p laintiff gro ups o r  usc of lead counsel auctions dwc<l rlS i ns ti t u t ionai i n\'C1IYem e n t) . 
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tempts to demonstrate the methodologies insti tutions are currently 
employing. 
Although there are several instances of ins ti tutional involvement in 
securities litigation prior to the adoption of the PSLRA,287 the formaliza­
tion of the statutOl)' lead plaintiff generated a much greater quantity of 
participation. Insti tutions have struggled with a variety of issues as they 
seek to develop and rationalize their participation in l i tigation.  These 
issues include when to become involved in securities l itigation,  how to 
identifY prospective lead counsel ,  what criteria to use in selecting counsel, 
methodologies for fee structure and negotiation, and the appropriate de­
gree of participation in the ongoing l i tigation subsequent to the selection 
of counsel . 
On the question of when to become involved, insti tutions h ave iden­
tified several relevant cri teria, including their perception that the case 
has merit, the size of their interest in the case, and the potential impact 
that they can have by becoming involved. Significantly, unlike the court, 
which typically lacks significant case specific information at the tim e  it is 
required to appoint lead counsel, insti tutions evaluate the merits of the 
case and the size of their losses at the threshold stage, prior to commenc­
ing the search for counsel .288 The State of vVisconsin Investment Board 
(S 1NIB) ,  for example, maintains several law firms on retainer for the spe­
cific purpose of reviewing filings and determining ·whether it should get 
involved.289 This evaluation provides a benchmark for the institution in 
evaluating l itigation proposals and fee structures by prospective lead 
counsel. Institutions typically screen cases and decline to become in­
volved unless their losses are substantial . 290 Insti tutions also seek to add 
value through their involvement. Often they will decline to seek lead 
plaintiff status if another capable insti tutional inves tor is actively 
i nvolved. 29 1 
287. See Fisch , Reform, supra note 285, at 5�9-40 (describi ng inst itutional 
involvement in securi ties l i tigation over l rnel Pentium chip and in  In re Cali fornia Micro 
Devices Securities Li tigation, 1 69 F .R .D .  257 ( N. D .  Cal 1 996) ) .  
288. Telephone Interview with Kayla Gil lan, General Counsel , California Public 
Employees ' Retirement System (Feb.  1 4, 200 1 ) [hereinafter Gil lan l n terYiew] ( explain ing 
th�t t California Publ ic  Employees· Retirement System emplovs i ts case review pol icy prior to 
c hoosin g  counsel) . 
289. Telephon e  ln tervin'l with .Keith J oh nson ,  Chief Legal Counsel & Cynthia 
Richson.  I nvesto r Responsibi l i ty Program Officer, State of 'v\'isconsin Investment  Board 
( N m . 20, �2000) [hereinafter johnson & Richson Interview] . 
290. See, e.g. ,  Telephone Interview with Horace Schow, II ,  General Counse l ,  Florida 
Sta te Board of Administration (Apr .  1 0 ,  200 1 )  [here inafter Schow In terview] ( exp la i n i ng 
that Fl orida fun d  will typically not  get i nvoh·ecl u nl ess i ts losses e� ceecl $2 m i l l i o n  or, i n  
some cases, $ 5  million ) ;  G i l la n l n tet-vi ew, supra note � S 8  ( recount ing th at , because o f  the 
Ctlifo m i a  P u b l i c  Ern plovees' Retirement Sys tem ' s i l l\·es l lll C l l l  s trategy. i t  gen c:ral ly clues 
not sufTer trading losses sufficicnr to just i r): i ts inmh-emet t t) . 
:!�l l .  See Ciilan Interview. supra n ote �288 (descr ibing ke1· cri terion �ls w h e t h e r  
Cct l PERS e m  < t clcl Yalue and n oti n g t h a t  '' i f  t h e re i� a r ; o J h e r  act i 1·c ins t i tu t ion t h < t t  wil l  get 
i m·nh e d .  '-" t: · n· nor n ecessaty'") : johnson & Richson l tH e n·i t:\1', supr<\ 110tc :28() ( c-xpL1 i n i ng  
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Once institutions decide to proceed, they take different approaches. 
Some institutions, including SWIB and the New York City Employees '  Re­
tirement System (NYCE RS) ,  identifY and select counsel on a case-by-case 
basis . 202 Others, including the California Public Employees'  Retirement 
System (CalPERS) and the Florida State Board of Administration (FSBA) , 
have created a pool of prospective lead counsel in advance and choose 
counsel frorn that pool when a specific case arises.29?> An institu tion may 
also choose a single firm to represent i t  on a long term basis . 2'>4 
In either case, the insti tution ' s  first task is to identify prospective 
firms to serve as lead counsel. Toward this end, institutions have used a 
variety of procedures. Some insti tutions rely primarily on contacts initi­
ated by counsel. Catharine LaMarr, General Counsel for the Office of 
the Treasurer of the State of Connecticut, explains that i t  is generally 
unnecessary for Connecticut to seek out prospective lead counsel because 
it  is continually approached with proposals .205 Several insti tu tions have 
developed more proactive procedures for identifYing prospective coun­
seJ ,2'H' such as prepadng and circulating a request for proposals ,297 seek­
ing recommendations, invi ting proposals from firms that have performed 
well in similar cases, and making use of repeat relationships .20tl Some 
insti tutions ha-ve also made an affirmative effort to solicit proposals from 
that i m t i tutions can be most effective by spreading their resources and taking turns in 
orc!er tu get i m·o lvecl in as many cases as possib le ) . 
2 9 2 .  See .Joh nson & Ri c hson Interview, �upra note 289; In terYiew with Lorna Bade 
Goodman,  Senior i'L%ista n t  Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department  (Oct .  1 3 , 
2000) [ here inafte r Goodman I ntet-view] . 
293. See Gil lan l tl ten·iew, supra note 288; Schow l tHen·iew, supra n o te 290. 
294. Sec,  e .g . ,  Armour v. Network A%ocs. Inc . . 1 71  F. Supp. 2cl 1 044,  1 0:52-53 ( N . D .  
C a l .  200 1 )  ( explaining process b y  ·,d 1 ich Louisian<l Teach ers' Retirement Sv.-;tcm e·aluatecl 
m ultiple l �!\\' firms, selec ted Bernstein Li towi tz. and thereafter cleYe lopecl a l on g  term 
relati o m h i p  with t h e  firm ) .  
295. Telephone I n terview wi th Catherine LaMarr, General Counse l ,  Office o f  the 
Treasurer of the State of Connecticut (Nov. 1 4, 2000) [ hereinafter LaMarr l tHet-view] . 
29G.  See,  e.g. ,  Gillan Interview, supra nme 288 (describi ng process of inYi ting 
pro:ipectiYe leacl counsel to apply for posi tion by se ndi n g l e t ters to the un iYe rse of p oten ti al 
firm:; and postin g  invitation on CalPERS websi te ) ;  Johnson & Richson l nt e rviel'.', supra 
n o t e  289 ( explain ing that S\NIB solicits proposal s from firms that haYe filed a compla int  i n 
t h e  cas e ,  firms rhat  have con tacted S'N!B ,  and nontrad i tional  pla i n ti ffs'  firms) ; D eclaration 
of r�oger Pugh at 2. In Re Cenclant Corp. Litig. , 98 F. Supp.  2cl G02 ( D .N J .  :?000) ( No.98-
28 1 9 )  [ h e rc:in�:fter Pugh Declaration] (describ ing procedu res usee! by the New Yo rk City 
Pemion Funds to idenrit)· prospective lead counsel in Cendanf) . 
:297 .  The l\�ew York State Common Fund, for example ,  has used formal req uests for 
p ropu:;�d s .  Coocl rnai l  i n terview, supra n o te 292; see also La\brr ! n terYiel\', supra note :?95 
( exp lai n i ng th�lt  Connecticut h as not used requests for proposals but is l ikeh· to clo so in 
the futu re) : cf. Telephone l n ten·icw with George Kim .Jo h n s o n ,  General Counsel ,  
Colorado Publ i c  Emplo1 ees Retirement Association ( Feb. 2 .  :200 ! )  f h c rci n<cftet· . Johnson 
intt' il iev.-] ( q1.<esrioning whether requests for p ro posals �1re ;!ppropriatc giYen t h e  cl ifTicul t 1· 
in q u�"t n rf t:·: ing p rofcssinrr�1l servic.�s) .  
��JN.  St: e ,  (:' .g. , . J ( )hn :�nn Inte r•:lt\\r, supra note :29 7  ( descri bing usc· ot. rccont rnend�nion:; 
and rt:·.- it·\\ o i "  r>t i l l: t· CJ'ies t u  iden ti!\· p ro:;pect in� l ead coum;e l ) .  
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firms that do not traditionally represent  plaintiffs in securities fraud class 
actions in order to increase the level of competi tion.299 
Institutions then use a variety of criteria to select from among the 
prospective firms either counsel for a specific case or a group of counsel 
that can be employed on a rotating basis as litigation opportunities 
arise . 300 In either case, the selection process appears highly competitive . 
Institutions choose from a large number of interested firms,30 1 focus 
their efforts on a group at least as large as the group that participates in a 
typical lead counsel auction,  302 and then apply a detailed evaluation 
process. 
The criteria include both price and qual i ty factors . Unlike courts 
employing the regulatory approach, institutional lead plaintiffs consider 
price during the selection process . Nonetheless, insti tutions repeatedly 
stress that they are unwilling to make their selection decisions on the 
basis of price alone, emphasizing the importance of quality criteria.303 As 
Horace Schow explains, '' I 'm not sure I want to get my brain surgeon as 
the lowest bidder. "304 
Institutions describe a more detailed inquiry into q uality factors than 
is reflected in auction decisions.305 Institutions report checking refer-
299. See Joh nson & R.ichson I n terview, supra note 289; Statem e n t  of Catherine E .  
LaMarr before t h e  Third Circui t Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel 4 (J une l ,  
200 1 ) ,  avai lable a t  h ttp:/ /w w.ca3.uscourts.gov/ cl asscounsel/vVi tn ess % 20Statements/ 
Catherine_Lamarr.pdf [ h e reinafter LaMarr Sta tement]  ( o n  fi le with the Columbia Law 
Review) (explai n i ng Connecticut's com m i tment to diversity in i ts sel ec tion process ) .  
300. See Gil lan Interview, supra n o te 288 (explai n i ng that advance identi fication o f  a 
qual ified pool is necessary due to time constrai n ts  in specific cases ) .  
30 1 .  See, e .g. ,  icl. (stating that approximately th i rty firms applied for positions as part 
of Cal PERS's pool) . 
302. See, e .g. ,  Declaration of Kei th L. Johnson in Support of S tate of \\'isconsin ' s  
Investment Board 's Motion for Approval o f  Selection of Lead C o u n s e l  a t  1 ,  Charles 
Dech ter Family Trust v. Anicom, I n c . ,  No.  00-C-4391 ( N . D .  I l l .  Nov. 1 0, 2000) [ hereinafter 
Johnson Decbration] ( describing review of proposals from n i n e  l aw firms) ; Pugh 
Declaration, supra note 296, at 2 (describing personal i nterviews with seven law fi rms i n  
Cendant l i tigation ) ;  Afficl<-tvi t o f  H i lary B .  Klein i n  Opposition t o  the Motion o f  the New 
York State Pension Fund Grou p  for Appoi n tment as Lead Plain tiff a t  2 ,  Aronson v. 
M c Kesson H BOC, I n c . ,  N o .  CV99-02020 ( N . D .  Cal. Aug. 25, 1 999) [ h e reinafter Klein 
Afticlavi t] ( describing contact with eigh t firms and evaluation of s ix ) ;  Gil lan l !Het-view, 
supra note 288 ( describing personal i n terviews wi th eight to nine lirms) . 
30?,. See, e .g. ,  Pugh Declaration,  supra n o te 2%, at 3 ( iden tif)·i ng ·' h igh q ual i ty legal 
work and reasonable price" as the '' two principal  cri teria for the select ion of lead 
counsel'' ) . 
304. Schow l n terYiew, supra n ote 290. Keith Johnson expressed the sent iment  i n  
\·inually t h e  s a m e  terms: · ' I  don ' t  necessarily wan t to h ave surgery pe rformed on me h v  th e 
c heapest doc tor. ·· Joh nson & Ric hson ln terYiew, supra note 289. 
:'\Oj . See . Joh nson l nt e n·icw, :>u pr�l note 297 ( " A u c t i o ns are pure cnmpcti t i un-there ' s  
n o t  m uch e\·<t luat ion . " ) .  
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ences,306 reviewing performance in other comparable cases,:l07 and even 
checking writing samples from prospective counseP08 Every institution 
requires an analysis of the case and a summary of proposed l itigation 
strategy; institutions report that the submissions vary dramatically from 
one firm to another.309 Insti tutions also indicate that they consistently 
use in-person meetings or beauty contests in addition to reviewing paper 
submissions.3 1 ° Finally, insti tutions typically involve several people in the 
evaluation process rather than relying on a single decisionmaker.:l l l 
Insti tutions seem to consider a number of qual i ty criteria that do not  
play a part in the j udicial analysis of firm quality.3 1 2  For example, insti tu­
tions value firm style and client relationship issues .3 13  They place consid­
erable importance on identifying a firm with which they can develop a 
good working relationship, and cite joint decisionmaking and regular re­
porting as important priorities .3 1 4  As l(ayla Gillan explains,  "selection of 
counsel is pretty personal ."3 15  Insti tutions identify concerns about firm 
umvillingness to remain accountable to the client and also hardball l i tiga-
306. See, e .g. ,  LaMarr Inte rview, supra note 295 ( "'vVe ask for references and check 
them." ) .  
307. See, e.g. , Gil lan In te rview, supra note 288 (describing review of l i t igation 
experience i n  post  PSLRA cases) ; Johnson Interview, supra note 2 9 7  (describing 
evaluat ions of prospective lead counsel obtained from other funds) . 
308. See, e .g . ,  Klein Affidavit,  supra note 302,  a t  2 (describing review of writing 
samples) . 
309. Sec, e .g. ,  Johnson In terview, supra note 297 ( reporting that firm outl ines of 
litigation plans vary greatly) . 
3 1 0. See Klein Affidavit, supra n ote 302, at 2 (describing detailed questioning of law 
tirms about "the facts and the law rela tin g  to the M c Kesson l i tigation ,  the ir  views on the 
probabi l i ties of success and the di!Ticul ties l ikely to be encoun tered in prosecuting the 
action on behalf of the class, and the fi rm's  experience in prosecuting actions of a similar 
nature" ) .  
3 1 1 .  See, e .g . ,  Johnson Declaration,  supra note 302, at 1 (describing usc of selection 
panel) ; Affidavit of Catherine E. LaMarr i n  Opposition to the Taft Hartley Pension 
Group ' s ,  the Waste M anageme n t  Plain tiffs Group's  and the WMI Institutional Shareholder 
Group's Respective Motions for Appointment as Lead Plai n tiff and Approval of Their 
Respective Selections of Counsel and i n  Opposi tion to the Appointment of an Option 
Subclass Lead Plaintiff at  3,  In re v\'aste :V!gmt . ,  Inc. Sec. Li tig. , 1 28 F. Supp. 2cl 401  (S. D .  
Tex. �{)00) [hereinafter LaMarr Arficlavi t]  ( recounting joint  effort by Connecticu t State 
Trcotsurer's  office and State Attorney Gener;tl ' s  o!Tice to select and retain counsel ) ; Gil lan 
Interview, supra note 288 (describing th e use of lawyer consul tants to assis t  in  selection of 
counsel ) .  
3 1 2 . See, e .g. ,  Goodman In te n iew , suprcl n ote 292 (explain ing that NYCERS looks for 
inte l lect and in tegri ty; trial experience is not significan t ) . 
3 1 3 . See, e .g. , Gillan I n tet1:iew, :;u pra n ote 288 ( explaining the importance of both a 
l! rm's  l i tigation phi losophy and h m,· t h e  fi nn deals with having a real cl ient  as opposed to a 
p�l.';Si\'C C lZl.SS ) .  
:� I -J. . Sec,  e . g . ,  Laivla rr Afticla1 it .  s u p ra note 3 1 1 ,  a t  4 (descri b i n g  repor t i ng 
rcq u i re;n e n ts and stra tegic discussions p rm·idc·d i n  retention agreen 1ent ) . 
�� 1 :�., . ( ; i l l �ln I 11 t.e rYiew·, �up1·�t n o te �08.  
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tion tactics as reasons to reject candidates . 3 1 0  Institutions also stress firm 
preparation .  By personally intervie>ving candidates, institutions are able 
to gauge each firm's  degree of investigation and the appropriateness of 
the proposed li tigation strategy.3 1 7  Finally, insti tutions convey a nuanced 
sense of the importance of firm expertise , describing the selection pro­
cess in terms of the best firm for a particular case . This description ap­
pears to refer to the price/ quality tradeoff and conveys the recognition 
that the necessary level of expertise is likely to be a function of case spe­
cific characteristics .  
After identifying qualified candidates, insti tutions then use the can­
didates ' price proposals as a starting point for negotiating the price and 
structure of the fee agreement. 3 1 8  Insti tutions explain this process as 
identifying a quality firm and then using the negotiation process to mini­
mize price and to obtain a fee structure that minimizes agency costs . 3 1 9  
Unlike some courts that have conducted auctions, institutions appear 
acutely sensitive to agency issues and readily defend their chosen fee 
structures in terms of minimizing agency costs . 3:!0 Institutions have ex­
perimented with creative fee structures designed to address these con­
cerns. 32 1 Moreover, institutions explain that they have e ru oyed consider-
3 1 6. See, e .g . ,  Lai\larr In terYiew, supra n o te '295 (expla i n i ng i m p o rtance of firm 
strategy and reputation, as well as com pati bl e style : ·'Th e  approach must  meet our 
objec tiYes. We don ' t  want slash and bum l i tigati o n . " ) . 
3 1 7 . See, e .g . ,  Klein ,-\fficlavit ,  supra note 30'2 , at 2 (describing process of i nt e rviews 
conducted) ; Joh nson & Richson I n terview, supra note '289 (explai n i n g  h ow personal 
interviews in .J�tst for Feel l i tigation,  Burke \'. Ru t tenberg , 1 0'2 F. Supp. '2d 1 280 ( N . D .  Ala. 
'WOO ) ,  enabled SWI B  to i den ti fy firm that h ad clone detailed i nvesti gative work) . 
importan tly, this e·aluation allows the l ead pbin tiff to reward a lawYer who h as conduc ted 
or igin al i rwestigation and brings m isconduct to the atte n ti o n  of the i nvestor. In contrast ,  
the auction reduces or  e l i m i nates coun sel ' s  abi l i ty to profi t  from such i nvestigati o n .  
3 1 8 . See, e . g . ,  Pugh D eclarati o n ,  supra n o te 296 ,  at 3 ,  e x . A  ( exp l ai n i n g  h ow i n itial 
bids were used as barga i n i ng poin ts i n  fee negotiations and presenting fee grids d e tailing 
i n i tial  fee proposals) .  
3 1 9 . See Goodman I nterview, supra n ote 29'2 ( explai n i n g  process of using firms' fee 
proposals to n egotiate lower fees) ;  Johnson & Richson I n terview, supra no te '289 
(explaining that  one does not <�hvays get the l owest fee from the fi rst ch o i ce fi rm, and that  
S\ViB h as generally tried t o  balance p ri ce ancl qua l i ty and t o  n egoti a te the fee down from 
th e firm's original p roposal ) . 
320. Instituti o ns relate a high degree o f  sensi tivi ty ro both agencv i ssues and case 
:;pecific factors. See, e . g . ,  Goodman I nterview, supra n o te 292 ( defen d i n g p reference for 
decl in i ng percentage fe es balanced with a lodestar crosscheck) ; Joh nson I n terview , supra 
note 297 ( expl aining that fees vary considerablY i n  both amou n t  and struc ture depending 
on the n�;ture of t h e  case ) ;  Lafv.larr In te rYiew, supra n o te '29:) ( argu i ng that Co n necticut 's  
fee structure provi des a basis  for acU usting to i n dividual case d i fferen ces ) ;  Schm1· I n tcrYiew , 
:;u p ;·a note 290 ( e�pla i n i ng th a t a case i m·oh ing a smaller po ten tia l recm·cry may req u i re a 
higher fee percent<tge to gi\ e counsel suffi cient i n ce n tive to " l i t igate ha re!" ) ;  sec also Kei th 
L. Joh nson, l ns t i tutional l nvestor Part i c i pation in Class Actions  Aft e r  t h e  P ri1·ate Secu ri ti es 
I .i t i g<t tion Reform Act of ! 990 .  AU-ABA, 1\ov. 7-8 , 1 996, at ;\7:.! , :188-.':\9 ( clde nd in g fee 
stn1cture in C:el lsta r  o n  the in:js t.!1at i t  m i n imized agencv costs ) . 
�12 1 .  f\j �n . J ( )hnson .  rnr e��an1 plc .  h as ncgntla ted �in h ouriy fee r�tth c r  than a 
U > i l i i ngenC\ fcc i n  circ: t t m:-;ta n c c:s in which there c l ear!\ \\·ould be �� ·;url e m c n r .  Anoth e r  
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able leverage in fee negotiations322 and cite retainer agreemen ts th<n 
provide for considerably lower fees than the traditional class action 
benchmarks .32"' Even those insti tutions that place less emphasis on mini­
mizing price report fee structures below the reported benchmarks . :�2 1 
Insti tutional involvement typically does not end after the selection of 
counsel . Insti tutions report ongoing supervision of the litigation process . 
They review pleadings ,  sometimes making substantial revisions or ed­
its,32s discuss litigation strategy, and monitor settlement discussions."'2r; 
In some cases, institutions have participated actively in the settlement ne­
gotiations.327 Some insti tutions also monitor counsel ' s  work effort dur­
ing the course of the litigation, reviewing time records and similar 
data. '�28 
alternative is to p rovide a bonus payment  to counsel if  the recm e ry l evel  i s  a su ffici en t ly 
high percentage of the losses claimed. Johnson Inten·iew, supra note �97.  Joh nson also 
explains that the u p-front payment  of l i tigation expe n ses relieves cash f1ow p ressure on a 
small firm, thereby reducing i ts incemive to push for a quick settlement. See also Pugh 
Declara ti on , supra n o te 296, at 4-S ( explaining how negot iated fee struc ture in Cm drm! 
con tained safeguards to address uncerta inty about the extent of recO\·el]') . 
322. See, e .g . ,  LaMarr I n terview, supra n ote 295 ( explai n i ng that law firms are highly 
motivated to work with Connecticut i n  securit ies l i tigation, and tha t  this oflers a 
competi tive advantage i n  n egotiati ons ) . 
323. See, e .g . ,  I n  re Conseco, Inc.  Sec. Litig. ,  1 20 F. Supp. 2ci 729 , 732-34 (S .D.  Incl. 
2000) (describing represe n tation by Anchorage & Lou isian a  Fire that they had n egotiated 
a percen tage fee stmcture that is  substantial ly below typ ical fee awards in securi ties class 
actions) ; State of \Nisconsin Investmen t  Board's Motion for Approval of Selection of Lead 
Counsel at 6-7, Charl es Dech ter Fam i ly Trust v. An icom, Inc . ,  ( N .D. I l l .  2000) (No.  00-CV-
439 1 )  ( exp lain in g S'v\'IB \ competi t ive bidding process as result ing i n  lower fee awards and 
citing examp l e of 15% fee award i n  I n  re Physician Comp u ter Network Sec.  Li tig . , Civ. No. 
98-98 1 (D .NJ. ) ) ;  Kle in  Atliclavit ,  supra n ote �102,  a t  3 ( describing n ego t iated retai n e r  as 
p roviding fees "sign ifican tly lower than the origi nal  fee struc tures p ro posed" ) ; LaMarr 
Afficla1·i t, supra note :n 1 ,  at S ( describing fe e schedule as providin g lower fees than th ose 
typica l ly  awarded ) ;  Daniel  Wise, Big Apple, Empire S tate V i e  LO Con trol Stock Suit,  Nat'! 
LJ, .Julv 1 9 , 1 999,  at AS (quoting assista n t  c orporation counsel H ilary Kl e i n  as stating that 
the c i ty's fee agreement with its coun:;el i n  McKesso11 p rm·icles fo r fees u f  l ess r.ha n  1 0 % of 
the recO\·ery) . 
324. See,  e .g. , Schow l n tet-view, supra n o te 290 ( ackn owledging that Florida has been 
less '1ggressi1·e than some insti tutions in seeking w m i n i mize f.-.::e:; but  desc ribing tvpical  fee 
ran ge as 20%-25 % ,  some times less ) .  
;)25 .  See Goodman I n terview, supra n o te 292; I .a\'larr l n te n ie\•:, :-;u pra n o te '295 .  
325.  Johnson Interview, sup ra n o t e  297 (de scrib i ng htm Colpcra monitors ongoing 
l i t igat ion and participates i n  sett le m e n t  negotia tions ) . 
9,27 .  See, e .g . ,  Sch0\1· l n te rYiew, supra n o te 290 (describing i mportmce Df 
i n :,ti t u t i o n a l  p resence at seulement  discussions �mel recountitlg attencl�\i, Ce �1t m ediation 
session ) ;  Johnson 8..: Ri chson f n t e iYiew, suprcl n o te 289 ( cle:;cribing Joh nson's  .. intinmtc 
i JWoln::ment"' i n  Cells tar sett le m e n t  n egotia ti u ns ) . 
:'\28. See johnson l nten·iew, supra n o te 297 ( describi n g  reYi e\'.· <m el "Pfl rcl\·al of hours 
cxpe n clecl on <J m o n th !I· bas i s ) . 
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In summary, the selection process employed by institutions closely 
resembles the process by which corporations select legal counseP29 In­
s ti tutions report using a variety of methods to increase competition and 
to identify a wide pool of candidates . They are developing selection cri te­
ria that are case specific and reflect a combination of price and quality 
considerations. They are increasing their knowledge of market rate fees 
and becoming familiar with both traditional and alternative fee s truc­
tures . This familiarity, coupled with their bargaining power, has enabled 
them to negotiate reduced fees .330 
Moreover, insti tutional investors do not  approach selection of coun­
sel in securities li tigation as novices. Like corporations, institutional in­
vestors are repeat players in the market for legal services.  Most institu­
tions are accustomed to hiring outside counsel routinely, using some type 
of competitive basis and evaluation process that considers price and qual­
i ty. :�3 1 Finally, because of their careful up-fron t  work assessing their i nter­
est in the case, insti tutions profess an ability to measure the results of 
counsel ' s  efforts by comparing the recovery to the claimed losses.3'�2 As 
George Kim Johnson has observed, given this experience, i t  is not  clear 
what value judicial involvement adds to the selection process .33'' 
C. Advantages of Institutional Procedures 
Both the characteristics and the developing practices of insti tutional 
investors are well suited to address inadequate competition and lack of 
information, the potential causes of market failure. Evaluated against the 
goal of creating a functioning market for legal services, insti tutional em­
powerment appears to be a viable solution.  Importantly, negotiation by 
insti tutions offers several advantages over both traditional judicial selec­
tion of counsel and lead counsel auctions. 
Institutional investors can clearly generate a competitive selection 
process . They have used a range of approaches, each of which effectively 
pits competing firms against each other. By using a varie ty of methods to 
identify prospective firms, and by actively soliciting participation until 
Lhey have considered a reasonable number of fi rms, institutions can en­
sure sufficient levels of participation to generate competitive prices .  Sig­
nificantly, insti tutions appear to generate greater law firm participation 
329. In deed, a number of ins t i tutions h aYe di rec tiy modeled their se lecti o n  
procedures on t h e  market for corporate l egal services, s o m e  going s o  far <ts t o  h i re outside 
counsel to teach them how to nm a beauty contest .  
3:10. The i nsti tutional experience can be con trasted with  the •;eeming inabi l i ty of 
c o n ti ngency fee pla intiffs to negotiate cleYiations from benchmark rates such as 33 % .  
33 1 .  See .Johnson I n terview, supra note 297.  Kayla Gi!Lm e:--.:pbi ns,  ·' I have been 
picking outside counsel for fifteen years.  I know how tu pick:  I know how to m o n i tor '' 
Gi l lan I nterview, supra note 288. 
332. See .Johnson I n terview, supra note 297; Schow I nterview, supra noLe 290. Schow 
explains that, because inst i tutions are repeat players, thev have an <lch·an tagc CJ'.'er the c o u rt  
in measuring damages. Icl. 
:n3 . .J o h mon l n te rYie\\·, s t tpra n o te 2CJ7 .  
T 
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through their selection procedures than the typical lead counsel 
auction.334 
Insti tutional negotiation enhances competi tion . In an auction,  the 
court is limited to the bids submitted. The fact that a bid is the lowest 
need not make it reasonable ,  particularly given the limitations on the 
ability of auctions to generate optimal prices.33" In a nego tiated process, 
the lead plaintiff can gauge the market by reviewing various firms ' pro-
. 
posals and then use this information to secure a better price than that 
initially proposed. 
By acting as repeat players, insti tutions learn the market, enabling 
them to act, much like corporate clients ,  as sophisticated purchasers of 
legal services. Institutions explicitly describe the learning curve that has 
enabled them to refine their negotiations both through repeated partici­
pation and by becoming familiar with likely recovery amounts and the 
litigation processes necessary to obtain these recoveries. Importantly, as 
frequent class members, insti tutions can develop extensive information 
on the range of legal services available .  An institutional investor such as 
the FSBA, which h as participated in dozens of class actions,  is l ikely to 
have far more extensive knowledge of the marketplace than a j udge 
whose docket includes a handful of securities cases . 3"•6 
Additionally, insti tutional investors increase their information base 
through activities that extend beyond securities l itigation.  Insti tutions se­
lect and retain counsel for a varie ty of purposes. Many insti tutions have 
developed competi tive procedures for evaluating and selecting lawyers 
prior to becoming involved in securi ties l itigation . Accordingly, insti tu­
tions can draw upon their o ther experience in the legal marketplace to 
evaluate, select, and negotiate most effectively. 
Institutional selection offers several advantages over lead counsel 
auctions. One substantial difference between lead counsel auctions and 
the more traditional auctions used to sell artwork and oil wells is that the 
former involves the sale of a service contract. As previously indicated, as 
auctioneer, the j udge acts reactively toward many of the contract terms, 
such as the structure of the fee arrangement, the specified contingencies, 
and the treatment of costs. If the judge specifies a particular structure, 
334. Inst itu tions also appear wil l ing to consider a broader range of  firms, thus 
increasing competition .  See, e .g . ,  LaMarr S ta tement, supra note 299, at 2 (describing 
Con n ec ticut's chosen firms as i ncluding "a l arge, ful l  service lmv firm," a local "boutique 
securities l i tigation firm," and a " mi nori ty-owned finn" ) .  
335. See, e .g . ,  In re Cendan t Corp. Prides Li tig. , 243 F.3cl 722, 7:q-36, 742-43 (3d 
Cir. 200 l )  (concluding that fee gener�1tecl by auction procedure did not reflect  re<csonablc 
fee award in l ight of factors i ncluding lack of complexity of case, l i m i ted duration of 
proceedings, speed of settlement, and virtual absence or motion praCLice and discoYery) . 
:'>?.!:i. See, e .g . ,  I n  re Oracle Sec. Li tig . , 1 3 1  F . R. D .  688, 695-96 ( N . D .  Cal . 1 990)  
( e:-;pb i n i ng tha t  j udges rarely ha,·c necessan' markel information w pe rm i t  compelenl 
CYal uat ion of reasonableness of proposed fee aw<Jrd ) . 
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he or she makes value j udgements about various contract terms that may 
not be appropriate and may thwart innovation .3:�7 
Insti tutional negotiations, in contrast, allow both greater tailoring of 
contract terms, and the opportunity to make tradeoff's between different 
aspects of the contract. The contractual detail described by insti tutional 
investors demonstrates the richer contracting capacity that can be 
achieved through a negotiated selection process. Insti tutions describe 
contract provisions that set forth anticipated l itigation timetables and 
structure monitoring of lawyer effort and output.3"'K 
Enhanced contracting capacity also permits institutions to develop 
creative fee structures . For example,  insti tutions report negotiating com­
plex contracts that address both incentives and agency costs, such as in­
creasing percentage of recovery fee structures that are l imited in size 
through lodestar or other types of cross-checks or hourly fees coupled 
with b01mses. 339 Insti tutions describe fee structures that permit  higher 
rewards when counsel succeeds in recovering from more culpable cle­
fendants .340 Insti tutions explain fee structures that reward counsel for 
pursuing nonmonetary benefits ,  such as corporate governance re­
forms. :H 1 Finally, institutional fee structures , unlike those set by auction, 
typically permit some adj ustment, with the institution's  consent, in  the 
event  of unanticipated litigation developments ,  thereby reducing the risk 
that poorly operating fee incentives will induce inappropriate l itigation 
decisions.'WZ The institution ' s  reputation and repeat player role enable 
the insti tution to credibly commit to these adj ustments ,  freeing counsel 
from the need to price the risk of unanticipated litigation developments 
into the fee structure . At the same time,  the fact  that the institution bears 
the cost of such adj ustments in the form of a lower recovery limits the risk 
that institutions will respond too readily to midstream requests for in­
creased fees. 
337.  Signi fican tly, al though courts have typi cally l imited fee structures to a choice 
between the lodestar and percentage of recover)' methods, the l i terawrc ref1ects a broader 
range of options. See, e .g .. Painter, supra note 1 :!2, at 4 -5 ( proposing fee structure cal led 
" th e  New American Rule" based on  the lower of a l odestar and a pcrcen t�tge of recoVCI) 
award and reviewing other proposals for cont ingen t  fee reform ) .  
338. Sec Goodman lnterYiew, supra note 292; LaM<IlT l n terYiew. supra note 295. 
339. Sec Goodman l nterview, supra no te 292; .Johnson In ten·ic\Y, supra no te 297. 
340. See Johnson & Richson In ten·iew, supra note see abo Letter from the Public  
Pension Funds to the Hon .  vVi l l iam H .  \Nal ls (Aug. ! 7 , i 998) , in Put.;h Declaration , supra 
note 29() ,  ex . C  a t  2 ( ident ifying  concern that auction procedure 11 i l 1  n o t  aclequateh address 
the importance of recm·erv from Ernst & Young) . 
34 1 .  See, e .g. ,  Schow Interview, supra note 290. 
342. See, e.g. ,  Letter from The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 
Committee on Federal Courts to Third Circuit  Task Force on Selenion uf Class Counsel 4 
( iVlay 8 .  200 1 )  ( identifying potential for m id-case adjustments of fee arrangements in l ight 
of unanticipated consequences as an advantage of empu11·crcc\ lead pla in tiffs m er 
auctions ) ; johnson Statemenc. supra note 22CJ,  :u :) ( c i t ing ret e n t ion of rh::-;ib i l i r\ tu adj w;t 
ree agreerncnt i n  1 i gh t of  c h a n ged circtl111 S tanC.:':--� ; J S  ' "a h�d } rn �lrk n f  cl ient-·clirec tecl 
l i t igat:ion ·� ) .  
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Institutional negotiati ons can also directly counter some of the fac­
tors that weaken the abil ity of lead counsel auc tions to produce reasona­
ble fees. The winner's  curse problem, for example,  c an be reduced 
through the potential for midstream fee adj us tments or m o re complex 
contracts .  To the extent that institutional participation reduces counsel ' s  
risk o f  undercompensation,  counsel need n o t  compensate for that risk by 
demanding a higher overall fee.  Similarly, although auction theory sug­
gests that firms will seek excessive fees to compensate them for investiga­
tion costs, insti tutions can make a firm ' s  investigation l ess expensive 
through participating in fact  development and analysis .  By developing 
case specific information and disclosing i t  to prospective counsel,  an insti­
tution can both reduce counsel ' s  costs and increase efficiency because 
the information can then be used in the case, unlike information ob­
tained by prospective auction bidders,  most of which is ultimately wasted .  
Ins ti tutions can also reduce social ly wasteful investigation and bid prepa­
ration costs by dividing the selection process into stages and screening 
prospective counsel prior to requiring them to perform detailed 
investigations.  
Finally, and most importan tly, institutional investors are clients .  
When they select counsel and negotiate a fee agreement, they are acting 
as principals, not agents . ?·'u As suggested above , clients are not m otivated 
by the same factors as courts in selecting and retaining counseF·+l The 
difference seems par ticularly relevant to the price/ quality tradeoff; insti­
tutional investors do not place the same importance as courts on p rice 
minimization.  For a court, the easiest facto r  to eval uate in a p roposed fee 
agreement is price-specifically the percentage of the recovery reflected 
in the fee award .  Price offers the court a seemingly obj ec tive standard , 
and one that faci l i tates review through the traditional j udicial methodol­
ogy-comparison with other cases. Price dominance also frees a court 
from the need to develop complex formulas to weigh price re lative to 
lawyer quality.  These fac tors enco urage courts to focus p rimarily on min­
imization of legal fees.  
On the other hand, clients rarely view m inimizing couns e l ' s  fee 
award as the dominant goal; clients typically seek to m aximize their  recov­
ery.345 Institutions describe their priorities in these tenns and explain 
that price minimization is inconsistent with maximizing recovery. Moreo­
ver, institutions seem to take quality quite seriously, eval u ating prospec­
tive counsel on a far wider range of quality fac tors than the courts . 
343. To the exten t tha t t h e i r  interests d iverge from those of other class members, 
inst i tutions are also age n ts and subj ect to tradi tion al agen cy cost analYsis. This A .. nicle 
rakes the posit ion that such divergence is l i m i ted in the context of securi ties l i ti gation.  For 
further discussion of thi:, iss u e ,  �ec i nfra notes 355-357 and accompanyi ng text. 
3-14. Sec, e . g . ,  Johnson Statement, supra n o te '2'29, at '2 ( i clen tii}'i n g  ways in ,,·h ich 
i n terests of i nsti tu tions and uther class me mbers m ay diverge from thos e  of other p lavers in 
the l i tigati on ) .  
345. The maximum n.: c O\ e rv l ll<ty of c o urse include n o nmon c t�w .. bnors in acldi t iun 
to money damages. See i n fra note 3"l6. 
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By emphasizing quality evaluation , institutional investors can address 
factors that fal l  completely outside the auction process, such as the socie­
tal impact of the l itigation"46 and the value  of rewarding original investi­
gations that uncover bases for liability. The interest of institutional inves­
tors in pursuing particular types of cases, such as those that enhance 
overall deterrence or increase market safety, is  l ikely to generate in­
creased investigation efforts by prospective lead counsel. Institutional un­
willingness to seek lead plaintiff status in cases viewed as frivolous will 
discourage lawyers from filing strike suits .  At the same time, the interest 
and involvement of large investors at the prefiling stage may reduce costs 
and facilitate the success of entrepreneurial lawyers at the preliminary 
investigation stage. 
As the background and legislative history to the lead plaintiff provi­
sion explain ,  insti tutions are well suited to perform these tasks due to 
their experience, relative sophistication, and substantial stakes in  the l i ti­
gation ."'47 The dollar amount at issue for a large insti tution provides a 
tangible incentive for the insti tution to invest the necessary time and ef­
fort to identifY qualified counsel, negotiate a reasonable attorney's  fee ,  
and develop a fee structure that minimizes agency costs .  Unlike the 
court, the lead plaintiff with a substantial interest in the case has a finan­
cial interest in maximizing the net  recovery to the p laintiff class , and in­
ferior fee structures adversely affect its expected return from the lawsuit. 
One additional point should be addressed.  Even if insti tu tional ne­
gotiations are superior to lead counsel auctions in addressing price and 
quality considerations, auctions have been widely used in government 
contracting to address concerns about collusion and favoritism. 348 ·with 
the growing involvement of public pension funds, which are also political 
actors , as lead plaintiffs , i t  is necessary to consider whether auctions are 
warranted to l imit political influence on case selection and counsel 
selection. 349 
346. One i mportan t nonmonetary fac tor in securities l itigatio n  is the poten tial  to 
obtain corporate governance reforms through the settlement.  The exte n t  to whi c h  l ead 
plain tiffs should pursue governance reforms in secu r i tJe� l i tigation i s  an i nterest ing 
quest ion.  Pursuit  of such reforms mav make securities l i ti gation more of a positive sum 
game. Moreover, governance reforms arguably can i m p rove corporate and market 
performance to the benefi t  of al l i nvestors. None theless, it  can be argued that p u rs u i t  of 
n o n m o n e tary forms of recovery creates a confl ict  be tween class members who are 
cont inuing investors i n  the defendant corporat ion and those who are not.  This Arti c l e  wi l l  
n o t  attempt to resolve the issue excep t  to obsen'e that ,  for the moment,  i n s ti tu ti o n s  state 
that they are not sacrificing damages in favor of governance reforms. See Schow I n te n;iew·, 
supra note 290. As i n s t i tutions become increasingly inYolvecl with m o n i torin g  l i tigation 
clecisionmaki ng, h owever, it  will  become import a n t  to determin e  the exte n t  to which such 
a sacrifice '''ould be appropriate.  
347.  See, e .g. , Fisc h ,  Aggregation,  supra n ote 1 3, a t  74, 92-93 (describ i n g  backgro u n d  
and legisla ti1·e h istory a s  deta i l i n g  advan tages o f  parti ci pation b y  instituti o n al i nYestors ) . 
348. See su pra note 1 38 and accompanyi n g  text. 
:-'149. See Coh e n , supra n o te 1 37.  ;tt 1 352-5'1 (ach·oca t ing use of auct ions i n  o rd e r  to 
e l iminate such poli t i cal i n fluence ) .  
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Two troubling scenarios are possible. The more obvious risk is that a 
fund will choose a law firm on the basis of political contributions made by 
that firm to the fund or politicians with political control over the fund.  
In the Cendant case, for example, a competing lead plaintiff applicant 
alleged impropriety because two of the firms selected by New York State 
to represent  it in securities fraud l itigation had made substantial contri­
butions to the State Comptroller's campaign for reelection .350 Although 
the allegation of impropriety was unproven,  the court defended i ts deci­
sion to use an auction, in part, as addressing this concern .35 1 A second 
and more subtle risk is that public pension funds may face political pres­
sure from politicians as to which law firms to hire and which cases to 
enter. 
Political corruption in the selection of class counsel is a serious con­
cern . As the SEC has warned, selection of a firm after political contribu­
tions by the firm to the lead plaintiffs  decisionmaker warrants serious 
scrutiny.352 More generally, political pressure at any stage of the l itiga­
tion process can cause an institutional investor 's  interests to diverge from 
those of other members of the plaintiff class. Currently, h owever, these 
concerns fail  to rise to the level of j ustifying an auction.  Despite wide­
spread allegations of misconduct and mudslinging in recent battles over 
the selection of lead plaintiff and class counsel, ' 53 and the incentives for 
competing lead counsel applicants to uncover wrongdoing, there are no 
reported cases in which improper political influence h as been demon­
strated.�''14 Moreover, reports of successful attempts to game government  
auctions are rampant, and as indicated above, j udges too are susceptible 
to political influence, although it is influence of a different kind. Final ly, 
as the preceding discussion of the price/ quality tradeoff demonstrated, 
attempts to curtail the role ofjudgment in the selection process are most 
likely, as is often the case in government contracting, to sacrifice qual ity. 
350. See ·wise ,  supra n o te 32?> ( describing allegati ons of pay-to-pl ay ) . 
35 1 .  See In re Cendant Corp. Litig. , 1 82 F.R.D.  1 44,  1 52 (D . N..J. 1 998) 
(" [N]  otwi thstancling the absence of proof of pay-to-play, the auction is salutary because i t  
removes any speculative doubt abou t that issue . " ) . 
352.  See l\ilemoranclum of the SEC, Ami cus Curiae, In re Baan Co. Sec.  L i tig. , 1 86 
F. R . D .  2 1 4, 234 ( D. D . C .  1 999) ( No. A.98-2465 (JI-IC) ) .  
353. See, e . g . ,  Z-Scven Fund, I n c .  v. Motorcar Parts & Accessories ,  2 3 1  F.3cl 1 2 1 5 ,  1 2 1 7  
(9th Cir. 2000) (describing counsel ' s  "sh ri l l  al legations of uneth ical condu c t" i n  competing 
for lead counsel appo i n tmen t) ; I n  re Ne twork A • .ssocs. Sec. Litig. , 76 F.  Supp.  2d 1 0 1 7, l 031  
( N . D .  Cal. 1 999) ( recounting " inflammatOiy charges o f  fraud, i n competence, and 
soli c i tation-even allegations of criminal  conduct" ) .  
354. Despite :VIs. Coh e n ' s  assertions that payi ng-to-plar is widespread, she cites only a 
s ingle example of pay-to-play i n  securi ties fraud l i tigatio n ,  the Cen dan t case. Cohen,  supra 
n o te 1 37,  at 1 542-43. /\.! though one of the l ead counsel firms in Cendant had contributed 
:)40,000 to the e<tmpaign fund of the New York State Comptroller,  the court did n o t  find 
a ny i mp roper i nfluence and,  i n  [act,  subsequen tly appointed the firm as lead counsel 
despite i ts knowledge of the con tributio n .  See I n  re Cenclant Corp . Sec.  Litig. , 264 F.3d 
20 1 ,  269 ( 3cl Cir. 200 1 )  ( descri b i n g  abse nce of e1·i cl e n cc supporti n g  �! ! legation of pal -to­
pia)·) . 
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The risk of politi cal influence, at  this point, seems insufficient to j ustify 
abandoning a process that has the potential to produce high quality rep­
resentation in favor of one better suited to producing mediocrity .355 
Although attention has focused on political corruption,  there is  also 
a risk that conflicts of interest will cause insti tu tional investors to behave 
inappropriately. Insti tutions could enter into side agreements to obtain 
private benefits in exchange for selecting a particular firm or agreeing to 
terms in a retainer agreement. An insti tution might, for example,  seek to 
trade a higher legal fee in a class action for represen tation on better 
terms in another case . An insti tution could also seek a resolution of the 
litigation that disproportionately benefits i t  at the expense of other class 
members. �156 Only further experience with the empowered lead plaintiff 
model will reveal the magnitude of these risks . Several factors,  however, 
mitigate against these types of self dealing. First, the decisions of public 
pension funds are subject  to oversight procedures and disclosure require­
ments that are likely to reveal actual and potential conflicts of interest.3"7 
Second, as insti tu tions adopt clearly defined structures for selecting class 
counsel, they minimize the potential for their other interests to influence 
the selection . Third, concern about reputational effects may constrain 
institutional opportunism. 'l58 
D. InteljJretive Guidelines for the Judiciaiy 
The developments described above are precisely what Congress con­
templated in adopting the PSLRA. '1'') They are threatened, however, by 
two types of judicial decisions that undermine lead plaintiff control. 
First, some courts have aggregated the holdings of multiple investors to 
appoint lead plaintiff groups rather than a single investor.%0 Second, 
some courts have sought to retain affirmative control over the selection 
and compensation of lead counsel, rather than deferring to the l ead 
plaintiffs decisions.36 1  
35.5.  I t  should also b e  noted that  a number o f  ins t i tut ions h ave struc tu res o r  pol ici es 
designed to l i m i t the poten tial for poli t ical i n fl uence.  See Gillan Inrerview, supra n ote 288 
(describing CaiPERS's th irteen member board, of which only th ree members a re 
appoimed by the governor, and which must appr<l\·e counsel selec t ion decisions,  as "not  
\ CrY vulnerable to  pol i tica l  i n fluence'' ) ; Goodman I n ten·iew, supra not.e 292 ( explai n i ng 
that selection cri teria in future cases \\·i l l  exclude fi rms that have m ade poli tical donations) . 
3:16 . An argument can be made t l l<lt instituti onal efTorts to obtain corporate 
gc>':crn;mce reforms as part of the sett lement  pro cess reflect th is  type of confl ict .  See supra 
note 346. 
357 .  See, e.g. ,  Gil lan I n ten·ie\\·, supra no te 288 ( cle:;cr ib ing role of Ca!PERS board in 
overseeing l i tig:J.tion dec i s ions ) . 
358. See, e .g. , Sch ow I nterview, supra nut.e 290 ( iclen tifving importance to inst itut ion 
of m a intai n i ng the quali ty of i ts reputation in order to be effective) . 
359.  See Fisch ,  Aggregatio n , sup r·a note 1 :'>. at 92-93 (describing congressional  
ubj e c ti1·es con c ern ing participation b1· inst inniou< i l  i m est ors ) .  
3(:)0. Sec i c! a t  65-69. 
'�() ! .  In <1 prior article,  I h ;we quest io ned the proprietv of continued j udicial  efforts to 
''S'. c n  cun trol cn e r  the counsel selection p r( lcess 1 1 1  i i g h t  of the fac t  that n1<1ny t:xist ing 
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I have previously identified a number of problems with the appoint­
ment of lead plaintiff groups.362 Among other problems, the use of lead 
plaintiff groups adds subj ectivity and unpredictability to the process of 
appointing a lead plaintiff. Groups suffer from a variety of functional 
limitations that reduce the li tigation control of group members,  generally 
in favor of greater lawyer control. Even small groups introduce uncer­
tain ties about decisionmaking structure and may result in compromise 
decisions or coordination problems. 363 Finally, judicial acceptance of ag­
gregation may result in the displacement of a large individual or insti tu­
tional investor by a group with a l arger aggregate interest, but whose indi­
vidual members have relatively small s takes, thereby diminishing the 
incentive for active client participation.  
The power of even a single lead plaintiff is undermined when the 
court seeks to maintain control over the selection and compensation of 
class counsel. Judicial efforts to exert control vary in degree.  Some 
courts , such as those that conduct lead counsel auctions, have effectively 
ignored the PSLRA mandate in favor of selecting counsel themselves and 
determining an appropriate fee structure .364 Indeed, in Quintus, Judge 
·walker went  so far as to appoint counsel and then instruct counsel to 
choose an appropriate lead plaintiff-thereby restoring the type of lawyer 
control targeted by the PSLR.A.. 'V''"' 
defi c i e ncies i n  class acti on procedures are p roduc ts ofjucl ic ial creation.  See icl. a t  94-95. 
Judic ial partic i pation in the l i tigation process may introduce part icul ar biases or 
perception problems that h i nder effective evaluation of the prob lems . For a more 
comp rehensive treatment  of the cornpara ti,·e inst iwtional advan tage issues raised, se c  
general ly N e il K. Komesar , I mperfec t  Alterna tives ( 1 994) . 
%2. See Fisch , Aggregat io n , supra note 1 3 ,  at 7 1 -73. Of co urse groups also o11er 
some advantages, such as inc reasi ng re presen ta ti on , adding expertise or experience,  
gen era ti ng a d i,·e rs i ty of i deas and perspect i,·es , an d  ass is t ing i n  l i t iga tion financing.  
363.  I n  Cendant, for example,  u n ly one member of the lead pla in tiff group appeared 
in opposition to the fee award, which was based on the terms of the auction . Transcri pt of 
Proceed ings at 98-99, I n  re Cendant Corp . Sec. Litig. ( D . N J .  June '28, 2000) (�lo.  98-
1 664) . The absence of a formal response from the oth e r  members made it difficul t  for the 
court to ascertain the oHi cial position of the group . !d. Tn Laborers Local 1 298 Pension Fund 
v. Campbell Soup Co. , the coun appointed as co-lead plain tiffs two i n dividuals and the 
Treasurer of the State of Connecticut,  and app o i n ted two correspondi ng se ts of leac\ 
cou nse l . No. 00- 1 5 2 ,  2000 U . S  Dist .  LEX IS 548 1 ,  at ''' 1 1  ( D . ('; j. Apr. 24, '2000 ) . This 
forced the ins ti tution to work wi th a law finn that it  had n o t  selec ted and with whi c h  it  had 
no personal o r  fo rmal c o n t rac tual relationship,  thus l imi ting the institu tion 's abi l i t)' to 
engage in the type of ongo i ng mon i toring and con trol described in the previous 
Subsection . See LaMarr S tatemen t , supra n ote 299,  at 3 ( descri bi ng ··poor responsive ness 
and sl i pshod qual i ty of the work"' pedormecl by co-lead counsel ) .  
::164. Si m i lar an alvsi s  a p plies wh en a c ou rt s i mp ly substitutes i ts prefe rred Lwyer for 
the o n e  chosen by th e lead plaint iff. See,  e . g . ,  Z-Se,·en Fund , Inc .  ' ·  l'vl u torcar Pans & 
Accessories, 2 3 1 F.3cl 1 2 1 5 , 1 2 1 7 (9 th Ci r. '2000) ( desc ri bing trial coun's appo i n t m e nt of 
i ndi\·iclual i m es to r Fr<m c i n e  E h rl ich as l ead plaint i ff but se lect ion of the bwyer 
rep rese n ti n g  a competing le<ld plain tiff appl ican t as lead Ctltm,c l ) .  
c'\6:1 .  After j uclge Walke r used a n  a u ctio n to :;elect  Wei ss & Yuunnan <IS le�1cl counsel,  
the original l ead pia inti ff reCused tC> work with rhe  fi rm .  See J1snn Hoppin.  At turne\ S 
Gett i ng the  S i l e n t  TreJtmem, Recorder, June 1 9 , �00 1 a t  l ,  �t\ � t i bh i e at \\'L, 6/ l ':l/200 1 
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Other courts pay l ip service to the lead plaintiff role but attemp t  to 
exert control indirectly, such as by designating appropriate selection pro­
cedures or fee structures and threatening the lead plaintiff with the pros­
pect of removal for failing to defer to the court' s preferences. Thus the 
court in NetwoTk Associates unsuccessfully sought to impose i ts selection of 
counsel procedure on the institutional lead plaintif£. 366 
Some judges h ave explicitly concluded that the failure to select the 
court's preferred candidate or negotiate the court's preferred fee struc­
ture rebuts the statutory presumption of adequacy and justifies the court 
in replacing the lead plaintiff. In Coppe-r JVfountain, for example,  Judge 
Walker held that "a negotiated deal with the best, competi tive terms sup­
ports an inference that the negotiating plaintiff is the most adequate 
plaintif£. "367 Accordingly, the court found that the presumption of ade­
quacy in favor of investors with substantially larger losses was rebutted 
and selected an individual investor who had suffered a loss of only 
$59,000 because his negotiated fee agreement was, in the opinion of  the 
court, "significantly better for the class. "368 
As indicated above, uncertainty about the most appropriate fees and 
fee structures, coupled with demonstrated judicial weaknesses in securing 
and compensating counsel,  make i t  hard to accept judicial superiori ty 
over lead plaintiffs . Simply put, lead plaintiff negotiations are a market 
approach;  judicial selection is not. To quote Judge Posner, " [m ]  arkets 
know market values better than j udges do. "369 
Nor do recent j udicial opinions demonstrate greater procedural pro­
tections or more sophisticated evaluation of agency issues. The Coppe-r 
Niountain decision , for example, rejected wi thout discussion the possibil­
i ty that the higher fee structure for C:wii ' s  chosen counsel could be j usti­
fied based on quality differences. :-\7o Similarly, the court viewed the fee 
caps and declining percentage structure of the Barton 's  proposed fee 
agreement as advantages despite the agency problems they create . More 
troubling is the court 's  rejection of selection decisions made through a 
competi tive process by investors wi th substantial stakes . :n l  Copper Nioun-
RECORDER-SF 4 (describing lead plain tiff Hi l l ' s  refusal to speak with Weiss & Yourman) . 
Judge Walker responded by " simp ly as king 'Neiss & Yourman to find i tself a c l ient." Id .  
366.  See supra note I l l  and accompanyi ng text.  
367. In  re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. L i tig . ,  N o .  C-00-3894 (VRW) , 2001 U .S .  
Dist.  LEXIS 1 6560, a t  *33-''' 34 (N.D.  Cal. Apr. 1 2 , 200 1 )  
368. J d .  �H ''' 34. 
369. In re Cont'l I l l . Sec. Li t ig . , 962 F.2d 566, 570 ( 7th Cir .  1 992 ) .  
370. See In IP Coppcr A1ountain, 200 1 U .S .  Dist .  LEX I S  1 6560, a t  *'!>7 ( "The sign ificant 
differences in potential auorney fees cannot be ration ally o: pl a i necl by i n tangible fac tors 
such as the \\·el l-recognized brand name in securities l i tigation of CiVil 's  counsel.") ; cf. 
supra tex t accompanving notes 205-207 (describing court ' s  analvsis of this fac tor i n  
(2Hintus) . 
cl7 l .  See . e . g. ,  In IP CojJjH'r lvloun tain , 2001 C .S .  D ist .  LEX!S 1 6560, at ''' 3::! (fi n ding CMl  
to h<tYe clemomtrated a wil l i n gness to n ego t i a te wi th cuut 1 sel ) ;  Tt·;mscri pt of Hearing dated 
l\ Lt r.  S ,  ::!00 1 ,  <l t ::!9. ! u  rc Copper i'vl o u n t a i n  N e tworks Sec. Li t ig , ( N . D .  Cal. Apr. 1 2 . 200 1 )  
( No .  C-OO<�IN·l (VRW) ) ( tes t imony oF pbin t i fT H :m n o t l  d c:;cribi n �· h is c o ns idera t ion of 
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tain is not  an isolated example; the court 's  decision to conduct an auc­
tion in Cendant after insti tutional plaintiffs had negotiated a competitive 
fee agreement is analogous. 372 Such decisions either reflect a rejection 
of the lead plaintiff s  abili ty to perform i ts role or an effort to try to whip­
saw counsel into accepting a lower price .  The former position is inconsis­
ten t  with the PSLRA; the latter undercuts the lead plaintiff s  abil ity to 
nego tiate effectively with prospective counseP7'� 
It is difficult to reconcile this j udicial oversight with the obj ective of 
client control .  Potential judicial interference with the lead plaintiff s  de­
cision also discourages large investors ,  particularly insti tutions, from ac­
tive participation.'�74 A lead plaintiff must expend i ts own resources to 
investigate the case,  develop information on the market for legal services, 
identify qualified counsel,  and negotiate a fee agreement. Although an 
investor can justify these expenditures if they ultimately enhance the re­
covery, they are wasted if the investor 's  decisions are supplanted by the 
court.'�75 
approximate ly eleven firms before deciding on Milberg Weiss) ; i cl .  at 35-43 (de tai l ing each 
CMI member's negotiation exp eri ence, famil iarity at deal i ng with lawyers and counsel 
selection procedures i n  thi s  case) . 
372.  See, e .g . ,  B rief of New York Ci ty Pension Funds for Appellants at 30, In re 
Cendant Corp. L i tig .  (3d Cir. Dec . 1 3, 2000) ( Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653) [hereinafter Cendan t 
NYC B rief] ( arguing that lead p lai nti ffs had fulfi l led exac tly their role under the statute, 
inc luding negotiating the " ' hardes t bargain ' . . .  ever n egotiated in  advan ce in a securities 
class actio n" ) .  
373.  Judicially determined fee struc tures also reduce counsel ' s  accoun tability, both 
di rec tly, by el i mi nat ing negotia ted provisions providing for ongoi n g  reporting and c l i en t 
oversight, and i ndirectly, by removing the l ead p la i n ti ffs control over counse l ' s  
compensation ,  which reduces the incentive to moni tor and l imits the effectiveness of 
atte m p ts to exercise control. By reducing counsel 's accoun tab i l i ty to the lead p lain tiff, 
these structures place a greater burden o n  the court to determine, on an ex post basis, i f  
counsel ' s  efforts were reasonable. See I n  re  Cendant Corp .  Prides Li tig. , 2 4 3  F.3cl 7 2 2 ,  732 
(3d Cir. 200 1 )  ( concluding that fee resu l ting from auction must nonetheless be eval uated 
for reasonableness) .  
374.  See, e . g . ,  Cendant NYC Brief, supra note 372, a t  32 ( argu i ng that district court 
decision ''will surely impact the wi l l ingness of i nstitutional im estors to step forward as Lead 
Plaintiffs") ;  LaMarr Statemen t, supra note 299, at 4 (warn i ng that " imposition of class 
counsel through an auction . . .  may well be a deterrent  to pa rtic ipation of the type of 
institutional i n vestor plainti ffs we believe Congress sough t to attract to this process" ) .  
Alternatively, i nsti tuti ons may opt out of class actions i n  favor of individual suits i n  state o r  
federal court. See Remarks of Horace Schow II Before Thi rd Circuit  Task Force on 
Selection of Class Counsel , j u n e  l ,  200 1 ,  a t  5 ( explai n i n g  that  FSBA may o p t  our a n d  
insti tu te i ts own action to avoid risk of auction or the  possibi l i ty of having to  share con trol 
as part of an unaffi l iated group ) .  For an exam p l e in wh i ch an ins ti tution chose an 
independen t state sui t in favor of class panic i pation in federal court see Louisiana State 
Em p loyees ' Retirement Sys. v. Citr ix Sys . ,  ! n c . ,  No. 1 8298,  �00 1 De l .  Ch. LEXJS 2 ( Del . Ch . 
. Jan . 5, 2 00 1 ) .  
375.  Sec, e . g  . . Pugh Declarat ion ,  supra note 296, at 6 ( iden ti fy i ng costs associated with 
k:acl p lain tiff posit ion and wa rn i n g  that by "raking <1'.\'ay the le:tcl plai n ti ffs' righ t w choose 
i r.s own counsel as wel l  <ts the ir  a b i l i ty lO nego tiate a t tornq·s ' fe(�S to maximize reco\·ety for 
the class, the [ Cenrla n l ]  auction procedure \ i rt ua l lv n u l l i fied the Ci t\· pcustun Funds' 
i n c e n t. in· to senT as l eacl pht i nti rl'' ) . 
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How should this analysis affect j udicial implementation of the lead 
plaintiff provision? First, as I have argued elsewhere,376 and as the s tatute 
directs, the appointment decision should rely on an obj ective criterion,  
the s ize of the investor's interest.377 Both the text of the statute and 
strong policy arguments militate against judicial attempts to review coun­
sel selec tion procedures or the terms of fee agreements in the guise of 
determining the adequacy of the lead plaintiff. 37R Simply put, the court 
should not inj ect  i ts preferences regarding selection of counsel into the 
process of appointing the lead plaintiff. 379 
Second, although the court retains approval power over the selection 
of lead counsel, that power should be exercised narrowly. To ensure that 
the lead plaintiff mechanism is used to effect client control rather than to 
shield lawyer driven litigation, the court may reasonably require the lead 
plaintiff to demonstrate 1 )  that the selection of counsel was the result of a 
competitive process, and 2)  that the lead plaintiff actively negotiated a fee 
agreement with counseJ.380 These criteria, hmvever, should be satisfied 
by minimal showings-the court  should not withhold approval on the 
rationale that an al ternative selection process is preferable or that a lower 
fee agreement is possible .  Only by allowing lead plaintiffs a degree of 
discretion is it possible to promote a varie ty of competi tive selection 
methods and creative fee s tructures that include quality and o ther intan­
gible factors, in addition to price .38 1 Finally, a failure by the lead plaintiff 
to make the necessary showing should not resul t in his or her disqualifica­
tion as lead plaintiff, or enti tle the court to select counsel i tself. 382 The 
376.  See Fisc h ,  Aggregation, supra n o te 1 3, a[ 76.  
'377 .  The p resum p t ion of adequacy, which e x te nds to the i nvesto r with th e largest 
s take in the case, should only be rebutted by factors that in terfere with the lead p l a in ti ff s 
abilitv fairly to represen t the class, such as conflict ing ownership i n terests or u n ique and 
ongoing contractual relationships with a defendant.  
378. Indeed, i n  many cases i t  \vil l  be i nappro p ri a te for t h e  court eYen to consider 
a ppo i n tmen t of lead counsel  a t  the ti me that i t  appoin t s the lead plai n t i ff I n  cases in 
which there are competing applic a n ts for th e lead pl ain t i ff posi t i o n ,  i t  ma,· n o t  be 
reasonable for p oten ti al l ead p l a i n tifl'i to i n c u r  t h e  t ime and expense o f  n egotiat i on s wi th 
counsel prior to the court's rul i ng . Nloreover, an i m·estor wil l  be abl e  to negoti a te more 
effe c t iYelv w i th plai l1[ i ffs ' firms after se curi n g  t h e  appoin t m e n t  as lead p l a i n t iff. 
379. E.g. ,  I n  re Cell Pathways, I n c . ,  Sec.  Litig. I I .  203 F .R .D .  1 89,  1 92 ( E . D .  Pa. 200 1 )  
( co n c l uding th at appointmen t of l ead plain tiff and a pp ro\'a l of lead c ounsel are " two 
sepante issues'' ) .  
:180. ln re Ce ndan t Cor p .  Litig. , 264 Lkl 20 1 ,  260 ( 3 cl C i r. 2U0 1 ) .  
38 1 .  For the s a m e  reason ,  th e c ourt sh ould accord t h e  fee arr<mgement n egotiated ly,­
<1 !1 i nst i tu tional i twestor a '·presumption of reason�tb!en ess·· and shuulcl aware! fees i n  
accord<mce with :'uch an agreemen t absent ch anged circumstances o r  clear exccssi\'C n css. 
I cl .  al  2(')�-8�3. 
:1H�.  Disqual ifi cation of d1e lead plai n t iff sh ould be reset-vee! for extr< tord i nzu·,· 
c i tT U !I 1s t.;_t ! 1C t��s, :;;uch as d e n1on:; tratcd c l i e n t  un\\·i i ! i n g n ess :.:lc t i \·t: 1 �  .. t � ;  p�: r t i c i pate � b ri bery, 0 1 ·  
L h t: :;•:: ! e c t i u n  o f  ]D t e n tiy  u n q ual i fied c o u tbcl . 
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court should merely defer i ts approval of the lead counsel appointment 
pending the necessary shmving. 383 
Despite recent increases in the involvement of institutional investors, 
not  every case will involve an insti tutional lead plaintiff. In some cases ,  
no institutional investor wil l  seek the appointment; in others, an individ­
ual investor may have a larger stake .384 It is important to note that the 
PSLRA does not  limit i ts presumption of adequacy to insti tutional inves­
tors.385 Moreover, although insti tutions may offer some advantages, indi­
vidual investors are ful ly capable of performing the duties of the lead 
plaintiff.38G In securities l i tigation, the size of the investor 's  loss serves as 
a reasonable proxy, both for the i nvestor's incentive to participate actively 
and for his or her abil i ty to do so.  Wealthy individuals vvho suffer large 
losses have similar motives to participate actively as clients in traditional 
litigation, and they are l ikely to be experienced in negotiations,  in deal­
ing with lawyers, and in monitoring agents. Accordingly, the absence of 
an insti tutional lead plaintiff does not enti tle the court to ignore the stat­
ute and assert control over the selection and retention of counsel. 387 
V. ExTENDING THE EMPOv\'ERED PL\INTIFF MoDEL 
PJthough the PSLRA. is the only statute formally to endorse the em­
powered lead plaintiff, the model can be extended to other substantive 
areas. Courts have the power to select a lead plaintiff in other class ac­
tions and to vest the lead plaintiff with the authority to select and retain 
383. Cf. I n  re Quintus Sec. Litig. , 201 F.R.D. 475, 490 ( N . D .  Cal. 200 1 )  ( order 
concluding that plaintiff could not meet adequacy requirement of FRCP 23(a )  ( 4) wi th out 
demonstrating that "he is able effectively to select and negotiate with a prospective lead 
counse l " ) ; In re Lucent Techs . ,  I n c . ,  Sec. Litig. , 1 94 F . R. D .  1 37,  1 56-58 ( D . N J. 2000) 
( o rder refusing to appoint  lead pl a i n tiff s choice of counsel and i n s tead ordering an 
auc tion because court found no evidence that  pla i ntiff considered other counsel or ac tively 
negotia ted a fee agreement) . 
384. See, e .g . ,  Z-Scven Fund, I n c .  v. Motorcar Parts & Accessories,  2 3 1  F. 3cl 1 2 1 3 ,  1 2 1 6  
(9 th Cir. 2000) ( describing allege d losses of appoin te d individual investor as exceeding 
rhose suffered by Louisiana State Employees ' Reti rement System) ; In re Tclxon Corp. Sec. 
Litig. , 67 F. Supp . 2cl 803, 823 ( N . D .  Ohio 1 999) (fin di ng tha t  the Joss of $ 1 ,087,967 
asserted by the two Hayman brothers "is clearly  l a rger than the �428,000 loss of the 
[FSBA] " ) . 
385 . See, e.g. ,  Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 82 1 -22 ("The i nstitutional investor is not 
p resumptively the most adequate pbi miff solely by Yirtue of i ts status as an i n s ti tu tional 
investor, howe e1. If that were the case, Congress would h ave simply provided that 
institutional investors are presumptivelv the most adequate piaintiffs, regardless of the size of 
finzmcial loss . . . .  " ) . 
38b. Cf C)yinlus, 201  F .R.D.  at 487 ( !·eas o n i n g  that " Congress found,  and mo:;t courts 
mJtdd agree , tha t  ins ti tu tional plaintiffs are bette:· equipped than indiYicluals to sen·c a.s 
lead plain tiff�; '' ) .  
337.  Cf. Armour '.' ·  Nen, ork A:;�;ucs . ,  Inc . ,  1 7 1  F .  Supp.  2cl 1 0-14, 1 00 6  ( :\ .D .  CaL 200 1 ) 
( suggcstj ng  that deference rnay not  be \varran ted if 1cacl pl:tin tiff is an i nd i,·idu�d in'.·estcr) ; 
-�:'\ 'e n..::lerh old Y. c:yli n i� Corp. ,  1 88 F . lZ. D .  577,  587 ( :\.f .I) .  c:ai . 1 999)  ( rt�tsoning thal:  because 
t h e  lead plc.ti n tiff ·wtlS an ind iYidual rathc·r  th�ln an i n stitu tional i nvestor. hl:--: �1bi l i ty Lo �:el:::c l  
�·t n cl rn o n i lnr c Lt:3S coun:�el  v:as 1 cs::. c h a n  idea l ,  �-tnd �  therel "ure.  conduct i n g  !)UCt io n ) .  
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lead counsel , subject to the approval of the court, on the terms described 
in this Article .388 This Part considers the potential scope of such an 
expans10n . 
Class actions differ. Arguably mass tort cases, securities fraud litiga­
tion,  and consumer fraud lawsuits have little in common beyond the pro­
cedural vehicle that establishes a collective litigation structure. 389 These 
differences frequently condemn efforts to develop universal solutions to 
problems in class litigation . Accordingly, this Article does not  p urport to 
propose a solution to all class action deficiencies, or to offer a mechanism 
for addressing counsel selection and compensation issues in  all contexts . 
Rather, the Article explicitly recognizes that the empowered lead plaintiff 
model is not  suitable for all class actions and \Vill work effectively only if 
certain criteria are met. 
This Article proposes three criteria for determining when i t  is appro­
priate to delegate selection of counsel, fee negotiation, and case supervi­
sion to an empowered lead plaintiff. First, the class must include mem­
bers with a sufficient financial stake in the litigation.  Only if the 
empowered lead plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the case will it incur 
the costs of identifying, negotiating with, and monitoring class coun­
sei .390 Second, the potential lead plaintiffs must be sufficiently represen­
tative of the i nterests of other class members. The interests of all class 
members need not be identical , but large class members should not  have 
interests that are qualitatively different from those of smaller m embers. 
If they do, agency problems wil l  hinder the lead plaintiffs  ability to make 
decisions on behalf of the plaintiff class . Third, the size of a class mem­
ber' s  interest should be correlated with its sophistication and ability to 
handle the selection,  negotiation,  and monitoring processes .39 1 This cor­
relation permits the court to use the size of the plai ntiffs  interest as an 
objective selection criterion.  
These criteria are satisfied in the typical securities fraud class action. 
Plaintiff classes generally include members who have suffered substantial 
losses, institutional investors and wealthy individuals, who are competent 
388. Courts need not awai t  expl ic i t  statutory auth orization .  Courts h ave deve loped 
the roles of lead plain tiff and lead counsel under the ir  general power to supervise class 
l i tigation. The model described here is consiste n t  with the courts· bro ad j udic ia l  authority 
although i t  entai ls  a less proactive judicial  role than that  ref1ec ted under the trad i tional 
approach. 
389. See Joseph A. Grun dfest & Michael A. Perino,  The Pentium Papers: A Case 
Study of Collective Insti tutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 Ariz.  L Rev. 559, S74-76 
( 1 996) (describing class actions as a conti nuum ranging from cases in which  class members 
have small stakes, and, therefore, no incentive to mon i tor,  to cases i n  wh ich members with 
large i n terests are l i ke ly to opt out) . 
390. In some cases, plai n tifis who are repeat plavers can spread these cost<; over 
multiple lawsuits, in wh ich case the stakes in anv single case n eed not be as high.  
3�J l .  This correlati o n  is  l ikely, for example, when l oss s i z e  is :elated to the  plaintiffs 
wea l t h ,  <t:; is tvpi c a l ly the c a s e  in  securities l i ti ga t i o n .  
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to perform the responsibilities of the lead plaintiff.392 By comparing the 
stakes of would-be lead plaintiffs , the court can use a simple benchmark 
to select a class member who is both interested and capable of function­
ing as lead plaintiff. Finally, the interests of insti tutions and large i nves­
tors in securities fraud litigation are not qualitatively different from the 
interests of other class members. Because all class members have a com­
mon interest in maximizing the total recovery, and because recovery is 
allocated on a per share basis among all shareholders, large investors are 
capable of representing the interests of the entire class . 
Because the empowered lead plai ntiff model is well designed for se­
curities l itigation, it is difficult to understand the propensity to use auc­
tions in this context.393 As the New York City Pension Funds argued to 
the Third Circuit, " there [ is] no need to ' simulate ' the market in the 
presence of actual market negotiations. "394 The same criteria can be 
used to identify other suitable candidates for the lead plaintiff model. 
For example, antitrust class actions and some intellectual p roperty cases 
include class members with large stakes, a commonality of interests 
among large and small class members, and a correlation between the size 
of a plaintiffs interest and the predicted ability of that plaintiff to per­
form the role of lead plaintiff. In the Auction Houses l i ti gation,  the losses 
of all class members due to the alleged price-fixing were similar regard­
less of the amount of the claimed loss. 395 In addition, the class included 
wealthy and sophisticated members who had suffered substantial 
losses .396 
The empowered lead plaintiff model can be extended to some state 
court l i tigation.  Shareholder derivative suits are a particularly good ex­
ample of l itigation that would be amenable to the empowered lead plain­
tiff modeJ .397 In many relevant ways, shareholder derivative l i tigation, 
3 9 2 .  I t  should be noted that  the viabi l i ty of the empowered lead pla imiff model does 
not depend on the presence of i nsti tuti onal investors as class members. Plain tiff classes in 
securities l i tigation typical ly include individual investors with substantial i n terests in the 
l i tigation who can select  and monitor  class counsel. See, e .g . ,  In re E. Spire 
Communications, Inc . ,  Sec. Litig . ,  Civ. No. H-00- 1 1 40, 2000 U.S.  Dist .  LEXIS 1 95 1 7, at 
''' 1 4-'> 1 5  (D .  Mel . Aug. ] 5 ,  2000) (appointing an i ndividual investor who had suffered losses 
of $40 1 , 700 as lead plai ntiff) . 
393. All but two of the cases i nvolving lead counsel auctions h ave been securities 
fraud class actions. 
394. Cenclant NYC Brief, supra note ::\72,  at 32 (emphasis in origi nal ) .  
395. See, e .g . ,  I n  re Auction Houses Anti trust Litig. , 1 93 F.R.D.  1 62 ,  1 67-68 (S .D.N.Y. 
2000) (describing nature of al leged losses i n  the context of granting  class certification ) .  
396. See , e .g. , I n  re Auction Houses Li t ig . ,  2000 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1! 7 3 , 1 23 (S .D .N .Y 
2000) ( rejecting motion to i nt<.:rYene filed bv class member with a lleged losses of over $6 
m il l ion ) .  
397. l n  fact, Chan cel lor  Chandler  recen tly lnokccl to the federal lead plaint iff model 
in his appointmem of a le�tcl pbin ti ff in TC'N Te ch .  Ltd. Part. v. l n tennecl i a  
CDrmm_mi cations I n c . ,  N os.  J f) :) �)fl. l i-\:ZS9,  1 8\?CJ'l, 2000 D e l .  Ch.  LEX1S 1 47,  at ''' 1 0-''' 1 1 
(De! C h .  O c r .  1 7 , 2000) . 
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based on state corporate law,398 i s  analogous to  securities fraud class li ti­
gation.399 Commentators have characterized derivative suits as represen­
tative litigation and raised similar concerns about the potential for excess 
lawyer control,  suits that do not further shareholder i nterests ,  collective 
action problems that limit shareholder attempts to monitor counsel and 
the inability of courts to address the potential abuse through review of 
proposed settlements:wo 
The empowered lead plaintiff model has the same potential to ad­
dress these problems in shareholder derivative suits .  The shareholder 
class is the real party in interest in derivative litigation. The shareholders 
are fundamentally a class of investors, and similar to the plaintiff class in a 
securities suit, the class includes institutions and other large investors ,  
who have both sufficient  stakes to benefit from active participation and 
the ability to select and monitor counsel effectively. The interests of large 
investors in derivative l itigation are likely to reflect the interests of the 
entire shareholder class , perhaps even to a greater degree than in securi­
ties fraud litigation because there is a greater degree of commonality 
among the interests of current shareholders .40 1 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that large investors; including 
institutions, would be willing to take on the role of empowered lead 
plaintiff in derivative litigation. Even in the absence of statutory or case 
la1v providing them with the powers of a statutory lead plainti ff, insti tu­
tions have attempted to participate actively in some derivative suits ,402 
al though their efforts ,  to date, have met with limited success.403 Indeed, 
3 9 8 .  T h e  same analysis applies t o  shareholder derivative sui ts brough t i n  federal court 
o n  the basis  of diversi ty of c i tizenship.  
399. lVIuch of the l eading scholarshi p  o n  represen tative l i tigation is  addressed to b o th 
class actirms and derivative suits .  See generally iviacey !:� Miller, Plain tiffs"  Attorney's Role,  
supra note 1 :2 ; Coffee,  U nders ta n cl ing,  supra note 1 9 .  
400. See, e.g . ,  Roslyn Fal k ,  ilvlay a Share h older v\'ho Objects to a Proposed Settle m e n t  
of a Derivative Action Appeal an Adverse Decision) A Report o n  Califo rn i a  Public 
Employees' Retiremen t  System v. Felzen, 25 Del . J.  Corp. L. 235, 240-4 1 ( 2000) (asserting 
that d erivati,;e suit settlemen ts often provide merely "cosmetic" measures and have l i ttle 
deterrent effect whi l e  gen e raf.ing substa ntial counsel fees) ;  Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Sui t: Litigation without Foundation),  7 J.L. Econ . & Org. 55, 84 ( 1 99 1 )  
( a rguing that derivative suits arc lawyer driven and do not i n crease shareholder valu e ) . 
40 1 .  The i n terests of i nsti tu ti on al i nvestors may also parallel more general social 
i:Herests reg�m:ling the desirabi l i ty of l i tigation. See Falk, supra note 400, at 242. 
402.  Twelve institutions, i ncluding CalPERS and t.he NY S ta te Cornmon Retire m e n t  
Fund, recently j oined together t o  pursue a clerivati,·e sui t  on behalf o f  Columbia/ H CA 
H eal th c;c.,·e Corporati o n .  See \;l cCaii v. Scott, 239 F. 3cl 808,  8 1 6- 1 7  ( 6t h  Cir.  200 1 )  
( fi ndin g su±Ticient <ilkgatio n s  o f  demand fut i l itY to re,·e rse dismissal) . 
403. See, e . g . ,  J.'",.a\111 v. Sullivan , 594 A.2d 48, 48-49 ( Del .  1 99 1 )  ( describing 
participation by CalPF.RS in opposition to proposed setdernent) ; Falk, supra note 400, a t  
2�6 ((Iescribi�[g ()�j ecLio.n by {��l lPER.S �1nd FSB.-\. t o  proposed settlernent in Felzen v . 
. ".ndrea:,, N..::. . 9S-22'T9,  1 99'7 C: .S. Dist. LEXIS 2:'\646 (C.D.  I l l .  july 7, 1 997) , and subsequen t  
�t t t .::nl p t  to appeZ!-\ frorn d istrict cott rfs appro\·al o f  th e se r.tl�IYtent) ; Grundfest i:!:= Perino, 
s·t·:.pra n c c e  ��80.  c. t  582-SJg ( cle�cribing successful p�lrticipation hy in �:. t itutiona'! i n \'e�.; r.ors in 
F ..e n "Li.-� l l11 c h i p  cl�ri\'tlti\T �·!n d  e Lls:•. act ion suits) : K.ei th l . . J o h n  .. � o n ,  L)e te rrcnce of (:orporate 
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to a significant extent, courts have resisted institutional involvem e nt.404 
Formal recognition by courts of the empmvered lead plaintiff position 
would create a m odel that s tructured the role of the institutional i nvestor. 
This would enable insti tu tions to parti cipate actively fro m  the o utset  of 
the l itigation ,405 minimize disrupti o n  of o n going procedures,40G and as­
sure institu ti o ns that their expenditures of time and effort will n o t  be 
wasted. 
The empowered lead plaintiff model is not suitable for all class ac­
tion s .  In particular, it is unlikely to work well in cases that fal l  toward 
e ither end of the spectrum of class actions-small claimant cases , on the 
one hand, and mass tort cases on the other. In small claimant class ac­
tions, such as consumer fraud cases or nonpersonal injury products liabil­
ity cases, no class member is likely to have a sufficient stake i n  the case to 
make active participation viable. Thus collec tive action p roblems will 
dominate , and l ead plaintiff oversight is unlikely to overcome excessive 
lawyer con trol .407 
The l ead counsel auction is l ikely, however, to exacerbate the risk of 
opportunistic  behavior by counsel.  As this Article has demonstrated, lead 
counsel auctions are unlikely to produce \Nell structured l egal services 
contracts that align the interests of counsel and the plaintiff class.  Be­
cause the lead counsel auction sacrifices extensive ex post review by the 
Fraud Th rough Securities Li tigation: The Role of I ns ti tutional I nvestors, Law &..: Con temp. 
Probs . ,  Autum n  1 997,  at  155, 1 62 n .37 ( descri bi n g  L'vfcCall v. Scot/, a derivative sui t  brought 
by i ns titutional i nvestors against  Columbia/HCA H eal th care Corporation ) .  
404. See,  e . g . ,  Felzen v. An dreas , 1 34 F. :1cl 87:1, 8 7  c}-7\i ( 7th Cir. 1 99tl) ( de nying effort 
by CalPERS to appeal from district court decis ion becmse CalPERS had L1 i lecl to i n terYene 
i n  the origi nal  acti on ) , aff d  sub nom. Cal .  Pub.  Employees'  Ret. Sys. v. Felzen , 525 U .S. 
:1 1 5  ( 1 999) ( per curiam) (4-4 decision ) .  
405. U n der curre n t  law, i nst i tu tions lack a satisfactory m echan ism for participating i n  
cleriva r.iYe l i tiga ti o n .  A. number o f  problems m ay b e  created, for example,  i f  a n  institutional 
i nvestor seeks to i n tervene as a party. See generally Brief for B a rcbys Global Investors. 
N.A., State of 'Wisconsin I nvestmen t Board, an d Certai n  Other ln:;t itutional Investors as 
Ami c i  Curiae Supporti ng Petit ion ers, Cal. Pub. Employees·  Ret. Sys. v. Felzen, 52!) U.S.  3 1 5  
( 1 999) (No.  97- 1 732) (describ ing these proble ms ) . 
<±06. I n  the absence of a formal mechanism for structuring institutional ir1\'ohcment, 
i nsti tutional efforts to part i c ipate mav be viewed as i n terferi n g  wi th ongoing litig<nion 
decisions by oth e r  parties. For example ,  the parties obj ected to CaiPERS' efforts in F'rd:en 
as obstru c tionist .  See Falk, supra note 400, at 23G.  
407.  Collec t ive act ion p roblems c u rr c n tlv c r:��tle frequen t opportunities fur 
opportunism by plaintiffs' counsel i n  small  claiman t eLls:- c tctions. Among o ther things, 
these cases furnish many of the most egregious exampl e�; of sett lements in which the 
pbintifT class receives l ittle if  anv value,  but counsel recei-..·es <t substan tial fee award. A 
recen t exampl e is the proposed settlement of Rinafdi ''· lo.•nega CmjJ. , a lawsui t al legi n g  the 
sale of clefectin: zip el ise drives to some ::.!8 mil l ion cons>J l l l crs. 1 999 Del. Super. LE.:·<.IS 563 
( Del .  Super. Ct. 1 999) . The settlement  provides class mem bers with rebates ranging from 
))5 to £40 appl icable to future pu rchases of lum ega products .  See Ca1-y i-J:incls, Iomeg<t 
Settles Class-Action Lawsui t ,  Standard-Examiner.  Apr. l -t ,  200 l ,  at Cl ( describing 
se ttlement term ' ) .  The propo sed fee '\Wct rcl w pbin tiHS' cou!':;cl i s  up w �? -! . 7  mi lhm.  
i\fotice of  Pe ndency of  C:Iass J'-\ction a n d  f-f c�1r ing o n  Prr )po\cd St: tdernen t.  :_H_ �� , 1<.ir:�:ldi ·;. 
Jumeg:1 Corp . . (D<-: 1 .  Super. !\Jar. :2 3 ,  '?U0 1 ) ( :--.io .  'JW :-uc)-1 Ji14 -PJ� C) . 
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court in  favor of an ex ante fee determination, it  also reduces counsel ' s  
accountabili ty to  the court in precisely the cases in which judicial over­
sight is important and client oversight is unlikely. In  particular, small 
claimant class actions are the most likelv to suffer from the auction 
I 
model ' s  excessive reliance on price.  Accordingly, if auctions are used in 
these cases, they are likely to produce lowball bids that subsequently lead 
to quick, cheap settlements .  If anything, auctions may induce j udicial 
complacency over the litigation outcome and the fee award, thereby re­
ducing the court's review of both the proposed settlement and the legal 
fees.  
Furthermore, the use of auctions eliminates the court ' s  abil ity to tai­
lor l itigation incentives through its fee awards .  Small claimant class ac­
tions provide the most common examples of lawsuits that m ay not be 
socially desirable.408 At the same time ,  small claimant class actions are 
often the only possible mechanism for deterring certain types of wide­
spread misconduct that cause a limited degree of harm. Because en­
trepreneurial li tigation is highly influenced by the potential financial re­
wards, and because counsel ' s  financial interest in these cases will 
dominate the interests of the class, i t  is particularly important for legal 
fees in these cases to reflect, to the maximum extent possible ,  the private 
and social value  of the litigation .409 Under the traditional ex p ost  ap­
proach, courts can, in setting legal fees,  consider such factors as the social 
value of the suit, the extent to which the litigation reflected original inves­
tigation or pathbreaking legal theories, and the deterrence value  of the 
litigation. 
The lead plaintiff model is problematic in mass tort cases for differ­
ent reasons . 4 1 0  Although mass tort cases generally include class members 
with substantial s takes, the interests of class members may diverge sub­
stantially. In  particular, the interests of those class members with the larg­
est stakes, often the most seriously injured, are likely to conf1ict with 
other class members ,  such as those with more modest inj uries or expo­
sure only plaintiffs . As a result, although the severely i�ured plaintiffs 
may have sufficient motivation to participate actively, they may not be 
408.  See,  e .g . ,  Fisc h ,  Reform, supra n ote 285, at  552-53 ( describin g  proposal to 
amend Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to reduce the incidence of l i tigation that wil l  produce only trivial 
benefits to class members) . 
409. For c i tations to the l iterature examining the extent to which social  and p rivate 
l i tigation costs and benefits are aligned, see Fisch ,  Qui Tam, supra note 1 0, at  1 7 1 n . 2 2 ;  see 
also D u nbar et a l . ,  supra n o te 1 52 ,  at  8 (c hal lenging stan dard efficiency cri tique of fee 
awards for fai lure to address " that  what is opti mal for the plain tiff may n o t  be op timal for 
society" ) . 
4 1 0. But see Resnik ,  supra note 46, at 2 1 29 (arguing that, because judges " a re  the 
marke t'" in  mass tort cases, they should structure the m arket for legal services by shaping 
the supply and demand for l i tigation t h rough their  al location of legal fe es in accorcla n c c  
wi th social goals ) .  
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capable of representing the plaintiff class fairly.41 1 Additional ly, because 
the process that generates differing class stakes is l ikely to be fortuitous or 
random, there is l i ttle reason to believe that those with larger i nterests in 
the case are l ikely to be particularly well qualified to serve as  lead 
plaintiff. 
The conflicting interests in mass tort litigation pose a similar obstacle 
for the use of lead counsel auctions, however. The appointment of lead 
counsel in mass tort l i tigation through any mechanism, thereby delegat­
i ng class control to a l imited subset of plaintiffs lawyers, many of whom 
have preexisting relationships with individual class members, raises 
problems. These problems include the limited ability of lead counsel to 
represent class members with disparate interests, the potential for the ap­
pointment of lead counsel to interfere with existing lawyer-client relation­
ships,4 1 \Z  the risk that the use of lead counsel will undermine prior l itiga­
tion efforts by individual plaintiffs lawyers , and the appropriate division 
of fee awards between lead counsel and other participating lawyers. By 
focusing the court on the method of appointment, the lead counsel auc­
tion masks these issues. 
In sum, although the empowered lead plaintiff will not  work in every 
class action, current  experience suggests that i t  can readily be extended 
beyond securities l itigation to other substantive areas and that, where ap­
propriate, it is l ikely to be more effective than the lead counsel auction at 
providing a market-based solution to counsel selection and compensation 
problems. In other cases ,  deficiencies in the lead counsel auction are 
l ikely to create greater problems than the traditional regulatory ap­
proach . In particular, a lead counsel auction cannot substitute for active 
j udicial review of intraclass conflicts ,  adequacy of representation,  and the 
fairness of any proposed settlemen t. 
CoNCLUSION 
This article has evaluated the use of lead counsel auctions in the 
selection of class action counsel .  As an increasing number of courts ex­
periment with the auction model, i t  becomes critically important to evalu­
ate whether lead counsels can effectively address selection of counsel 
problems such as the absence of a market mechanism and the resulting 
information problems, absence of competi tion, and problematic fee 
awards. The article demonstrates that the auction approach is i l l-con­
ceived and that, for a variety of reasons, judicially conducted lead counsel 
auctions are unlikely to improve the existing regulatory approach . In 
particular, the article describes structural problems in the design of lead 
4 1 1 .  See, e .g . ,  Arnchem Products,  Inc .  v. Windsor, 5 2 1  U.S .  59 1 ,  622-26 ( 1 997)  
(rej ening adequacy of represen tation where extent  of i nj uries :.;uffered by c lass m embers 
diverged substantially) . 
-! 1 '2 . See ,  e . g. ,  In re Dalkon S h ield, 693 f.'2cl 847,  85 1 (9th Ci r·. 1 98'2)  (" [T) he righ t of 
l i tig�mts to choose their own counsel is a righ t not  l ightly w he brushed aside. '' ) . 
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counsel auctions, explains that the price dominance of the auction ap­
proach may compromise selection of quality counsel, and reveals impor­
tant limitations on the ability of an auction to produce reasonable legal 
fees. 
The Article proposes an alternative market-based approach to coun­
sel selection-the empowered lead plaintiff. It explains the impact of the 
lead plaintiff provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and 
describes recent developments in the involvement of institutional inves­
tors as lead plaintiffs . The Article argues that these developments are 
having the effect of increasing the role of market forces in the selection 
and compensation of class counsel and proposes an extension of this ap­
proach, carefully implemented, as the most promising solution to selec­
tion of counsel issues in class litigation. Accordingly, i t  sets forth criteria 
to determine circumstances under which the empowered lead plaintiff 
model will be effective and argues that the model should be extended in 
particular to antitrust and derivative litigation .  
